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Abstract 
This thesis examines what it means to take social cohesion seriously in 
relation to school educational policy. Much of the literature on such policy in 
English speaking countries has an explicit directive to promote 'civic bonds' in 
schools. This thesis is a philosophical account of how we characterize these 
civic bonds and a consideration of the educational implications for how we best 
encourage and develop them. 
The discussion identifies the necessary facets of civic relationships within 
a modern democratic society. It criticises theories of social cohesion as lacking 
an analysis of the model of belonging used. To address this deficiency, three 
metaphors for the civic relationship are considered: friendship, family and market. 
A version of the family metaphor, democratic fraternity, it is argued, best provides 
the desired ideal civic bond. 
The research offers insight into the educational implications of civic 
relationships, social cohesion and school choice. It enquires into how metaphors, 
models and social imaginaries give a framework for considering our 
interrelatedness. It suggests we should extend our understanding of the interplay 
between, on the one hand, the models and metaphors we adopt for civic 
relationships, and, on the other, the institutions we choose to teach and nurture 
the relevant attitudes, virtues and values. 
As the models we adopt can have deep effects on the organisations we 
create, the thesis then explores, through consideration of current practices, 
implications for school educational policy in relation to the promotion of civic 
relationships. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In 2008, a French court denied citizenship to a Muslim woman from 
Morocco on the basis that her practice of 'radical Islam' was incompatible 
with French values. Her initial application for citizenship in 2005 was 
turned down on the basis she was 'insufficiently assimilated' into French 
society. The woman, married to a French national and with three French-
born children, wore a burqa, lived as a virtual recluse, disconnected from 
French society and was considered to act in a submissive way to her 
male relatives. This was judged to be incompatible with the principle of 
equality of the sexes and the concept of laIcite (religious neutrality). The 
court said that the woman could reapply for citizenship when she had 
assimilated the values of French society. 1  
The challenge of ethnic and social diversity, and the implications that this 
has in turn for social cohesion, is one of the most pressing political concerns 
facing Western liberal democratic societies. Our global society has seen many 
changes in recent years with the spread of democracy to areas of the planet 
where previously it had not taken root: the Soviet Union has split into parts; the 
Berlin wall has been torn down; apartheid rule has ended in South Africa; 
Fukuyama even predicted the end of history with the prevalent spread of liberal 
free-market democracies. 
Global factors have caused millions of people to migrate to the West, many 
of whom may belong to traditions other than those previously associated with 
Western Europe and the USA (Feinberg, 2006, p234). Most countries, with the 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7503757.stm [last accessed 19.11.09] 
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opening of previously closed borders and with wider social mobility, have seen a 
rapidly changing and diverse populace created, which in turn has created 
tensions and difficulties both with the existing population and between competing 
groups. This move towards a more globalized economy plus the transitory nature 
of some immigration patterns highlights the need for public policy makers to 
consider how such societies can hold together and function as one with the 
coexistence of potentially conflicting ideas and commitments. 
Social cohesion, in many ways, is a new term applied to the desire for a 
stable society. Arguably, liberal political theory has always dealt with this issue 
(Reich, 2002). Indeed, the existence of different ways of life and how to ensure 
groupings coexist peacefully has occupied theorists from Locke to Rawls. Yet the 
question of balancing the 'associational bonds' that enable citizens to live together 
whilst, at the same time, respecting the flourishing of the bonds that tie 
communities of tradition and culture together still remains of critical importance. 
What is new in this debate, however, is that much of the recent literature 
highlights the role of education in achieving or undermining the cohesive society 
(Cheshire, 2007; Rogers and Muir, 2007; Stevens, 2001). Furthermore, empirical 
research seems to confirm that certain features of school choice systems have 
the unintended consequence of increasing social segregation and fraying social 
cohesion (Ball, 2003; Cheshire, 2007). Much of this literature demonstrates that 
school choice policies result in an increase in social sorting into differing 
subpopulations (Galston, 2004, p322), with parents seeking out schools with high 
standards of achievement and lower concentrations of pupils they see as different 
or undesirable (Ball, 2003; Cheshire, 2007; Green, Preston and Germen Janmaat, 
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2006).2 However, there is a notable ambiguity in the use of the term 'cohesion', in 
which all too frequently it is thinly conceived and seen as unproblematic. Rarely 
does the literature contain a coherent conceptualisation of what a socially 
cohesive society should look like. 
It is therefore surprising, given the current unease as to whether or not 
unrestricted school choice policies affect our parallel desires for social cohesion 
and social well-being, that empirical research has only recently sought to explore 
exactly how particular education policies affect social cohesion (Green, Preston 
and Germen Janmaat, 2006). Evidence of the consequences of school choice 
from a number of different countries demonstrates that this is not particular to just 
the UK situation, but a widespread phenomenon. Whilst the perceived interplay 
between civic relationships, social cohesion and school choice is an exceedingly 
complex one and, as such, is frequently the subject of much disagreement, there 
seems to be little doubt amongst academics that the consequences of school 
choice policies are implicated in the development of civic bonds. 
If my analysis were to remain merely at the level of the effects of school 
choice upon social cohesion, it would offer little different to the already numerous 
school choice critiques. Behind the issues of equity and social justice frequently 
associated with this discourse, lies a more complex and relatively unwritten 
element of the debate about the model of belonging that underpins our beliefs 
and commitments to the socially cohesive society. Much existing theorizing in this 
2 Prior to 2005, there was little evidence about how schools were segregated on lines of race or 
religion in the UK. A study by Burgess, Wilson and Lupton in ' Urban Studies' indicated high levels 
of segregation for different groups, albeit with high levels of variation in England (Burgess, Wilson 
and Lupton, 2005). Their study indicated higher levels of segregation within schools than by 
neighbourhood alone and that this increased with population density. Previously, most research 
concentrated on economic segregation and on whether the market based choice system 
increased or decreased such segregation. 
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area lacks an explicit analysis of the relationships needed between citizens to 
support a democratic life. Subsequently, there can be a lack of consideration of 
the models of bond that best encapsulate the relationship that allows us to speak 
of the collective as a 'we' within the civic realm. 
The lack of clarity found in the many uses of the term 'social cohesion' 
through policy, educational documents and curriculum frameworks demonstrates 
a need for significant theoretical attention. Within this area, a certain 'slippage' in 
the language often moves from instances of 'community cohesion' to that of 
`societal cohesion', assuming that one may lead to the other without explicitly 
drawing out how this may be done (Green, Preston and Germen Janmaat, 2006). 
Consider the following quotation from the guidance given by the Department for 
Children, Schools and Families on the duty of schools to promote community 
cohesion: 
By community cohesion, we mean working towards a society in which 
there is a common vision and sense of belonging by all communities; a 
society in which the diversity of people's backgrounds and circumstances 
is appreciated and valued; a society in which similar life opportunities are 
available to all; and a society in which strong and positive relationships 
exist and continue to be developed in the workplace, in schools and in 
the wider community (DCSF, 2007, p3)3 
This conceptual mingling of the concepts of community and social cohesion can 
then result in confused policy recommendations. 
This thesis is a philosophical contribution towards a rich account of how we 
characterize these civic bonds and, leading from this, a consideration of the 
educational implications for how we best encourage and develop the models used 
to examine these bonds. In an attempt to bridge educational theory and practice, 
my research examines what it would mean to promote civic relationships in 
3 Quoting Alan Johnson, Secretary of State for Education and Skills, speaking in 
Parliament on 2 November 2006. 
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relation to school educational policy. I start from a stance that the term 'civic 
relationship' has become troubling in policy decision making in two ways: firstly, it 
has the potential to be an empty, meaningless term used merely rhetorically. 
Similarly and perhaps more importantly, when people start to clarify what they 
mean by the civic relationship that of which they speak tends to dissipate and 
prove problematic in analysis (as will be illustrated in chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
With this in mind, this thesis seeks to answer three fundamental questions. 
Firstly, what would it mean to take social cohesion seriously? Can we ascertain 
what the bond, the civic relationship, between citizens in a society deemed 
socially cohesive would look like? If we care about social cohesion, do we not also 
need to care about what is required to sustain and perpetuate it over generations? 
Do different models through which we envision these human relationships carry 
different implications for how we educate for and structure the bonds that support 
a civic relationship? 
Leaving to one side the confusion within the concept of community itself 
(Gereluk, 2006a), I wish to develop the point that for societal cohesion within a 
framework of democracy, citizens need to have concern for the public way of 
relating to each other and that this in turn requires a particular model of civic 
relationships. Much evidence from anthropology suggests that most cultures and 
societies use two particular relationships, those of friendship and family, to model 
civic relationships. To these two, I have added a modern alternative, that of 
market, which has gradually moved from economic parlance into aspects of public 
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life. These three concepts offer differing metaphors for connectedness in the civic 
sphere.4 
Any society seeking congruity between its guiding principles of democracy 
and liberalism, and equally desiring social cohesion at societal level, should aim 
to shape educational policy in appropriate ways, hence my second question 
becomes: what sort of school structures would meet this model? How should we 
organize education when we aim at encouraging and nurturing these 
relationships? Are there particular structures that can increase social cohesion or 
be more 'friendly' to the factors that nourish it? Likewise, do any particular 
arrangements or structures impede this aim? 
Thirdly, what pedagogy would we need to achieve the goal of social 
cohesion? Are there implications for the way we teach or what we teach in our 
public schools? How should the next generation of citizens be formed and with 
what type of values? Is the best way to tolerate and cope with differences in 
others by casual acquaintance and contact with others? 
To answer these questions, five perspectives run throughout this thesis, 
drawing on arguments across many different traditions in both philosophy and 
social research. The first perspective falls within the philosophical tradition: a 
consideration of some of the unclear notions within this area, necessitating an 
exploration of the notion of 'we'. Such debates about how we relate to others in 
the world are all too frequently underpinned by unclear notions of who we are, the 
commitments we are bound by, and the values we share. How do different 
4 I have deliberately restricted my choice of relationships within the parameters of this thesis, not 
only for reasons of range and depth of study, but for what these particular metaphors can offer by 
way of analysis. For this reason, I have chosen not to consider the concept of solidarity. As 
Brunkhorst indicates, solidarity is based upon the Roman legal concept of an obligation for the 
whole or a joint liability. Everyone takes responsibility for anyone who cannot pay his debt and 
vice versa. It binds unfamiliar persons within the demands of the law. (Brunkhorst, H. (2005), 
Solidarity (J. Flynn, Trans.). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.). 
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groupings in society, through relating to each other, enable society to act and 
function as one? What are social bonds and how do they affect the way we 
organise social life? 
The second significant perspective is an enquiry into how metaphors, 
models and social imaginaries give a framework for considering our 
interrelatedness. I draw on the contribution that can be offered by the study of 
metaphor as the method we use to conceptualise our world, to govern our ways of 
perceiving and acting, and thus shape educational practice. Do metaphors reveal 
unconscious beliefs that, in turn, influence our behaviours and actions? Can the 
way we conceive of the civic relationship directly affect the normative values and 
beliefs to be transmitted to future generations? If we value ourselves as being 
connected in particular ways, do we then create organisations and structures that 
reflect and nurture those ways of being connected? Equally, when we fail to value 
civic connectedness, do we create organisations and structures that disconnect or 
only pay lip-service to this feature of social life? 
The field of relationships between metaphors and policy, whether in 
education or elsewhere, is decidedly under-theorised at present. This thesis is a 
first step towards this goal, considering not only some of the prevalent metaphors 
for the civic relationship, but also studying how these particular metaphors shape 
practice with regard to school organisation. Although writers in the field 
constantly emphasise that the language and concepts that we choose can 
arguably define how we structure our thoughts about subjects (Batstone, 2001) 
this has not, as yet, been applied within the field of school systems nor 
considered systematically for possible contribution within the arena of civic 
discourse in general. 
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As a way of leading into both the second and third questions, the third 
perspective draws on parallel arguments in empirical studies into social 
relationships as a way of understanding social networks as an account of what it 
is to be civically connected (see Chapter 5). The importance and definitions of 
these social relationships and their relationships to policy decisions have been 
explored through empirical studies with growing interest particularly through the 
notion of social capital. Using the insights of theorists such as Granovetter and 
Putnam (Granovetter, 1983; Putnam, 2000; Putnam, 2001; Putnam, 2007), I 
explore the underlying theories behind much of current thinking in this area. 
The fourth perspective involves a close examination of the concept of 
fraternity and a revision of the concept as a root metaphor in an understanding of 
democracy. Whilst little has been heard specifically of fraternity per se in recent 
political literature, I shall argue that fraternity has to some extent become an 
unspoken value within the literature. It has been 'smuggled' back into modern 
social science discourse through newly emerging arguments of social capital 
(networks of trust, obligation and cooperation). Fraternity has a long history in 
political life as a relationship between those bound together in 'family' groupings, 
bound by similarities and common heritage. Nevertheless, I shall highlight a rather 
different aspect of the concept which I shall argue can help articulate how we can 
relate to others outside our immediate arena of concern by building on the work of 
Veronique Munoz-Darde, arguing that any relationship of citizens must be firmly 
grounded within the notion of democracy itself (Munoz-Darde, 1999). I shall not 
be considering a complete revision of the concept, taking it away from its existing 
meanings, but will be attempting to show how the history of the concept itself 
requires the move I will be suggesting here. 
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The fifth perspective considers how this revised conception of fraternity 
can contribute to the discussion of school choice arguments through considering 
how schools can best be organised to promote, nurture and support this element 
of the civic relationship. I shall claim that when we consider what kind of a society 
the concept of democratic fraternity would embody, and the types of educational 
structures needed for its survival over generations, we may be led to reconsider 
our current method of organisation of these structures. This alternative 
perspective provides a philosophical account that may have direct policy 
implications. With these perspectives in mind, the main structure of my argument 
is as follows: 
Chapter 2 introduces the first of the metaphors for our social 
connectedness, that of personal friendship and outlines some necessary features 
of the concept. An outline of, and justification for, the general Aristotelian 
approach which underlies much of this literature is offered, together with a 
consideration of more recent challenges to this area. Friendship is then related to 
the Aristotelian notion of 'the shared life' as a prequel to considering it as a 
candidate for the civic bond. 
Chapter 3 extrapolates these features of friendship into the wider civic 
relationship. From this, I indicate many difficulties in expanding the concept of 
friendship into the civic arena, even metaphorically. I situate this concept in its 
original historical context and subsequently explore its relevance in a modern 
liberal democracy. 
Chapter 4 explores one particular strand of the market metaphor and 
begins with an exploration of the nature of loyalty. Using both theories of brand 
loyalty and Albert Hirschman's distinction between exit and voice, I offer an 
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account of how human loyalties may be formed in general before contrasting both 
civic loyalty and market loyalty in the field of education. I explore the implications 
for civic loyalty when the metaphor of market loyalty is in ascendance in 
educational parlance. I argue that civic loyalty is an essential component for social 
cohesion and as such, can be undermined by features of marketisation. 
Chapter 5 considers the bond of the family metaphor through that of 
fraternity. I explore some of the conceptual and practical difficulties it has as a 
simple metaphor in encapsulating civic relationships. From this, I argue that it may 
be redeemed by grounding it in the concept of democracy itself as a metaphoric 
'sibling' relationship. I identify two contrasting spheres of fraternity and argue that 
democratic fraternity constitutes an alternative way to consider our civic 
engagement beyond the boundaries of family and friends. 
Chapter 6 develops the argument that all description of the civic 
relationship is necessarily metaphorical. I argue that the metaphors we choose 
carry over images and values from one area to another enabling the discussion of 
basic political principle. If this is holds, it is essential that the debate concerning 
social cohesive ties is based upon a coherent view of the civic relationship based 
upon the best models available. 
In Chapter 7 I consider the implications for a democratic society which 
wants an appropriate education system that will nourish social cohesion. I 
consider what sort of structures and pedagogy would best enable us to meet 
these ends. In addition to this, I consider how theory moves to policy. 
Finally, in the Conclusion, I draw together the different strands of my 
argument and consider both the originality and importance of this thesis. I argue 
that acknowledging the necessary rooting of the discourse within the domain of 
17 
metaphor may shed new light on the dilemmas and issues affecting policy makers 
within the field of school choice. 
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Chapter 2 
A Concept of Friendship 
In 2005, President George Bush nominated his old friend and personal 
lawyer, Harriet Miers, for Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court. 
The nomination met with stiff opposition from all sides of the political 
spectrum. As a former corporate lawyer, she had no experience as a 
judge and was felt to be unqualified for the role and chosen simply on 
account of her friendship with the president. It was felt the appointment of 
a close political ally to such a key post was inappropriate. 5 
Introduction 
The concept of friendship, after a lull, has had a great deal of attention 
within recent years from philosophers. Whilst the majority of the attention has 
centred around the Aristotelian conception of friendship and related areas 
(Pangle, 2003; Sherman, 1987), there have been moves to reinterpret the 
concept in the light of sociological and psychological interpretations and evidence 
(Gilbert, 1991; Pahl, 2000). Others have sought to use friendship as a heuristic 
device for discussing the political relationship between peoples (Cocking and 
Kennett, 2002; Hansot, 2000; Jenkins, 1999). Still others have concentrated on 
friendship as a model for morality (Blum, 1993; Cocking and Kennett, 2000; 
White, 1999a). 
There is much empirical evidence that those with many friends and/or deep 
friendship bonds lead happier, healthier lives, thus linking the concept closely to 
conceptual frameworks of our personal well-being (Pahl, 2000; Pahl and Spencer, 
5 See report online for details: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4382370.stm [last 
accessed 19.11.2009] 
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1997). This link with our personal well-being appears to be reinforced by empirical 
evidence, according to research by Gallop entitled Vital Friends: The People You 
Can't Afford to Live Without, an illustration of the importance of personal 
friendship in social mechanisms in such areas as health, poverty and social 
relationships. Friendship can thus be claimed to have a constitutive role in our 
happiness and personal identity (Badhwar Kapur, 1991). 
When discussing how humans relate to each other in society to elucidate 
the model of belonging, it is customary to go back to the simplest forms of 
relationship, that of family and friends. It is presumed that by studying these 
intimate relationships, one can learn and extrapolate from these to consider wider, 
looser forms of human interconnectedness (Macmurray, 1961). As such, could 
the study of friendship throw light upon the bond needed to support the socially 
cohesive society? 
Studies of friendship tend to start with the work of Aristotle wherein one 
finds one of the richest treatments of the concept. All standard treatments of 
Aristotle, according to Cooper, point out that the Greek word 'philia' has a far 
wider range of meaning than our word 'friendship', covering intimate relationships, 
family relationships and what is commonly termed 'civic friendship' (Cooper, 
1977a; Cooper, 1977b; Cooper, 1999; Maclntyre, 1985). It is important to 
remember that this term is not reserved for voluntary relationships in Greek 
thought. This, in itself, makes it difficult to be sure exactly what it is that is being 
compared (King and Devere, 2000). 
Whilst friendship has come to be seen as a private affair, a matter of 
personal choice, this has not always been the case. Friendship has been seen to 
6 Vernon, Mark "Amity is the Best Policy". The Guardian. July 10th, 2006. [last accessed 
19.11.2009] 
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be part of the common morality that applies to everyone, regardless of other 
personal values. The Aristotelian model of friendship draws a direct connection 
between the personal and the civic. Not only does Aristotle hold that intimate 
relationships are a necessary part of the flourishing life, but that 'civic friendship' is 
an essential human good. Not only does one need to have personal friendships 
that have common, shared activities at the heart of the relationship, but fellow 
citizens should be predisposed to wish and do each other well (Aristotle, 1156a5). 
Tying together the two forms of friendship has a long line in political 
philosophy, from Aristotle to Maclntyre (Aristotle,; Maclntyre, 1985; Schall, 1996; 
Schollmeier, 1994; Schwarzenbach, 1996; Schwarzenbach, 2005). It can be a 
useful analogy to make in that it allows us to consider what draws people 
together, to look at issues of sameness or difference, to examine whether bonds 
of friendship between people can rest on matters other than shared values, goals 
and similar personalities. It is in this respect that friendship, as a metaphor, may 
approximate the desire for social cohesion. 
In this chapter, I seek to ground the concept of personal friendship through 
illustrating particular features and understandings prior to examining the concept 
as a metaphor for the civic relationship in the next chapter. Section 1 thus begins 
with an examination of the nature of friendship, looking at the features identified 
within the concept. Section 2 then considers the contribution to this area of 
Aristotle on the importance of friendship in the flourishing life of the individual and 
the forms of friendship. Section 3 explores the view that friendship is concerned 
with the concept of self as a moral being. Section 4 continues by further 
considering a conception of virtue friendship, concentrating on the features of 
Partiality, Trust, Equality, a Shared History and Reciprocity/Mutual Aid. In Section 
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5, I draw together the features of friendship and suggest why this topic may be 
receiving current attention as a possible model for relationships within the civic 
sphere. 
Section 1: The Nature of Friendship 
Friendship is a curious relationship, important to us all, yet strangely 
neglected in our public life. We do not have ceremonies to mark the start of 
friendships nor their demise (as we do with relationships such as marriage). 
Although we do not have public celebrations of our friendships, we value them 
above many things. We see something valuable in another person that makes us 
want to be with them, to commit to them, and they to us in some unspecified 
fashion. Friendship introduces a moral element into our behaviour with non-kin. 
Indeed, Pahl refers to friendship as "a metaphor for morality" (Pahl, 2000, p86). 
One cannot be a friend in isolation: as a concept it requires the existence 
of another person: "Friendship requires two consenting parties" (Goering, 2003, 
p402). Although it can be noted that friendships do exist between more than two, 
it should also be born in mind that they are not the same friendship. For example, 
Tom may be friends with Louis who may be friends with Robert, who may in turn 
be friends with Tony, but the friendship between each pair is unique to that pair. 
Friendship excludes a one-sided relationship. It has to be mutual, to be reciprocal. 
It differs from relationships with, say, colleagues and other interpersonal 
relationships, being a deeper, more intimate relationship (Helm, 2005). 
Friendship is both an emotional attachment to another and a statement 
about the status of that relationship. Central to this, is that the emotional 
attachment has to be one of affection. For some philosophers, it is a form of love 
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(Thomas, 1987; Thomas, 1993). It would be curious to call someone a friend and 
not care for them or have any feelings towards them in some way. It would be 
equally curious to call someone a friend and it to make absolutely no difference in 
the way one treated or regarded the person (this partiality is one of the reasons 
the area has attracted such attention in recent years as will be explored later). 
Friendship is by nature preferential: we prefer some to others. Because of 
this, it must exclude some from the relationship. When we say 'this is my friend' 
we are saying something to set this particular relationship apart from others: it is a 
relationship of positional importance. When we call someone 'a friend', we are 
saying something about the status of the relationship. We are giving it a value and 
indicating in some way that we see the other as having value to us. That we see 
our friends as having value to us does not mean that they are in themselves more 
valuable than other people; other people may have different friends. 
Friendships are not the kind of things that can be forced on someone by a 
third party. They are essentially voluntary relationships, entered into by the 
persons concerned without written agreements or agendas. Demands by parents 
of young children that their child become friends with a particular child rarely have 
the desired outcome. For a relationship to be termed a friendship, it has to be 
voluntary: 
A relationship that is forced or assigned is not a friendship. Familial 
connections do not constitute friendship for this reason. We are born into 
families, and then we may choose to act in ways that acknowledge or 
ignore the unchosen relationships. Family members may become our 
friends, but they are not friends simply in virtue of their familial relation. 
(Goering, 2003, p402) 
This emphasis on the voluntary nature of friendship becomes a crucial factor in 
metaphorizing outwards to the civic community (see Chapter 4). 
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We may choose our friends for many reasons: on the basis of shared 
interests, similarities, mutual pleasures. Most of us have little idea how we made 
our friends. But the chances are, we did not wake up one morning and decide to 
suddenly make one. Maybe they are people we met at work, or at school, or 
through mutual friends. Most literature on the psychology of friendship suggests 
several different reasons for choice: proximity (they are people we come into 
contact with), a form of reciprocal liking (both parties like each other), similarity 
(parties have something in common), physical attractiveness (we like the initial 
look of them) or strategic friendships (they can do or have something we want) 
(Furnham, 1989; Goering, 2003; Helm, 2005; Schutte and Light, 1978). 
From this we can elucidate that friendship is a mutually, reciprocal 
relationship of concern. It is a voluntary, emotional attachment to another person. 
It seems important, at this point, to return to, and examine in depth, the model of 
friendship identified by Aristotle, which forms the grounding for many of these 
conceptualisations. 
Section 2: Aristotle and Friendship 
The ancient philosophers took it for granted that friendship was a virtuous, 
moral activity. It was revered as one of the highest of virtues and was seen as a 
way of building character. Aristotle, for example, gives more space to an account 
of friendship than to any other personal virtue. Aristotle suggests that being with 
others is not only desirable but also a fundamental condition of what it is to lead a 
flourishing life (Aristotle, 1155a5-20). Friendship ties in closely with all accounts of 
our personal well-being and what it is to live a good life. This suggests that being 
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with others is in some sense a fundamental condition of what it is to be fully 
human and is intimately connected to our sense of who we are. 
It is generally accepted that the person without friends is less well off than 
the person with friends. Without friends, says Aristotle, no one would choose to 
live even if he had all other goods (Aristotle, 1155a5). Within the Aristotelian 
model, friendship is defined as recognised, reciprocal goodwill (Aristotle, 
1155a30-35). But 'friendship' itself may not be a simple concept: it may not 
indicate or point to one particular thing that can be identified. Richard White refers 
to it as "an inherently complex and multiple phenomenon" (White, 1999b, p21). 
Central to this Aristotelian model is the division of the concept into three 
categories of friendship, which Aristotle terms utility friendships, pleasure 
friendships and virtue friendship.' The first two categories are friendships based 
on the self (pleasure or utility); the third category is based on the other person as 
an end in themselves. Taking each of these sub-divisions in turn, I now want to 
highlight and focus in on a deeper understanding of this model which has proven 
central to much of subsequent thinking on the concept. 
Friendships of Utility. 
If one were to summarize utility friendships, three points would arise. 
Firstly, in utility friendships, each only loves the other incidentally, for the good 
they can get from each other. Secondly, because these friendships are based on 
personal interest, they are the most easily dissolved of all friendships. Take for 
example two colleagues, Ricky and Nikki, who work together at the same school. 
Suppose it fits their purpose to share a car to get to work. This car sharing forms 
This is sometimes referred to as perfect or character friendship. However, for the purpose of this 
chapter, I shall use the term 'virtue' to cover this third category. 
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the reason they have come together. They get on agreeably and try to fit in with 
each other's timetables to enable their travel plans to coincide. Suppose one of 
them moves job to another school where it is no longer possible for the pair to 
share their travel arrangements. Now that the purpose that defined their 
`friendship' no longer exists, the chances are that the two will no longer be the 
same sort of friends and will gradually drift apart. The friendship existed only for 
the purpose of utility — it was useful to both parties. 
This, in turn, gives rise to the third point: because what is considered utility 
can change over time and because one cannot count on someone remaining 
`useful', such friendships are prone to disappointment and dissolving. Such 
friendships are quickly activated ... and just as quickly fall apart. Such friendships 
of utility are frequently found amongst those who are opposites. For example the 
colleague with a car, and the one who needs a lift; the friend who can cook and 
the one who likes to eat; the friend who is learned and the one who is ignorant. 
But is this view of friendships of utility sufficient or even satisfactory? 
Maybe the two colleagues sharing a car earlier will keep in touch. Maybe the 
utility served as a means to a deeper form of friendship. Or maybe it's OK to have 
useful friends. If friends weren't useful in times of need, questions Badhwar, in 
what sense are they still friends (Badhwar Kapur, 1987)? Just because the utility 
ceases, it does not always mean the end of the friendship. The friendship may not 
take the same form any more, as in the two colleagues now separated by jobs. 
Perhaps they will find a different reason to keep in touch. 
For it to be a friendship of any description surely there had to be some form 
of feeling between them however loosely defined or mild, a form of affection that 
goes beyond deriving benefit from the other? Even a friendship of utility has to 
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have affection within the relationship. The usefulness or exchange of services 
may have been the initial reason for people coming together but that does not 
mean it has to remain the sole purpose. 
Returning to our two colleagues working in the same school. Suppose 
Vicki also lives nearby — what reason could Ricky have for choosing to travel with 
Nikki as opposed to Vicki? Suppose that Nikki is a quiet, placid character, similar 
to Ricky, whereas Vicki is a loud, gossipy character. Is it not likely that Ricky 
would prefer to travel with Nikki simply because she likes her better? No matter 
how useful someone can be, there comes a point where sometimes the price you 
have to pay for his or her usefulness is greater than the benefit received. 
Whilst Aristotle argues that in friendships of utility, the affection is 
motivated by the friends' own good, I would argue that even here, the character of 
the person is relevant. Even young children will on occasions prefer to be on their 
own rather than to play with just anyone. We prefer to be with people we like and 
are drawn to when we call them 'friends'. We prefer to be helped by those we like 
when a choice is possible. And so to the second category of the Aristotelian 
model. 
Pleasure Friendships 
Friendships of pleasure are motivated by the pleasure experienced or 
shared between the friends. As long as the pleasure continues, so does the 
friendship. Whilst they last, they are deeply felt, the friends cherishing each 
other's company. But should one of the two change in some way, and the initial 
pleasure experienced as a result of the relationship wane, so may the friendship. 
As Aristotle points out, these friendships give cause for problems; they are prone 
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to change with changes in the object of their pleasure; they have a tendency to be 
transient. He argues that this is because such pleasure friendships are based on 
emotions and emotional responses, for example, people falling in and out of love 
(Aristotle, 1156b). 
Take, for example, a group of young people who go out every night 
together. Now suppose they take great pleasure in this joint entertainment, 
forming a major part of their friendship, for example the preparing to go out, the 
shared venture, the chat about it later. Then suppose that one of them becomes 
pregnant and has a child and thus is unable to join the others in their joint 
revelries. That person is now excluded from the main source of their friendship, 
and in many cases, the friendship ceases. The previous friends are unable to find 
anything now in common with their previous partner and can no longer share 
common events and experiences. 
If we did not take pleasure in the company of our friends, why would we 
remain with them? Surely it must be part of what we look for in a friend that we 
should find their company pleasurable? Only martyrs and masochists would think 
otherwise! But we don't take pleasure in everyone's or just anyone's company. 
We take pleasure in the company of people we like, and we like them for reasons 
of who they are. Even friendships of pleasure are to some extent reliant on the 
character of the friend. Sharing time, company and pleasures are important to 
friendship as acknowledged by Aristotle. All of these are demanding of time and 
energy, leading one to assume that the number of people one could count on as 
being 'pleasure friends' would ultimately be limited. And finally to the third 
category in this model. 
28 
Virtue Friendship 
If we take utility friendships to be based on material advantage, and 
pleasure friendships to be based on emotional attachments, how do we 
understand virtue friendship? 	 Aristotle sees the perfect form of friendship in 
those who love their friends for their own sake, not merely because they are 
useful (which they may be) nor because their company is pleasurable and they 
are fun to be with (which they might be) but because of who and what they are, 
the virtuous person (Aristotle, 1156b5-10). Virtue here represents the highest 
level of moral goodness and the virtuous person, the epitome of such goodness. 
The characters of the virtuous draw such friends to each other, not because of 
any benefit each may incur. Virtue friendship could never involve using another 
person as a means to one's own happiness, but because such complete 
friendship would be based on mutual recognition and association in virtue (Blum, 
1993; Cooper, 1977b; Pakaluk, 1991). 
Virtue friends are integral to each other's lives and thus the flourishing of 
one is intimately connected with the flourishing of the other. But what is it to say 
someone is virtuous? At a basic level, it is to make a judgement or evaluation 
about the character of the individual. It is to identify admirable traits that are 
central to one's character (Millgram, 1987): 
...the virtues are essential properties of humankind: a person realizes 
more or less fully his human nature according as he possesses more or 
less fully those properties of character which count as moral excellences. 
(Cooper, 1977a, p635) 
If virtues are a central part of whom the person is, we could reasonably expect 
them to be stable character traits. However, Aristotle further claims that even 
virtue friendships will last only as long as the persons involved are 'good' (and as 
goodness within his definition lasts, so would these friendships) (Aristotle, 
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1156b10-15). He admits that even the virtuous may be corrupted from virtue, but 
that would mean that the person was no longer the same sort of person and 
hence could not be the friend they had been. 
Friendships of virtue, in this view, would come only to the virtuous, which 
leaves rather a lot of us without! Most of us do our best in our friendships. 
Sometimes it is good enough; sometimes it is not. There are very few who do not 
at some point exhibit the odd vice or two, or who fail to be totally virtuous or who 
find moral goodness just a little bit too difficult twenty-four hours a day. That there 
are very few such paragons of virtue around capable of such friendship leads one 
to ask if all our friendships are merely pleasure centred or utility centred? Are we 
incapable of anything other than self-centred 'friendships'? 
Cooper appears to find a way around this conundrum (Cooper, 1999). He 
puts forward an interpretation of Aristotle's concept of perfect virtue as being part 
of a wide variation of virtue friendships. One could, in this scenario, be attracted 
to someone for his or her generosity to the less fortunate, or for his or her 
kindness whilst still acknowledging that they have a foul temper first thing in the 
morning and do not suffer fools gladly! They do not have to exhibit virtue of every 
kind but just have some morally good qualities and it is those qualities that attract 
their friend. Such a friendship could still be part of the category of virtue 
friendships even though neither person has a perfectly virtuous character. Cooper 
must be, in this instant, correct in his view, if we are to allow the possibility of 
people having character friendships, and common experience teaches us that 
they do indeed exist. Perfect friendship of the perfectly virtuous would thus be an 
extreme example of this friendship of character. Ordinary mortals are capable of 
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character friendships through showing an unselfish interest in others. But what of 
the opposite? Could there be instances of 'vice' friendships? 
Joseph and Danny are best friends at school. They see each other all the 
time outside of school, always play together, look out for each other, share 
everything together, and bully the other children together. In fact, bullying plays a 
major role in their friendship. They both enjoy making other children cry, smashing 
their toys and creating general mayhem. Could their relationship not be seen as a 
'friendship'? It exhibits many of the identified features: loyalty, sharing, spending 
time together. 
Within an Aristotelian conception of virtue friendship, friendship pervades 
all aspects of one's life. With Danny and Joseph, what brings them together, is 
their bullying behaviour and the pleasure they get from it. It has to be 
acknowledged that not all relationships bring out 'the best' in those concerned. 
There are cases where friends can bring out 'the worst' in each other, where a 
particular pairing can incite each other forward to situations or events that neither 
would arrive at on their own. For example, in the film 'Heavenly Creatures', two 
girls in 1950's New Zealand became inseparable, obsessive friends to the extent 
that they created an alternative reality from which others were barred and which 
ended in murder. 
Whilst Aristotle's account of friendship is attractive in its simplicity, it holds 
many problems. I would argue that the separation of the three types of friendship 
is not as clear-cut in practical terms as supposed. Character traits matter in 
questions of friendship. They have to, or we would never have a reason to choose 
one person over another as a friend. Friends can doubtlessly be useful, but they 
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are still friends and the emotional attachment inherent in the term is necessary to 
the concept. We enjoy and take pleasure in doing things with our friends; 
spending time with our friends is part of the friendship: it is how we build the 
'common history' and get to know our friends better. 
We all have differing 'circles' of relatedness and dependency. There are 
those we have never met and may never meet, those we meet in their roles with 
whom we exchange goods and services. We don't see them as individuals, we 
don't know them, we don't even particularly want to know them. There are those 
whom we term acquaintances: we see them fairly regularly and are friendly 
towards them, but we stop short of being friends with them (colleagues perhaps). 
There are those whom we have an emotional attachment to and we term friends 
(a small number again) and there are a few that are within our inner circles of 
intimate friendship. But even to talk in terms of circles of friendship, requires the 
use of metaphors. The 'useful friends', 'pleasure friends' and 'virtuous friends' 
may again be metaphors for how we categorise our relationships with others, but 
if we start to categorise all our friendships, they would hardly survive the process. 
How does this help us to understand the nature of friendship itself? The 
reasons we have for starting a friendship may be different from those for 
sustaining it. We may well start with utility or pleasure, which, with time, then 
becomes friendship based on elements of character. If we return to Ricky and 
Nikki — the utility of sharing a journey gave them the opportunity and space to 
discover each other's character, to find out if they liked each other enough to keep 
the friendship going for its own sake. If their relationship does not survive the 
utility, perhaps they discovered they really didn't like each other that much to 
begin with! 
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It is to be remembered that Aristotle's theory of friendship takes place 
within the context of the Nicomachean Ethics in which he seeks to explore the 
connection with morality: that friendship helps us to become good. As Richard 
White describes it: 
... true friendship offers us an apprenticeship in virtue and an everyday 
training in the moral life. 	 (White, 1999a, p79) 
Friendship is thus an 'introduction to the moral life': it teaches us to see others as 
ends in themselves and not as a means to an end. Whilst Aristotle's discourse on 
friendship is useful in the many insights it offers into friendship, there are 
alternative views. In my next section I shall be considering the work of more 
recent philosophers to elucidate further the usefulness of the concept of 
friendship in modelling public life. 
Section 3: Friendship and the Self 
To talk about friendship is to talk about how we relate to others. Friendship 
plays a considerable role in our self-knowledge and perspectives on the world and 
is frequently the means by which we learn the affective dimensions of social life 
and respect for others outside of the family. It can thus be argued that a form of 
moral development and/or character education takes place within its remit. 
According to Cocking and Kennett, a view of the self is vital to an understanding 
of the nature of friendship (Cocking and Kennett, 1998). They discern that a mark 
of friendship is the extent to which the self is disclosed to the other in the 
relationship. This disclosure, in turn, serves to create intimacy and to further 
cement bonds of trust between the individuals. 
The model, developed by Cocking and Kennett, presents two alternative 
interpretations of 'companion friends'. Firstly, individuals disclose themselves to 
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their friends through a 'secrets' model of friendship: we share those things closest 
and most important to us with those whom we trust the most. Alternatively, we 
see ourselves as reflected in our friends (a 'mirror' model of friendship): the idea 
is that the friend is a mirror for the self; we see ourselves reflected back because 
my friend is like me. Both models depend on disclosure in the relationship: either 
the disclosure of the self to the other or the self is disclosed in the other. 
According to the mirror view of friendship, people can be friends only in so 
far as they happen to be alike. In several places, Aristotle states that a friend is 
"another self" (Aristotle, 1166a30), a statement that has been held to support 
various interpretations (Cartledge, 1993; Cocking and Kennett, 1998; Franck, 
1999; Millgram, 1987). A friend is someone who shares many of the same values, 
goals and priorities as I do. However, Cocking and Kennett dispute this: 
...the mirror view misrepresents the depth and nature of the engagement 
which friends have with each other and the impact which each has on the 
other. For you do not passively reflect my own characteristics; what you 
give back to me is not a reflection, but an interpretation of me, and for 
this you do not need to be like me ...I do not see myself in you as the 
mirror view suggests, I see myself through you. We are thus, to some 
significant extent, each other's creators. 
(Cocking and Kennett, 1998, p509) 
It could be assumed that the more alike two people are the more likely they are to 
be friends, yet experience teaches us this is not always the case. It is possible to 
have very similar characters and to have absolutely no interest in being friends at 
all. Similarly, people can share similar interests and yet be very dissimilar 
characters: having similar interests or similar characters to another is no 
guarantee of friendship. 
There is the obvious interpretation taken by many, as pointed out by 
Annas, that logically a friend cannot regard another's thoughts, wishes etc as they 
would their own as they are separate beings (Annas, 1977). Yet as Annas 
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continues, there is a sense in which this phrase says something profound about 
the nature of deep friendship. There is a sense in which I can come to regard my 
friend as a second self in that I regard their wishes, desires and the fulfilment of 
them etc as having as much importance as do my own and will therefore seek to 
bring them about. And insofar as the other views me as a friend, they reflect back 
to me "an approval and endorsement of whom I am" (White, 1999a, p86). 
The moral self that we are is thus not developed in isolation, but 
particularly with those who know us best. As White continues: 
... our commitment to friendship is an objective expression of our 
commitment to the moral life. Indeed, at a more basic level than the 
reflective choice of moral principles and explicit values, my friends give 
me recognition and make me immediately aware of myself as a moral 
being. 
(White, 1999a, p86) 
If this is so, when a friend leaves or is taken away, we can feel a deep sense of 
loss: the loss of part of our 'self. 
Friendship is thus an 'introduction to the moral life': it teaches us to see 
others as ends in themselves and not as a means to an end. If friendship can be 
seen as a way of pursuing a shared moral life, then it assumes great importance 
for moral development: it forms an arena in which we learn to practise our moral 
reasoning. The dispositions of friendship (a complex mixture of attitudes and 
emotions) predispose us to consider the needs and wants of others as being of 
importance and thus to draw back from being prepared to always sacrifice the 
goods of others to our own. 
It thus appears that 'friendship' itself may not be such a simple concept 
after all (one that indicates or points to one particular thing that can be identified). 
In the next section, I consider friendship as a 'shared life' contributing to our moral 
development over time. 
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Section 4: Friendship and the Shared Life. 
Sherman points out that there may be specific shared ways of virtue 
peculiar to friendship, but the actual acquisition of the virtuous state of character 
must pre-date the virtue friendship (Sherman, 1987). The friends must choose 
each other based on character and, through the friendship, such commitments of 
character may deepen and develop. It is thus in the exercise of the virtues of 
friendship that we learn to become more virtuous in character. This seems to be 
asking a lot of friendship: how do we get to know each other's character except 
through the occasions of friendship? 
If we reflect on our own experience of friendships, those whom we are 
closest to, those we feel comfortable sharing the intimate details of our lives and 
selves with, those that have endured over many years are few, there are precious 
few of us with life-long friends. At different periods of our lives we seek different 
character traits in our friendships; some friendships last for many years, some do 
not. Those that last, tend to 'deepen' as the friends learn more of each other's 
character and build a common history of experiences, sharing secrets, letting the 
other break through our social pretences. 
Coming to know another person is a complex business. Crucially, we often 
begin interacting with someone before we can ascertain his or her character. We 
may initially believe we have much in common and then come to find 
commonalities were superficial at best. Yet in the interactions, we may come to 
regard the person as a friend, developing concern and care before we get to 
know the character of the person. Friendship, in these terms, becomes a long-
term relationship that is built up and develops over a period of time. This creates a 
shared history between the friends — which grounds mutual references and 
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experiences. To come to know another person, to be aware of what their well-
being consists in, requires time, energy and patience amongst other virtues. The 
time spent together in learning of each other's character really is 'time well spent' 
— this grounds the friendship. 
There is a sense in which we learn to share in the same activities as our 
friends and to share similar tastes. My friend may be a sports enthusiast and 
because this is an area that is important to her, it may become an area important 
to me. I may never develop an independent liking for the topic but through the 
friendship I may come to understand and appreciate what it is that appeals to my 
friend in sports. We want to please our friends; it is only in learning who they are, 
what their aims are, that we are able to do so. Deep friends will frequently 
sacrifice or subjugate some of their own wants and aims to seek out that which 
will most please their friend. 
Friends trade secrets and keep confidences for each other; friendships 
require some form of mutual disclosure. The things I may tell my friend about 
myself will be different to the things I may tell others in the more public domain. 
The extent in which someone is willing to reveal himself or herself to us is a 
measure of how much they trust us and vice-versa. 
Just as it is not possible to decide to be friends and then suddenly to be so, 
so it takes time to build a friendship. The time spent together exploring each 
other's character, tastes, likes, dislikes, opinions etc builds a bond between the 
two. This on-going sharing in each other's life is unique to each pair of friends and 
creates a 'shared history'. The past spent together creates the present 
relationship, an emotional and historical shorthand that enables other virtues to 
take place and be developed. 
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Part of what is required in friendship is spending time together in a "jointly 
pursued life" (Sherman, 1987, p596) as suggested by Aristotle (Aristotle, 
1171b30-1172a10); it is not the 'what is shared' that is important so much as the 
willingness to share and coordinate activities over a period of time. It would be an 
unusual friendship if the people concerned did not spend any time together. Could 
you count as a friend someone who would not ever go for a drink with you, neither 
would they go to the cinema with you, the theatre, the shops, nor spend time 
chatting with you nor eating with you? 
But in addition to this is the fact that friendship does not have a 'sell-by 
date'. To suggest a time limit seems to demean the relationship to one of utility 
and few people would be willing to put in the emotional work of getting to know 
another person for it to be held so lightly and valued so little. If it is subject to a 
time frame, it appears to miss a fundamental aspect of the relationship: the 
shared life has to be open to the possibility of future development and growth 
together. In the next section I shall explore further five distinct features of 
friendship identified by Aristotle and frequently used as a basis for metaphorizing 
to a civic relationship: partiality, trust, equality, shared history and reciprocity (or 
mutual aid). 
Section 5: Virtues of Friendship 
Friendship usually marks the boundary of where the private world meets 
the public and enlarges the number of persons we have regard to be partial to. 
Indeed, Goering suggests that morality may require us to give preferential 
treatment to our friends (Goering, 2003). To have a personal relationship is to see 
someone else as special. To treat a friend with the detachment of an impartial 
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observer seems, somehow, wrong. There is a sense in which friendship requires 
us to go over and beyond our duties/obligations to others; we are partial to our 
friends in a way we are not with strangers. If we did not show particular pleasure 
in their achievements (over and above that to others), if we did not in some way 
show them special treatment, what would mark them out for the title of 'friend'? 
The ship that you are sailing on sinks and you have found the only lifeboat 
(incidentally it only holds two), do you take in a stranger or your best friend? Most 
people would not have a problem. They would take their best friend over and 
above someone else. We would think them slightly odd if they did not and would 
probably make sure we never travelled with them if they would not show partiality 
to their friend! But if the choice was between one best friend and another, and we 
liked them both equally, it may be more difficult to choose and other factors come 
into play. 
In lots of situations we see nothing strange in giving preference to a friend, 
in choosing them first or giving them a better deal. When choosing to share an 
intimate secret, one would naturally choose a friend. When choosing to share 
some goods with another, it is natural to do so with friends. Personal teaching 
observation: when choosing a partner, young children choose their friends first. 
When given a choice as to whom to sit with, they will choose a friend. They play 
with ... their friends. Should we as teachers condemn such partiality? I would 
argue that such individual partiality is helpful in building the friendship itself. When 
young children are giving out some good in the classroom (e.g. milk) they 
normally give it out to their friends first (in most classes the children tend to 
distribute goods on a rota) and as such, each person will have different friends to 
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choose first. Only when there is a shortage of the good being distributed could 
there be a problem with equitability. 
Yet partiality can clash with the demands of justice. Take for example the 
case of a politician who appoints a close friend to a prominent position in 
government, despite there being other more qualified candidates (the case 
involving George Bush and Harriet Miers that we started the chapter with, 
perhaps). Would we see such partiality to the friend as praiseworthy or are there 
areas where we think partiality should bow out? If the impetus towards moral 
impartiality is to reduce the possibility of bias towards those within our immediate 
circle, when is it permissible to give advantage to our family and friends? If we 
treat all people the same in all situations, then we are leaving nothing special for 
our friends... and friendship makes the other person special. 
The second feature essential to virtue friendship is that of mutual trust. 
Deep friendships require trust of the other. Not just in terms of trusting each other 
with privileged information and being certain that the other will treat confidences 
appropriately, but being able to depend on and be sure of another. The more 
confident we are of each other's moral character, the more intimately we trust. 
Where there is a marked disparity in the ability to share privileged information, 
there can be an indication of lack of trust or regard. Self-disclosure can be one of 
the predominant ways in which deep friendships contribute to the flourishing life of 
the other. 
Trust between individuals tends to be something that is created over time 
as they get to know each other. The personally created history that is unique to 
each friendship builds the trust. When two friends have lost trust in each other's 
character and capacity for virtuous behaviour, how do they repair the damage? As 
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common experience teaches us, it takes time: talking to each other, explaining 
points of view, admitting and forgiving faults. Sometimes the trust cannot be 
repaired and the relationship ends. 
This brings me to the third feature, that of equality between friends. 
Aristotle put forward the view that it would not be possible for those with a wide 
gap between the parties, (whether of virtue or of affluence) to remain friends and 
that they do not expect to (Aristotle, 1158a25-1159a10). There are two differing 
ways in which this can be interpreted: the first that it would be unlikely for those at 
opposite ends of the economic sphere to have occasions to meet to develop a 
friendship. Neither the ultra-rich nor the merely wealthy tend to 'hang out' at the 
same places as the moderately financed or even the socially deprived. The rich 
man and Lazarus of the Gospels may never have had occasion to meet in order 
to become friends. The other interpretation, which is more interesting, is should 
they have met, could they have become friends without the richer feeling in some 
way obliged to help the poorer? 
Joe is a multi-millionaire who works in the city. Jerry is a homeless man 
who lives on the doorstep of Joe's company. Could they ever be friends? Would 
not the very nature of friendship itself have made the rich man automatically help 
the poorer and somehow equalise their positions one to the other? He has to care 
about his friend, he has to seek his good, and he is in a position to help Jerry. If 
they are friends, would he not have to do so? Joe could say hello each morning 
as he steps over Jerry. But that is not being his friend. Friendship has to go 
beyond being friendly. There has to be an active commitment to seek the 
flourishing of the other. If Joe genuinely cared about Jerry, would he not want to 
see him decently housed etc? 
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But why is equality so important to friendship? Goering, in discussing the 
work of Thomas states: 
If we look at Thomas's work, his main emphasis is that neither party in 
the friendship can be in a position of complete authority over the other 
(although the two parties need not be equal in all respects). 
(Goering, 2003, p403) 
If there is not a form of equality of trust, respect, self-disclosure, the relationship 
becomes more of a therapist than that of a friend (Goering). Nevertheless, I do 
want to suggest there may be something valuable in danger of being missed here, 
that the deeper the friendship goes, the more the most advantaged of the pair 
would feel impelled for the sake of the friendship to help the less advantaged. The 
commitment to aid the flourishing of the other in a relationship would motivate 
such action. 
The fourth feature I wish to consider is that of a 'shared history'. Aristotle 
emphasises developing friendships through time and a shared history of activities 
leading to some notion of a shared common good. Friends spend time together; 
they do things together. This in turn creates the 'shared history'. They have a 
unique 'language' of events that they can refer to as part of their friendship, 
whether of the "do you remember that holiday we took" variety, the personal 
events they have shared (mutual good luck, new jobs, family events, births and 
deaths etc). These are among the things that bind friends together. 
Joint ventures, shared projects, an active participation in seeking each 
other's good: these are all points drawn out by Aristotle as part of friendship as an 
ongoing, shared life (Aristotle). The fact that people share different events with 
different people contributes to the uniqueness of each friendship. 
The fifth, and final, attribute of virtue friendship to be discussed here is that 
of reciprocal goodwill. Friends help each other automatically. As previously stated, 
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friendship is a recognised reciprocated goodwill to another. Suppose one had a 
friend, a good friend of many years standing, a kind, and generous person, good 
to little old ladies and small furry animals, who turns to a life of drugs. He is 
extremely happy in his lifestyle; he enjoys taking the drugs; his view of his well-
being is centred on getting more and more drugs. We remonstrate with him, tell 
him all the dangers, and explain that the drugged state is different to reality for 
example, but he is still convinced that this is his proper end. Would we be bound 
to help him in his quest? Most of us would say he was mistaken in his view of 
what his well-being consisted in and that we were not required by reasons of the 
friendship to seek his good in this way. But how do we judge? How can we know 
what is good for our friends? 
Two children are at school studying maths, one who finds it really easy and 
one who struggles even to spell the word. The nature of friendship will frequently 
make the more able help their less able friend where possible and common 
experience shows us many examples where the more 'superior' may aid the 
'inferior' in the name of friendship. Friends automatically help each other. It is part 
of what is meant by friendship. One does not stand by and see a friend suffer if 
one is in a position to help. But what if it was an exam? Should the friend take the 
exam for their less academic friend? Are there areas outside the bounds of 
friends helping each other? 
What if friends were not in a position to offer help? Return to Joe and Jerry. 
Joe is in a position to help Jerry, but what realistically can Jerry ever do to help 
Joe? Anything Jerry does may not be of the same kind. Reciprocity implies that I 
will do something for you if you will do something for me: it is centred on an 
advantage as the focus. We take part in common endeavours because we both 
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benefit. Friendship carries with it the implication that we help each other for each 
other's sake, because of the relationship between the persons. 
Section 6: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered the concept of friendship in the private 
sphere of intimate relationships using both the Aristotelian framework and some 
modern insights. From this, certain conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the concept 
of virtue is tied in strongly with any concept of friendship in the Aristotelian 
framework: friendship is firmly tied with his idea of the good life. No one would 
choose to live without friends (Aristotle, 1151a5). Virtue friends are such not 
because they need each other, but because of each other. As Den Uyl comments, 
such friendships require "an extraordinary level of self-perfection" (Den Uyl, 1997, 
p107) One would need to develop dispositions to view any benefit gained as 
secondary to the relationship itself. One would need a secure sense of self to be 
able to relate to the other solely on the basis of the other's qualities. 
Secondly, the categories may not be as distinct as Aristotle would have us 
believe. Friends are useful, pleasant people by virtue of their being friends. What 
makes someone a friend is that we like them, and we like them for who they are. 
Even at a basic level, there is a need for character to come into play. 
Thirdly, friendship represents the point at which we meet unknown others 
for the first time outside the bonds of family. Friendship, at a basic level, binds us 
to another person. It is this binding together that becomes philosophically 
interesting as perhaps a model enlightening us in the civic realm and thus 
providing a model for the cohesive society. Thus Aristotle's connection of 
friendship, in this instance, with the desire to live together, creates a metaphorical 
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model for the civic community, which can then be interpreted as the bridge 
between family kinships and society. As Cooper comments: 
Civic friendship, then, as the special form of friendship characteristic of 
this kind of community, is founded on the experience and continued 
expectation, on the part of each citizen, of profit and advantage to 
himself, in common with the others, from membership in the civic 
association. This is to say that civic friendship is a kind of advantage-
friendship. 
(Cooper, 1999, p333) 
From this stance, it would seem reasonable that it might then leap into the civic 
sphere. It is this belief that has perhaps made the concept of friendship suddenly 
becomes 'topical', reigniting interest in both personal friendship as a virtue, and 
also as a model for the civic bond itself. In the next chapter, I shall further explore 
a more metaphoric version of friendship to see if the concept of 'civic friendship' 
can be made meaningful and thus function as a model for the civic relationship. 
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Chapter 3 
'Civic Friendship' 
Friendship also seems to be the bond that holds communities together, 
and lawgivers seem to attach more importance to it than to justice... 
Between friends, there is no need for justice. (Aristotle, 1155a20-30) 
Between countries, there are no friends, only interests.8 
Introduction 
The tragic events in London on July 7th and 21st,  2005, have made many 
people question urgently how disparate groupings in society can relate to each 
other in order that society can interact and function as one. Can we extrapolate 
from personal relationships to consider wider, looser forms of human 
interconnectedness that could model the civic relationship?9 Tying together the 
two forms of friendship, (personal and civic) has a long line in political philosophy 
(Aristotle,; Maclntyre, 1985; Maclntyre, 1999; Macmurray, 1961; Schwarzenbach, 
2005). Nevertheless, there are, as I shall indicate, problems in this move of 
characterising citizenship as a form of friendship. 
By using metaphors for particular relationships, it is believed we can move 
from the personal to the civic domain, allowing the insights engendered from one 
8 (Senegalese President Abodoulaye Wade, paraphrasing Lord Palmerston, in a 2005 letter to 
Pres. Chen Shui-bian, announcing Senegal's de-recognition of Taiwan and establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China).Chang Yun-ping and Ko Shu-ling, "Taiwan Foreign Minister Offers 
to Quit Over Senegal's Severance of Ties," Taipei Times, 27 Oct. 2005. Queen Victoria criticized 
her Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston for expressing sympathy for Poles seeking independence 
from Britain's ally Russia. He replied, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual 
enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 97, col. 122 (1 Mar. 1848) as quoted in: 
http://www.cctr.ust.hk/materials/working papers/WorkingPaper12.pdf [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
9 To achieve this unity, some commentators have suggested integration into the common life, 
whilst others have suggested assimilation. Others still, have suggested identifying a core of 
common shared values that should form the basis of 'British-ness'. 
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area to give us fresh insights into another, hence this chapter seeks to explore the 
philosophical possibility of the concept of 'Civic Friendship', as a model for the 
nature of 'belonging' that underpins societal cohesion. The success of this 
particular metaphor will ultimately hinge, in strong measure, on whether it can 
plausibly be understood as a form of friendship. Can the social matrix of 
friendship offer a framework for understanding citizenship? In response to this, I 
shall consider both of the standard arguments for civic friendship: that it can be 
understood as either a form of utility friendship or as a form of virtue friendship. 
The exposition of these arguments then lays the foundation upon which to 
consider the metaphorical argument, whether or not the concept is likely to do the 
work expected of it in characterising the civic relationship as a form of friendship. 
In Section 1, I start by considering 'what is civic friendship'. This entails a 
return to the Aristotelian understanding of the relationship between the personal 
and the civic, with the following two sections examining the link in greater detail. 
In Section 2, I consider whether civic friendship can be viewed as a form of utility 
relationship (Aristotle's first category). In Section 3, I turn to Aristotle's third 
category of friendship to consider the civic relationship as a form of virtue 
friendship through looking at Partiality, Trust, Equality, a Shared History and 
Reciprocity/Mutual Aid. From here, in Section 4, I consider the linkage with 
citizenship. In Section 5, The Ancient Greeks and Civic Friendship, I examine the 
context within which the concept arose in Ancient Greece and query how this 
may, in turn, map onto the modern context. In the Conclusion, I return to consider 
the possibly inappropriate categorisation of the civic relationship as a form of 
friendship and to claim that if this is the case, then it may be an inapplicable 
metaphor for the civic sphere in a modern liberal democracy. 
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Section 1: What is Civic Friendship? 
Before considering the place of civic friendship in a well-ordered society, it 
must be distinguished from other sorts of friendship. However civic friendship is 
understood, it must characterize the way that people relate to each other in the 
public sphere. By definition, it must be both civic and a type of friendship if the 
concept is to carry meaning. The civic element means it must relate to the civic 
realm, how we relate as citizens. It is not synonymous with being a citizen, but it 
should offer some illumination as to how, at a civic level, citizens relate. Here I 
concur with Spragens, who claims the adjective 'civic' is used to denote the 
politically relevant forms of friendship to distinguish between the private 
(individual) and public (political) realms (Spragens, 1999). The friendship element 
puts it clearly within the definition of friendship. It must carry enough of the 
characteristics of friendship as to be clearly 'of the same type'. If friendship is 
defined as a relationship denoting certain virtues, of mutual affection, of goodwill, 
of a propensity to seek each other's company, of joint endeavours and shared 
history, of mutual trust and help when needed, then we need to consider how this 
would extrapolate into the public domain. 10 
The Aristotelian typology of friendship, explored in the previous chapter, 
draws out a direct connection between the personal and the civic. Cooper makes 
the point that Aristotle holds that intimate relationships are a necessary part of the 
flourishing life (Aristotle, 1155a5) and that this leads to 'civic friendship' being 
considered as an essential human good (Cooper, 1977a, p622). For example, 
when citizens view each other as civic friends, they come together in a broad 
' These are among the virtues and features drawn out by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics in 
his description of the third type of friendship — virtue friendship — that only those who are good can 
really be friends in this sense: (see 'Aristotle on Social Friendships' by Theodore L Fortier) 
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consensus on matters of public policy, of things that are advantageous to the 
community (Aristotle, 1167b1-5). 
What is particularly of interest here, is that Aristotle holds the connection 
between the personal and the civic to be so close that he states that lawmakers 
care more for friendship than for justice: when men are friends they have no need 
of justice (Aristotle, 1155a25-30). Lawmakers seek agreement (concord) and the 
elimination of division (faction). Friendship, he argues, is similar. This seems, at 
first, a most curious statement to make: what has friendship to do with justice? 
Rawls, for example, states that justice is the first virtue of social institutions 
(Rawls, 1971, p3). In what way can friendship trump that? As Schwarzenbach 
points out, friendship is rarely cited as one of the constituent factors holding the 
modern state together (Schwarzenbach, 1996). 
To consider this question, a brief return to the examination of the 
Aristotelian model of personal friendship becomes necessary. Which particular 
model of friendship best provides this move from the personal to the civic? In the 
next section I consider the claims of utility friendship as a direct model for the civic 
domain. 
Section 2: Civic Friendship as Utility Friendship 
Aristotle, in the Ethics does not state explicitly the relationship between 
civic friendship and the three personal forms, yet it is argued to be a special case 
of utility (or advantage) friendship: the civic community is formed because of the 
common advantage that its members derive from it (Cooper, 1977a; Cooper, 
1991; Cooper, 1999). Central to this is that it is advantageous to be interested in 
the character (or virtues) of fellow citizens with whom one comes in contact (for 
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example, they should be trustworthy, honest), whether in economic or civic terms, 
because of the utility involved. It thus seems reasonable to assume that citizens 
care about the moral characters of their fellow citizens because the other is a 
fellow citizen. The prosperity and well-being of each is interlinked. (Cooper, 
1977a; Cooper, 1991; Cooper, 1999) : 
Civic friendship, then, as the special form of friendship characteristic of 
this kind of community, is founded on the experience and continued 
expectation, on the part of each citizen, of profit and advantage to 
himself, in common with the others, from membership in the civic 
association. This is to say that civic friendship is a kind of advantage-
friendship. 
(Cooper, 1999, p333) 
In such a community, as Cooper states, the citizens assume that all others, 
including those unknown or barely known, are supporters of the common 
institutions and contributors to these institutions from which all benefit. 
Significantly, this civic friendship would exist where citizens like each other, wish 
well to each other and are willing to confer benefits on others, recognising that 
they in turn also benefit regularly from the actions of others. Cooper further 
claims: 
..the advantage friend wishes his friend well for his friend's own sake, in 
consequence of recognising him as someone who regularly benefits him 
and has done so in the past. 	 (Cooper, 1977a, p633) 
The concern with character, however, is only in areas from which advantage can 
be drawn and only for that reason. 
As we identified in the last chapter, both utility friendship and pleasure 
friendship are essentially self-centred friendships. They are concerned with the 
self and satisfaction of the self's needs. With personal utility friendships, the 
friendship lasts as long as does the utility; they are the most fragile and easily 
dissolved of friendships: when the advantage ends, so does the friendship. With 
this in mind, is this then the most appropriate model for the civic community? 
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We cannot be certain when and with whom we will experience utility 
friendships in the future. We cannot in advance tell when or where we are going 
to need help. I may not require a state pension, meals on wheels and a home 
help at present, but I cannot anticipate that I never will, so it is to my utility to band 
together with fellow citizens to provide such assistance so that such help is there 
should I need it. Perhaps this can best be understood as a form of utility, or 
mutual support relationship, between citizens; but need this utility relationship be 
friendship? 
I contend it is possible to have a utility relationship without it being a 
friendship at all. An example, a plumber comes to put in a shower: it is an 
exchange of services for mutual interest. He puts in the shower, I pay him. Yet I 
would not describe him as a friend. I have some concern as to his character; it is 
to my advantage that he is honest, knows what he is doing etc. When the shower 
is in, the relationship ends; I do not expect him to come around and visit the 
shower, check it is doing well, bring me little gifts on the anniversary of it being put 
in! As the example indicates, it is a form of utility relationship, not utility 
'friendship'. 
It seems reasonable to assume that Aristotle wants utility friends to like and 
feel affection for each other. As both Schwarzenbach and Cooper indicate, 
Aristotle sees both of the lesser forms of friendship as real friendships (Cooper, 
1977b; Schwarzenbach, 1996) hence the emphasis on the affective dimension 
involved. However, it is one thing to seek mutual assistance from fellow citizens or 
to band together through the payment of taxes for common projects, but it is quite 
another to be required to like them as well. In the case of the plumber, I am not 
connecting with him in terms of the person he is, but in terms of his function 
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(fitting the new shower). I am only interested in his character in terms of how it 
affects the job he fulfils. Liking and feeling affection for him does not enter the 
equation; I do not need to be friends with him for the relationship to work. I can be 
friendly without being friends. Civic friendliness is a very different concept to civic 
friendship. 
I purport that this model of personal friendship leads to confusion in the 
civic arena and is thus particularly ill suited as a model for the civic relationship. 
When dealing with unknown, or barely known, others, friendship need not be a 
consideration at all: I can achieve utility in cooperative working with others without 
it. We are thus left with a conundrum: if the affective dimension of friendship is not 
needed for cooperative working, how do we then characterise the bond between 
citizens? Without the deep affective dimension, can it be friendship? In the next 
section, I consider the second path - virtue friendship as a model for civic 
friendship. 
Section 3: Virtue Friendship 
It would appear, on the surface, reasonable to assume that the features 
identified in the previous chapter as necessary attributes of virtue friendship could 
be applied within the civic domain. However, the confusion noted within the 
previous section spreads when we try to use virtue friendship in this role. In this 
section, I shall take each of the features from the previous chapter (partiality, 
trust, equality, a shared history and reciprocity/special mutual concern) and draw 
out how they may, or may not, apply within the public sphere at a macro level to 
see if virtue friendship provides a more effective model for the civic relationships 
underpinning conceptions of social cohesion. 
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Firstly, I shall consider the place of partiality. Friendship requires a certain 
partiality to our friends. In the private sphere, it seems obvious that I would do 
more for my friend than for strangers; I would benefit them above others, simply 
because they are my friend. This partiality, as we previously noted, is engendered 
by seeing these people as being, in some sense, special. In personal 
relationships, we expect people to be partial to their friends: that is what being 
and having friends is all about, always having someone on your side, someone 
who is going to put you first. But it may not easily translate from the private sphere 
into the public. The partiality of friendship demands that some are excluded from 
the relationship; there is a numerical limit to the number of people one can share 
this type of friendship with. If I attempted to include everyone within the boundary, 
then who would count as being within the realm of my special attention? 
There is a sense that in the public sphere impartiality is more appropriate 
(Baron, 1991; Cocking and Kennett, 2000; Jeske, 1997). An example: a politician 
is in a position to give someone a job as Chair of a major corporation. The job 
carries a massive salary, chauffeur-driven car, lots of travel etc. Should they give 
it to their best friend who needs a job? Or to their daughter, to keep the 'treats' in 
the family? If they exercised some form of partiality, no doubt they would do so, 
and be pilloried for so doing in the press. It would violate our sense of justice. We 
feel automatically that impartiality should have driven the hiring to such a 
position.11  Recall the hue and outcry in the UK in 2009 at Derek Conway, a 
Conservative politician, who hired both of his sons as 'researchers' at public 
expense.12 
II 
 Many politicians were highly criticised precisely for this reason during the expenses scandal of 
2009. 
12 httu://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/ian/29/derek-conwav-fined [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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Close friendships may lead to one friend covering for another — perhaps 
telling a lie. For example, a friend might lie about whether or not a particular new 
outfit suited another friend, not wishing to upset them. We might even see it as 
commendable in certain circumstances, for example, acting as a good friend, 
positively reinforcing their self-image. Nevertheless, when this translates to the 
wider public sphere, it is seen as something to be condemned. Those involved in 
the Enron scandal in America could hardly have given as their defence that they 
were just covering for their friends.13 A higher standard of behaviour is usually 
required in public life. 
Turning to the concept of trust. All friendships involve some form of trust. 
Trust is a way of saving oneself the time and trouble of finding things out; it is 
entangled between convenience and morality and has a close connection with 
forms of loyalty (O'Hara, 2004). When we trust someone, we have certain beliefs 
about how they will act/react, enabling us to make plans. It is only to be expected 
that we are willing to do things for people we trust that we might be reluctant to do 
for strangers (e.g. to lend them our own car). 
Trust undoubtedly transcends the personal relationship, and as such looks 
on the surface as the most likely candidate to transpose neatly from the personal 
virtue to the public. Just as we need to be able to trust our friends, so we need to 
be able to trust beyond individuals. When ill, I need to trust the medical 
establishment is truly trying to make me better, (for example, has appropriate 
expertise, is recommending the appropriate medication without payment from 
drug companies) without continually asking to see their qualifications and chasing 
13 http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/enronlessons.html [last accessed 
19.11.2009]. Enron Corporation was made bankrupt after a series of irregular accounting 
procedures made the company look more profitable than it was, driving stock up whilst profits 
were falling. The fall out from the scandal led to a wave of other companies being prosecuted for 
fraud, high-level corruption and insider trading. 
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up references. When a parent sends their child to school, they trust that the child 
will receive what is regarded as an appropriate education rather than training in 
theft, drug dealing and arson. 
Trust is necessary between civic individuals for civic life to take place. 
Where 'public trust' is strong, citizens are willing to try new ways of working, 
organising etc. However, public trust (going beyond particular individuals and 
groupings to encompass societal agencies) can be lost overnight, with disastrous 
repercussions for those involved. An example of the breakdown of public trust 
would be the supposed MMR link with autism (an injection given to vaccinate 
against measles, mumps and rubella). A report in the UK that the vaccine may be 
associated with autism provoked a dramatic reaction on the part of parents who 
then refused to have their children vaccinated in this fashion. Despite further 
reports and targeted studies not being able to find a link between the two, a link 
was formed in the public mind with serious potential side effects.14 A further 
example. The parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009 previously alluded to, is 
alleged to have had a direct bearing on the fragmentation of public trust to the 
extent that local council elections and European Parliamentary elections following 
the original outcry had disastrous turnouts of the electorate, enabling fringe 
parties such as UKIP and the BNP to gain seats.15 
The existence of trust cannot be assumed between a populace and its 
elected government. Politics in the USA has been dominated by money for many 
years (slush funds etc.). Both the President of France, Jacques Chirac and the 
Prime Minister of Italy have been reportedly using their offices to impede criminal 
14 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life and style/health/article5683671.ece [last accessed 
19.11.2009] 
15http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/cameron-pays-the-price-of-expenses-scandal-
1694507.html [last accessed 19.11.09] 
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investigations. In Germany, Helmut Kohl was supposedly discovered channelling 
funds to pet causes. In the UK, Jeffrey Archer and Jonathan Aitken (senior 
Conservative politicians at the time) were discovered lying under oath and served 
prison terms. Again in the UK, many of the sources accredited with the 
justification for the invasion of Iraq, turned out to have been falsified or based on 
incomplete evidence. Even the suspicion that Tony Blair 'lied' about the WMD 
held by Iraq was enough to taint his role as Prime Minister beyond repair.16 
Just as a lack or betrayal of trust between friends can destroy the 
relationship, so the breakdown of public trust can fracture the civic relationship. 
But is personal trust the same thing as public trust? Public trust is a much thinner 
concept and needs to be supported by a variety of laws and regulations giving 
justification for the trust. As recent events in the global 'credit crunch' have shown 
us, once trust between institutions is lost, rebuilding it comes at huge costs and 
frequently demands for further legislation to prevent 'civic misdeeds'. Yet the need 
for coercion (legal or otherwise) is problematic and can itself be claimed to be the 
antithesis of 'friendship'. 
Next, we turn to the notion of equality between friends. Here I raise three 
different interpretations of how this may be perceived in the civic domain, as 
resource equality, as equality before the law or as considering another's needs as 
being of equal worth. I questioned in the previous chapter whether a virtuous rich 
person might not, by virtue of their friendship, feel compelled to aid a poorer 
friend. This can prompt us to ask broad questions about the connection between 
this form of friendship and equality: should the civic relationship entail a 
16http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest contributors/article1364671.ece [last 
accessed 19.11.2009] 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/andrewpierce/3562865/Tony-Blairs-reputation-
finally-does-up-in-smoke.html [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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redistribution of resources within a society, to create the relevant conditions in 
order that 'civic friendship' should prosper? Could part of the nature of civic 
friendship require some desire for equality between sections of the civic body? 
To what extent should the ultra rich feel obliged to help those at the other end of 
the spectrum, and to do it willingly as 'friends' would'''. That the rich already 
contribute financially through progressive taxations systems is praiseworthy, but it 
is legally required; law has been needed to ensure this happens. As recent events 
have illustrated, the mega-rich would all too frequently manage to avoid paying 
any taxes if left to their own devices18. Once the force of law is involved, 
friendship seems to fade away. 
Yet virtuous individuals who seek to ameliorate the ravages of poverty on a 
voluntary basis, or going beyond what is legally required, do exist. History is 
strewn with cases of philanthropy: Carnegie, Vanderbilt, Peabody, Rockefeller, 
Guggenheim. Today we have such people as Bill Gates, even Andre Agassi 
(tennis star) has given away more than $20m. In the UK, we have had the 
Rowntrees, John Lewis, William Lever, Bourneville, Cadbury, all people of 'good 
will' towards others, seeking to improve life in some way for those less fortunate. 
Whilst all of this is undoubtedly laudable, we have to ask, is it wise to rely on the 
virtuous characters of individuals to sustain this element of the civic relationship? 
Is benevolence and/or altruism sufficient or do we need a framework of rights and 
obligations? 
Here, again, I concur with Spragens who directs us to seek an answer 
within the domain of democracy. In democracy, citizens are political equals, they 
17 "We don't pay taxes. Only the little people pay taxes" Leona Helmsley, U.S. 
businesswoman. Quoted in New York Times (July 12, 1989).[last accessed 19.11.2009] 
18 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/17/barclays-quardian-iniunction-tax: articles 
examining how numerous banks, the ultra-rich and multinational organisations avoided paying 
taxes.[last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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rule and are ruled in turn (Spragens, 1999). This gives civic friendship a 
weakened form of equality: a political equality not resource equality. Whilst not 
wishing to dismiss this important line of enquiry it does raise equally troubling 
issues: what does it mean to be a political equal? Does it in its weakest sense 
merely refer to an equality before the law? Yet is the poor man really equal before 
the law with the rich man in practice? 
This may well be so, to a point, yet I feel there is something valuable in 
danger of being lost within the complexities of this argument. Central to the ideal 
of virtue friendship, as we elucidated in the previous chapter, friends regard the 
well-being of their friends as they do their own: they seek each other's good. 
Hence, when people look on each other as friends, this empathic bond allows 
them to step back from demanding the satisfaction of their own needs at all times 
and to consider the needs and the cost of decisions to others as being of equal 
worth. Sometimes the fact of friendship serves to put others first. However, in 
friendship, this tends to be motivated by the deep love between friends and, 
again, it is hard to see how this would realistically expand into the civic 
community. Whilst equality may be an essential ingredient needed by any civic 
relationship within a pluralistic society, the concept of friendship is unlikely to 
ground it. 
And so to the concept of a 'shared history'. To some extent it seems 
reasonable that a society might have a 'shared history' in that they may 
experience certain world events together, for instance the death of a public figure 
(e.g. Diana, Princess of Wales), public tragedies (the events of 9/11). But this in 
turn begs other questions. Do we experience these things in the same way, with 
the same responses in the public arena? 
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The events that form the shared history between friends are experienced 
and lived by those particular individuals. Furthermore, it is quite possible in the 
civic arena for some members to be completely unaware of what is happening to 
their civic others. The plight of the Chinese cockle pickers, for example, brought 
the existence of an almost sub-culture of work-gangs and gang-masters to the 
attention of the British public; it had been assumed that such practices only 
happened in 'other places'.19 Certainly, some events are so widely publicised it is 
not possible to avoid knowing about them, but the knowledge tends to be gained 
through the mass media and not personally experienced, thus it is frequently 
superficial at best. It is the difference between being a participant in the events 
and an observer to the events. 
Similarly, the question arises at what point does one 'share' in a society's 
history? How long does one have to have lived in a country before one can claim 
to share in its history? Crucially, there are many minorities whose experience of 
the public sphere is one of exclusion; others may choose not to be a part of 
certain elements (Mason, interestingly, draws a distinction between citizens and 
long-term residents (Mason, 1997)). All that being said, it must be admitted that in 
many current liberal societies, the creation or understanding of a shared history is 
perceived as a difficulty, yet it need not be so. It can be claimed as a strength of 
democratic societies that they do allow for variation in the kinds of dispositions 
and attitudes permitted by citizens. Interestingly, the question then becomes, 
where should they draw the line between what is permissible and what should not 
be permitted? The civic relationship needs to be strong enough to permit 
19 On the 5th February, 2004, 21 Chinese cockle pickers, all illegal immigrants, were cut off by the 
tide and drowned at Morecambe Bay, UK because of the negligence of their gang master. 
httb://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/enqland/lancashire/4259226.stm [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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elements of inclusion for those who wish to be included, yet weak enough not to 
require the 'cricket test'20 . 
Turning now to the final feature, reciprocity. Friends spontaneously help 
each other in times of trouble out of concern for each other's welfare. What 
interests me here is the possibility of this concern converting into the civic sphere 
as a concern to provide all citizens with a minimum level of support. Superficially 
this extrapolation seems to have a logic about it. Yet the underlying rationale 
behind the provision of social welfare/civic aid works to restrict access to certain 
groupings. Most societies require a certain level of commitment, or reasonable 
anticipation of commitment, on the part of the beneficiary to the civic forum before 
allowing access to the aid (a certain length of residence, taxpaying etc); not just 
anyone can be a civic 'other'. Consider the recent argument concerning the 
extension of the EU to include many countries in Eastern Europe with a lower 
level of 'living' than the UK, leading to hasty, political moves to limit who may 
benefit and under which circumstances. 
This in turn results in two obvious outcomes: either firstly a seeking the 
good of another for no reason other than that one can or alternatively, a form of 
contributionist stance (that one should only aid those who can also in turn aid us). 
Taking the first pathway to begin with, altruistic actions do take place. Passers-by, 
seeing drowning children in rivers, do sometimes jump in at the risk of their own 
lives; people do donate to charities without knowing the recipient or without 
gaining anything in return; people do help their friends without thought of utility. 
Some people do have character traits fine-tuned to virtuous behaviour, and others 
do not. However, relying on people to develop virtuous characters may not be the 
20 Norman Tebbitt, a British politician, once claimed that citizens could be identified by which team 
they supported in a game of cricket 
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most advisable method of organising the way a society interacts or how they 
distribute social resources. 
The second pathway, as an extreme contributionist view of distributive 
justice, is rightly criticised by Buchanan (the idea that an individual has a right to a 
share of social resources if that individual contributes or can contribute to the 
community surplus) (Buchanan, 1990). This, as he points out, clashes with the 
sense we may have that even those who cannot contribute deserve to be treated 
justly. To say that only those who can contribute have a right to social resources 
would have profound, unpleasant implications for the treatment of the disabled 
and goes against many of our common instincts. We do have instincts that those, 
who from birth, are profoundly disabled in ways which prevent them from 
contributing in any way, should still deserve support from social resources, and 
that any theory of justice as fairness should allow and enable this. A strict form of 
reciprocity would rule out such views and would seem to destroy any notion of 
'civic friendship'. 
Whilst there may be a form of reciprocity and mutual aid common in both 
personal and civic sphere, the underlying motive is different. In the personal 
sphere, the motive is the relationship with the other as a person; in the public 
sphere, the character or person of the other is not always relevant: the motive is 
more of an utility relationship, which may not be mutual for all who benefit. Having 
rejected both forms of friendship as a model for the civic relationship, in the next 
section I consider further the close connection, and, on occasions conflation, 
between the concepts of friendship and citizenship. 
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Section 4: Friendship and Citizenship 
Scorza identifies two important structural similarities between friendship 
and citizenship (Scorza, 2004). Firstly, just as relationships between individuals 
evolve over time and develop with effort, so might those between citizens. He 
gives the example of how incensed we might be if a slight acquaintance 
presumed a level of intimacy in the relationship that may not exist, and relates it to 
that of citizens having claims made upon them by complete strangers and how 
this, too, may feel excessive. Just as a person might be displeased at a slight 
acquaintance expecting to move into their spare room when they have been 
made homeless, so might a community feel annoyed over newly arrived 'legal 
aliens' jumping the housing list over others within the settled community. This 
comparison, however, may merely mean there are layers to both, layers of 
friendships and layers of citizenship, interesting, but ultimately not necessarily 
enlightening. 
Secondly, he claims that citizens in modern liberal democracies may 
disagree and fight with each other as much as friends. In answer to this, I purport 
that when friends disagree, they try to govern those disagreements in such a way 
as to preserve the friendship bond, without stifling disagreement or terminating 
the bond completely. Neither do they risk an escalation to violence and snapping 
the bond. It may not be just a matter of differing opinions, as it might be with 
friends, but matters of substance that risk 'snapping the bond'. 
I can think of no better way of illustrating this point than to recall the 
banning of wearing the hijab headscarf within schools in France in 2004.21  The 
disagreement over the interpretation of the separation of religion and state within 
21 
 htto://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/04/schools.schoolsworldwide. Wednesday 4 February 
2004. Jon Henley. [last accessed 19.11.09] 
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the French Constitution and the practical effects that had for certain sectors of the 
school community, (whether Muslim, Sikh, Christian or Jewish), had already 
escalated. Many commentators argued that such a ban could result in the retreat 
of certain religious sections of the community away from the civic public sphere, 
that more students would leave the state-provided education system and seek out 
the religiously founded sectors that would allow these religious symbols/clothing 
(Gereluk, 2006a; Gereluk, 2006b; Levinson and Levinson, 2003). What makes 
this issue so complex is that this, in turn, would have the unintended outcome of 
possibly cutting those same people off from the civic forum whereby citizens can 
attempt to reach some form of shared public reason. In addition, it abandons 
attempts to create a shared history. 
Whilst the French authorities acknowledged that this might place a more 
onerous burden on certain sectors of the community for whom it may be a 
religious requirement, they equally claimed that this should not negate the duties 
as citizens that such communities of tradition hold. The argument was that there 
should be some place in the public domain whereby people can come together as 
citizens, not as members of such and such a community, and if this argument can 
be made, then surely in schools, wherein students are learning the duties, rights 
and responsibilities of becoming citizens, it assumes even more importance.22 A 
further argument pointed out that the wearing of some symbolic clothing directly 
contradicted many of the values and commitments held by the secular state (the 
burqa and niqab were seen as contrary to the equal status of women within the 
political sphere). 
22 Of course, the added worry is also of the pressure on some Muslims to wear the hijab, who 
might not otherwise do so, or even, as a recent court case in the UK identified, the pressure to go 
even further and wear the jilbab - and whether pupils should be protected from such pressures. 
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Such a view assumes, however, that one can divorce one's community 
affiliations from one's civic affiliations and it is unclear whether or not in practice 
this can be done. When one enters the public sphere, it is not a question of 
either/or in one's affiliations, but often both at the same time. Members of 
communities are rarely, if ever, members of just one community. Frequently they, 
of necessity, are members of several, overlapping communities, for instance a 
religious, a political, a social, a familial. They may, in a 'pick and mix' fashion, 
choose from a variety of mores and values interweaving many contradictory 
points of view. That we allow our beliefs to influence our actions is not that 
remarkable, but it is another thing entirely to claim that we cannot stand back from 
those beliefs and consider other viewpoints within, for example, the civic sphere. 
(If this were not so, then no one would be able to question their belief systems or 
to exit their communities, and common experience tells us that this happens.) 
John Kerry is reported to have said that when he votes as a politician he is a 
representative of more voices than just his own, and has to stand back from his 
personal belief commitments. 23 
Here I concur with Wellman, who argues convincingly that relationships 
between fellow citizens are not like those of personal friends and that the 
comparison is particularly ill-suited for three reasons (Wellman, 2001). We should 
examine his arguments in full as answers to the points made by Scorza. Firstly, 
he shows that personal friendships are chosen and consented to in a way that 
citizenship is not. Whilst there is a sense in which one can give up one's 
citizenship and take on another, citizenship as such, is not initially chosen nor 
consented to. Secondly, Wellman points out that the strong emotional attachment 
23 Democratic Candidate in the USA for president (in response to threats by Catholic Bishops that 
Catholic politicians who vote in favour of abortion etc should be denied Communion). 
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felt between two personal friends is lacking in the public sphere to the same 
degree. Personal friendship requires a form of caring, of intimacy, of having 
feelings towards someone, for it to be even termed a friendship. It would seem 
strange to expect someone to have an emotional attachment to complete 
strangers and to have the sort of caring feelings for people who may be very 
different from yourself, with whom you have very little in common, and whom you 
might never meet. There may, however, be a way out of this difficulty; if instead of 
expecting friendship within the civic sphere to echo that in the personal sphere 
(an unreasonable expectation, considering the amount of time and energy 
required to get to know people, for no one's life is long enough to allow for 
friendship with more than a minute percentage of a population), one changed the 
emphasis. In the civic sphere one should act as if one had caring attachments: 
being 'friendly' without being 'friends'. 
Lastly, Wellman indicates that whereas friendship might be argued to have 
intrinsic value, citizenship can only ever have extrinsic value. This last point, 
however, is debatable. Mason, for instance, challenges this viewpoint and claims 
that citizenship can also have intrinsic value (Mason, 1997), that citizens can have 
special obligations to each other based on the intrinsic moral worth of citizenship. 
He argues that nations are partially constituted by their traditions, that these 
traditions are themselves intrinsically valuable, and that as such one might have 
an obligation to sustain such traditions. Furthermore, by being a citizen, one is 
part of a collective body in which one enjoys equal status and recognition with 
other members. This collective body, the state, enjoys considerable power and 
influence over the members above that exercised by individuals. As such, they 
can contribute to the collective life, including forming laws and policies. Part of 
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being a citizen, in these terms, is having special obligations and responsibilities to 
fellow citizens (Mason, 1997). 
Yet to regard fellow citizens as in some way equating to 'a second self in 
the Aristotelian framework is to suggest an unrealistic mode of engagement in the 
whole life of the other, as a form of caring for the whole of each person that would 
be unsustainable in a modern liberal democracy. Similarly, and perhaps, more 
importantly, the public sphere has to encompass all people, regardless of how we 
feel about them, and it has to do so as political equals, in a way that friendship 
does not. It is possible to be friendly towards relative strangers and yet not have a 
friendship with them; friendliness is not itself friendship. 
Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the affective element of friendship. If 
friendship is a type of love (Thomas, 1993), if it requires an emotional attachment 
to another (Cooper, 1999; Long, 2003), it is difficult to see how this can be 
replicated in the civic sphere. diZerega agrees that all too often liberal writers 
have shied way from the "affective dimension of social life" (diZerega, 2003, p23) 
and rightly concludes that the civic relationship: 
... applies to all human beings equally....Friendship is selective, 
excluding as well as including. 	 (diZerega, 2003, p.24) 
Friendship has a certain exclusivity. It must exclude others in some way from 
sharing in the relationship. Each friendship is unique and irreplaceable: the 
features or virtues of A if found in B cannot be seen as an instance of a universal 
and thus lead to a replaceable friendship. There is a sense in which the civic 
membership has to be inclusive to a far greater extent than with personal friends: 
it has to include those we may not like. 
Within the Aristotelian framework, friendship requires a common 
commitment to the good. Within the civic domain, this would seem to entail an 
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official conception of virtue (Spragens, 1999). This is not to undermine nor negate 
the importance of friendship itself, merely to indicate that this may not be possible 
within the wider context of a liberal society committed to individual liberty in 
pursuit of plural conceptions of human flourishing. Perhaps friendliness, or 
goodwill, is all we can ask for in the civic sphere but neither virtue equates with 
friendship. 
It seems obvious that the concept of civic friendship cannot possibly be a 
literal form of friendship, yet I question whether indeed, it can even act at a 
metaphorical level. To be an appropriate metaphor requires the use of one part of 
experience to throw light upon another (Pepper, 1982); metaphors work by 
crossing categories of concepts and a similarity or contrast may be created. To 
consider this further, I now turn to the original context and purpose of civic 
friendship, questioning whether it can still perform its historic task. 
Section 5: The Ancient Greeks and Civic Friendship 
The desire to extend the virtues of friendship to the civic sphere is perhaps 
grounded in trying to pinpoint a particular moral dimension within the political field. 
As Brunkhorst indicates, within the historical tradition of civic friendship lay a 
desire to import the obligations of friendships into the communal bond 
(Brunkhorst, 2005). This idea of networked civic friendship was itself an attempt to 
deal with the problems of social integration, how a civic community could hold 
together without recourse or dependency upon the bonds of tribal relationships to 
create a socially cohesive society. 
As previous sections have argued, Aristotle clearly believes that individual 
friendship could be seen as a model for the public realm through being a 
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normative model for the practice of citizenship. Schwarzenbach indicates that 
Aristotle sees friendship between citizens as: 
...a necessary condition for the justice of any political regime. In the 
worst regime such as tyranny, he writes in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
there is the least amount of friendship. 
(Schwarzenbach, 2005, p234) 
Nevertheless, in what follows, I will argue that it would be a serious error to try to 
align the Greek concept with that of our own modern situation. 
To summarise in three points. Firstly, the arena within which Aristotle was 
writing was very different. He was writing for a small city-state (small by our 
standards) of about 15-20,000 citizens. The Athenian society was lived 'face-to-
face', in a culturally homogenous community. This in turn was upheld by vast 
quantities of slaves, creating the leisure conditions necessary for their 
deliberations. The size of the citizenry, as well as its composition (it omitted 
slaves, women, children and foreigners) meant that individuals could exercise real 
political power in a way not available within larger modern communities 
(Cartledge, 1993; Constant, 1806). Even here, the size of the citizenry would not 
have allowed for fellow citizens to have direct friendship with each other, neither 
did Aristotle expect it to. 
Secondly, the idea of friendship as a voluntary bond (as opposed to ties of 
blood) became an analogy for politics, separating the household from the polis. 
According to Benjamin Constant, (Constant, 1806) amongst the ancient Greeks, 
the individual was sovereign in public affairs having direct influence on law-
making and issues of war and peace. Because of this, the commitments to family 
versus the demands of the polis created a constant threat to public stability. 
Thirdly, an ancient Greek practice amongst aristocratic families was to form 
alliances with leading families of other cities called 'guest-friendships' (xenoi). 
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These 'xenoi', for example, would provide a refuge in exile should one offend or 
no longer be able to live in one's own state. They were not built on friendship but 
on obligation that could override other obligations (Herman, 1987). The host was 
obliged to provide food and shelter; the 'xenoi' in return was obliged not to raise 
arms against the host. These bonds of xenia outlasted the lives of individuals and 
were inherited by their descendents, could lapse for many years and then be 
reactivated, binding not just individuals but families together. As ritual friendships 
became over time transformed into political friendships, the kinship ties of 
individuals created a tension with civic demands (Deneen, 2000; Herman, 1987; 
Konstan, 1997). 
Aristotle's concept of civic friendship should thus be seen in this context, as 
an answer to the problem faced by the ancient city in which friendships of kin and 
guest- friendships endangered political stability within a particular political 
framework. Does this mean that the notion of civic friendship can no longer 
contribute to our understanding of how we relate in large culturally diverse 
communities? The modern state contains many millions of others who may not 
share a common view, or trust each other, certainly not necessarily have a shared 
history, and probably not harbour mutual affection for each other (features of 
personal friendship). How could they possibly know each other's character as 
friends would do? Is what we commonly call 'civic friendship' a form of friendship 
at all? It is unclear within The Ethics as to whether Aristotle, himself, is classifying 
civic friendship as a type of utility friendship or of virtue friendship. I think that this 
is critical and perhaps deliberate. In my concluding section, I shall elaborate why. 
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Section 6: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have considered whether the personal form of friendship 
can be extrapolated to the civic domain as a model for the bond needed for the 
socially cohesive society. My argument is that trying to identify which form of 
personal friendship civic friendship is best modelled on, may be to miss the point 
entirely. There are too many differences between the two to make the metaphor 
work effectively by carrying necessary attributes from one area of experience to a 
new one. By attempting to translate the features and structures from personal 
friendship into the public realm, we run into insurmountable problems. 
Firstly, virtue friendship would be impossible with large numbers and 
inappropriate without a winnowing of the content of the virtues. These same 
virtues and dispositions of personal friendship may be present to a greater or 
lesser degree in 'civic friendship', but not uniquely so: they are also present in 
many other concepts, such as democracy, solidarity for example. What of utility 
friendship? If it is possible to expand the concept of 'utility' to cover those beyond 
the immediate beneficiaries, this concept may be useful. We are all of us 
'attached' to someone who may be of no economic use to others or who may 
become of no economic use to others. It can make sense to include these people 
within a system of mutual aid and advantage because of others' attachment to 
them and our inability to see into the future as to when, where or how we in turn 
may need support and help. 
Nevertheless, one can have utility relationships without having friendship. It 
seems obvious that not all personal relationships are ones of friendship; why 
would we expect civic relationships to be a form of friendship? It is quite possible 
to behave in a 'friend-like' way to complete strangers and not be friends. I may 
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support the payment of child benefit to complete strangers through general 
taxation and not expect the recipients to come up and thank me. My motive is not 
that of liking the recipient, but a question of social justice: I can be 'friendly' 
towards my civic others without being their friend. Arguing over which Aristotelian 
form of friendship the civic relationship emanates from may not ultimately be 
helpful. 
Secondly, personal friendship has both an affective as well as a 
behavioural aspect. One of the overriding features of personal friendship is that of 
an affective, emotional attachment to another person, as a form of love (Fortier, 
1971; Thomas, 1987; Thomas, 1993). However, the civic relationship cannot 
contain the emotional attachments that are a defining feature of friendship on a 
large scale. We cannot care for everyone that we come across in the way we care 
for our special friends. At most, we can act in a way as if we care but care itself 
cannot be drummed up at will. We cannot come to care for our civic others as 
persons for we cannot get to know them as persons. No one's life is long enough. 
Can we legitimately base questions of justice on personal feelings towards 
others? 
Thirdly, the value of the concept of civic friendship may be in viewing it 
metaphorically. Somehow, when we consider our civic others, we should in some 
way, regard them as 'friends'. Metaphors abound in political philosophy and serve 
the purpose of enabling us to see the familiar in new ways, in explaining or 
clarifying, in providing insight to a problem. They give us a vocabulary to grasp 
complex unfamiliar domains. Take, for example, a model such as Benedict 
Anderson's 'Imagined Communities', wherein he posits the idea of the nation as 
an 'imagined community': 
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...because the members of even the smallest nations will never know 
most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion. 
(Anderson, 1991, p.6) 
The argument is not whether metaphors are useful in understanding the 
world, but that we need to carefully consider which particular metaphors we 
choose and how we subsequently use them (Lunt, 2005). We need to bear in 
mind how the chosen metaphor functions in directing policy by subconsciously 
encapsulating our deepest commitments and values, as shall be expanded on in 
Chapter 6. In the case of civic friendship, to indicate a likeness, to comment on 
similar features, to indicate a 'family resemblance' is one thing; to suggest that it 
goes deeper than this and indicates a closer relationship, that the civic 
relationship is a type of friendship, is entirely another. Friendship depicts 
relationships to particular others, our 'imaginary community' is not of that 
category. With the change in usage of terminology and changes in the nature of 
society, 'civic friendship' as a metaphor no longer fulfils its original function. 
Fourthly, the very concept 'civic friendship' seems to spiral downwards 
eventually into a partialism/impartialism argument. Friendship requires a form of 
partiality to a particular other that can be inappropriate in the civic arena; justice 
requires a form of impartiality. Schwarzenbach's argument for an impartial civic 
friendship based in part on individual rights and a re-emphasis on relationships 
between citizens (Schwarzenbach, 1996; Schwarzenbach, 2005) fails to 
acknowledge it would not qualify as a form of friendship. Once we introduce the 
vocabulary of rights, we start to leave the realm of friendship. We have to be 
partial to our friends, yet the civic relationship has to exclude this type of partiality. 
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Fifthly, any concept of political friendship today would have to acknowledge 
the fact of pluralism in society; citizens cannot be expected to hold thick values in 
common (Schwarzenbach, 1996, p114). This does not mean we hold no values in 
common or have no regard for the character of our civic others. Schwarzenbach 
concedes that even for Aristotle, civic friendship does not imply that all citizens of 
a city know and personally like each other (Schwarzenbach, 1996), yet the city-
state cannot equate to largely urban modern liberal democracies that encompass 
many millions of citizens with frequently competing visions of the good. The 
cohesion that may have been experienced within the Greek city-state may not 
translate into current political realities. 
Finally, Hansot directs us to consider that for Aristotle, civic friendship is 
grounded: 
...in part, in friendships between persons developed in the civic arenas. 
And of course the reverse is true: civic friendship in turn grounds the 
cognate practice of friendship between persons. Common to both is the 
notion of a settled disposition, the result of education reinforced by 
habituation in the individual and by custom in the polity. 
(Hansot, 2000, p178) 
Friendship is thus seen as not just practice, but also disposition. Practice and 
disposition can become customary behaviour and then develop as part of the 
background environment within which other practices can develop and flourish 
(Hansot, 2000, p180). These are among the predispositions that form the 
essential environmental ethos within which civic life should take place. We are 
back in the realm of civic virtue ... minus the friendship. Any attempt to situate the 
civic bond within the prevailing conceptualisation of civic friendship is doomed to 
failure. 
The journey, however, is not without value. Whilst Vernon indicates an 
impoverishment of popular discourse which has virtually privatised the concept of 
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friendship in modern life (Vernon, 2005), we cannot ignore the complex interplay 
between past and present conceptions in this area. Aristotle's expansion of 
friendship into the civic arena in The Ethics directs us to consider the importance 
or otherwise of 'the shared life' in enabling public discourse in the civic space, and 
a concern for the wellbeing of each other and shared desire for the good life. Part 
of the appeal of civic friendship lies in an attempt to expand an understanding of 
the 'binding togetherness' of friendship into civic life. However, the concept of 
'civic friendship' promises more than it can deliver. Friendliness is not the same 
thing as friendship. We are left finally facing the crucial question: it may be civic... 
but is it friendship? 
In the next chapter, I turn to the metaphor of market in which I will consider 
different strains of loyalty, and question how conceptions of civic relationships are 
formed. 
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Chapter 4 
Loyalty 
Introduction 
A Church school was approaching an Ofsted inspection.24 A new head 
teacher had been appointed the year before under unusual circumstances (the 
only person interviewed, close friend of some of the governors, etc.). The new 
head came with a reputation of poor management style from her previous school, 
and soon the new school staff discovered why. In short, she was a bully. She not 
only bullied the staff, but also the pupils. It was common place for her to shout at 
staff and undermine their authority in front of each other and in front of the 
children and to humiliate the children as well. Staff meetings were dreaded as 
each member of staff was targeted in turn for ridicule until eventually they either 
left for other jobs, or went on extended sick leave. Within a year, half the staff had 
left and been replaced. New arrivals soon started looking for a way out. 
The staff were caught. Should they stay and try to protect the children from 
the worst of the bullying, or should they think first and foremost of themselves and 
their careers and get out? Finally, remaining staff decided that they had to let the 
inspection team know what was really happening in the school and five of them 
told the Ofsted inspectors the truth. The inspectors were horrified at the reports ... 
and accused said staff members of being disloyal. 
24 Ofsted (The Office for Standards in Education) is the body responsible for inspection of schools 
in England. 
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The seeming view of the inspectors was that the teachers owed a duty of 
loyalty to the school and to the head that should have prevented them from any 
action that put either in a bad light. They assumed that the overriding loyalty 
should be to protect the school's reputation, and the head teacher in her role as 
head teacher. The staff, whilst acknowledging their emotional ties and loyalties in 
this direction, felt competing claims for their loyalty from their resolve as 
professionals to protect the children. To be loyal to one area entailed a necessary 
disloyalty in another area. 
Loyalty is a confusing area of study. We take for granted that it is 
praiseworthy to be a loyal person. Indeed, Royce refers to loyalty as: "the heart of 
all virtues, the central duty amongst all duties" (Royce, 1908, p xxiv). Yet dig a 
little deeper and a myriad of problems emerge. Whilst loyalty is a devotion of a 
person to a cause (Royce, 1908), there is no guarantee it will be a good cause: it 
is quite possible to be loyal to a bad cause - history has shown us many examples 
of this. If this is the case, how can loyalty be a civic virtue? 
Recently, philosophers have attempted to create an alternative picture of 
how this might be envisioned as a model for civic behaviour. Oldenquist, for 
example, situates loyalty squarely in the domain of the normative: 
...in terms of the logic of the reasons they provide, loyalties are a third 
category of the normative, distinct from both self-interest and impersonal 
morality. 
(Oldenquist, 1982, p176) 
Can loyalty, as a study of the moral relationships between people, offer a model 
for the normative relationship between citizens allowing us to sidestep the cul-de-
sac of friendship and its partner civic friendship? Can it enlighten us as to how 
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citizens should relate to each other and how these attitudes could then be taught 
to future citizens within a cohesive society? 
The UK, in common with many other countries, has gradually been 
importing the language and practices of the market place into educational 
language and practice. The privatisation of education as yet another commodity 
and/or parental choice has been written about many times (Boyd, 1987; 
Brighouse, 2000; Edwards and Whitty, 1997; Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997; 
Halpin, Power and Fitz, 1991; Tooley, 1995; Tooley, 1996). Furthermore, the 
social process that I am looking at within this chapter has been considered 
recently from the point of view of parents and their responses to the increasing 
effects of marketisation of education systems, to gain advantages and maximise 
chances through intensified positional competition (Ball, 2003). That there are 
elements of education and school structures that can be susceptible to real 
markets and can be bought or sold is outside the parameters of this thesis. I do 
not propose to cover this ground but accept that this description of the invasion of 
both genuine markets and market values, with the resulting effects of parental 
choice and specialisation of schools in education is accurate. Where I depart from 
commentaries and empirical research on this, is to apply a philosophical 
perspective by examining it through the lens of different strains of loyalty: that the 
commodification of education leads to undermining and might, under certain 
conditions, erase the very structures of loyalty and ties between people that are 
not only essential for the civic arena, but also necessary for schools to function in 
their civic task of educating the future citizenry. 
This chapter seeks to explore the possibility of loyalty as a model for civic 
connectedness and to lay out the implications such a model would have in the 
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realm of education. The task of discerning how the bond of loyalty ties in with 
issues of the market metaphor is both complex and intricate. The market 
metaphor relies on the cross-over of theories, language and values prevalent in 
the field of economics and business studies. Hence to examine this metaphor 
requires untangling these elements in their original fields. As a result of this, I use 
both theories of brand loyalty and Hirschman's distinction between Exit and Voice, 
to examine how human loyalties may be formed in general and then I apply these 
insights within the field of education. I indicate the implications this has for how 
these attitudes can then be taught to and developed between future citizens. I 
argue that the use of an inappropriate model of loyalty is forming our discourse in 
the world of education, and that this has serious repercussions for developing 
civic loyalty: that the form of loyalty encouraged and fostered within school 
systems and organisations is more akin to the vertical loyalty of the ruler and 
ruled (brand loyalty) than the horizontal loyalty needed of the equal citizens in a 
democratic society. 
In this chapter, I initially look at personal loyalty as a personal and civic 
virtue before considering the loyalty of the marketplace. In section 1, I look at 
loyalty as a relationship to particular others. Then in section 2, I consider the role 
that loyalties have in creating our identities. After that, in section 3, I consider 
what makes us loyal and turn to empirical work on loyalty within the marketplace, 
laying out briefly two types of brand loyalty to be used later in my argument, 
inertial brand loyalty and cost brand loyalty, reinforcing this with Hirschman's 
contribution in this area on Exit and Voice. In Section 4, I consider how schools 
and educational systems help create identity-loyalties. Following from this, in 
Section 5, I apply the metaphor of the market place loyalties within the 
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educational domain. In section 6, I contrast personal loyalty with civic loyalty, 
including patriotism, and argue that civic loyalty needs to go beyond this. In 
section 7, the conclusion, I argue that the use of marketplace language and 
suppositions that schooling systems can be equated with business practices are 
based on the misuse of a metaphor, which has the capacity to undermine civic 
cohesion. 
Section 1: What is Loyalty? 
A striking feature of this initial debate is that loyalty is now seen as more of 
a matter of personal choice against the historical reality of being imposed upon 
people by virtue of who they were and where they lived (Franck, 1999, p62). But 
what is loyalty itself and what is it to be loyal? Loyalty does not arise in the 
abstract: it arises as a result of a relationship to a particular other. Crucially, 
loyalty has to have some object. One has to be loyal to something or someone. 
Hence, to be loyal is more than merely having an attachment to something or 
someone: it requires a particular attitude. It is no wonder, perhaps, that it is 
difficult to find a person with no loyalties at all. Sometimes, as in the example at 
the start of this essay, there are competing loyalties. Loyalty requires an attitude 
of affection enabling one to put the needs or wants of another above one's own. 
Loyalty requires that, when the chips are down, we choose to help and support 
our friend, relative or colleague over a stranger. The key point to note here is that 
it grounds our behaviour and gives us motives for action. 
We do not just adopt projects, causes and persons to be loyal to at 
random; we are loyal for reasons. Critically, we are usually loyal when by doing so 
we in some way benefit or we deem the cause to be valuable. For this reason, 
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loyalty denotes how we stand to one another within an intricate web of 
relationships. Historically, our loyalty to tribe and clan members has been based 
on some expectation of a mutual benefit: the expectation of them being loyal to 
us, an expectation of food, shelter, and comfort: all the things necessary for 
survival. Our loyalty was the price we paid. 
One obvious way in which this can have a bearing on wider, civic 
connections is that loyalty can interfere with our deepest convictions in deciding 
on and judging moral behaviour; it can cloud our ability to be impartial where 
questions of our ties to others come into play. When we love someone, when we 
have an attachment that demands particular forms of loyalty, impartial moral 
judgement is on occasion blurred and sometimes inappropriate. Choosing to 
rescue our partners, our children, or our closest friends from drowning before 
unknown strangers are actions demanded by those ties, frequently without 
questioning the moral justification. We just do it. Indeed, the very act of 
questioning really would be 'one thought too many'. All too often there is unease 
that those who have to hesitate and weigh up what they should do before acting 
at all in such circumstances are somehow reproachable and are, themselves, 
failing to fully understand what is demanded by those ties. Underlying this is the 
assumption that ties by their very nature, demand actions, actions of particular 
kinds. 
On the surface, it seems obvious that loyalty crosses from the personal to 
the civic arena. Nevertheless, one does not suddenly choose to be loyal and then 
become loyal any more than one wakes up one morning and decides to be 
someone's friend (as indicated in a previous chapter). Suffice it to say, loyalty 
takes time to develop and also requires some form of shared history: I cannot 
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suddenly decide to be loyal to Canada and all its values, ways of life for example. 
I can, however, change my allegiance to that of Canada by finding out about the 
values, ways of life and, finding them to my liking, decide to adopt them after a 
time. Here, the time element is crucial: the emotional ties or attitudes take time to 
form and bind one properly from one set of values to another. Indeed, a 
comparison can be drawn with the development of a shared history within the 
concept of friendship as denoted in the previous chapters. As the new ones form, 
the old wither away, and exit from the previous attachments becomes possible. 
Connected with this is that when I have a loyalty towards something or 
someone, I regard it as in some way being 'mine'. Its value to me is derived from 
that emotional attachment: my friend, my family, my school. It is undoubtedly true 
that when that which belongs to me prospers, then I feel pride; when it is hurt or 
suffers, I suffer or feel the pain as well. In other words, we care about the objects 
of our loyalties and this can move us to action. 
If loyalty requires a propensity to put the needs of another first, sometimes 
even at the expense of one's own well-being, surely it can lead to some 
anomalies? By the same token, whilst we expect a parent to be willing to sacrifice 
for their own child, because they are their children, we do not expect them to be 
willing to sacrifice for someone else's child under normal circumstances. But how 
much do we expect them to sacrifice? Can their loyalty to their particular child 
warrant them over-riding the well-being of others? 
A true story. A girl wanted to be a cheerleader in the USA. Her mother, in 
order to bring about the dream of her daughter, murdered the nearest rival to the 
position, in order to improve her daughter's chances (the case of Wanda Holloway 
in Texas, USA, 1991). Can the parent's attachment to their particular child warrant 
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such things? There is a distinct difference between self-sacrifice (parents 
frequently go without things to ensure their children are provided for) and sacrifice 
of others. We would typically accept that such loyalty ties are limited in what they 
can justify. 
It is perhaps to be expected that who we are as people is affected by the 
values and attachments we form and the beliefs, attitudes and actions 
surrounding us. Our commitment to uphold these values and attachments 
reinforces those attachments within a moral community. Lu argues that a 
commitment to these values requires a commitment to their public display and 
expression and a commitment to seeing those loyalties prosper: "Public loyalty is 
an important consequence of moral maturity in the life of a shared moral 
community" (Lu, 2005, p224). But to see it as a circular pattern is to abandon our 
responsibility for those loyalties and our capacity to reflect critically as to their 
worth. 
In summary, being loyal, having ties and commitments, is fundamental to 
what it is to be human. Who we are and how we view ourselves impinges on our 
relationships to others. Loyalty requires an attitude of a particular kind; it denotes 
a particular tie or bond; the bond requires particular actions to reinforce the bond. 
It helps us separate those we need to be partial to from those deserving of 
impartiality (Oldenquist, 1982). But the act of loyalty cannot be a substitute for 
moral discernment. Loyalty is our attachment to the cause after deeming it 
worthwhile. The problem is in discerning what is worth our loyalty, and how much. 
To explore this further requires that we explore the connection between loyalty 
and self-identity. 
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Section 2: Loyalty and Identity 
As the preceding discussion has suggested, when we speak of our 
personal identity, we usually mean those attributes that make us unique as 
individuals and different from others (Olson, 1965). Fletcher, for example, refers 
to this as the 'historical self: our history and our personal biographies make up 
who we are (Fletcher, 1993, p16). It seems evident that we do not choose to be 
born into a particular culture, neither do we choose our initial mother-tongue, 
childhood religious or political ideals. These commitments are made on our behalf 
by others - parents, family or leaders. 
For instance, it is to be expected that a child brought up in a closed 
community such as the Amish, will eventually choose to stay Amish. It should be 
noted that the Amish claim to operate a 90% retention rate (Walker, 2002). They 
have been brought up to believe certain beliefs about how they should live their 
lives, which will affect how they live their lives. Central to this is that their earlier 
experiences will have formed their inclination to make that choice. 
People identify with each other on the grounds of similarities: indeed, 
aspects of our self-identity are tied up with this. To take just one example, 
Anderson's idea of the 'imagined community' points to a certain psychological 
component of nationhood, that we need a group identity, a community we think of 
as 'us' (Anderson, 1991) and that as such, nationhood is intimately connected to 
our sense of who we are. It would be possible for someone to identify with 
different groupings for different purposes, for example groupings of teachers, 
ethnic origins, philosophers, vegetarians, stamp collectors, religious affiliations. 
Some groupings may clash in their aims and objectives; others sit side by side. In 
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the civic arena, it springs from the need to identify those who are to be governed 
together, and those outside the scope of such governance (Gilbert, 1998, p26). 
Whilst our personal identities are linked in with our group memberships and 
loyalties, there is also, as Glover points out, an identity that we create for 
ourselves branching out from these 'givens' that gives a sense of authority over 
our own lives (Glover, 1999). This self-creation is a long process. Glover likens it 
to a narrative: 
The story we tell ourselves, partly by what we do and partly by how we 
edit the account of our past, is central to our sense of our own identity. 
(Glover, 1999, p145) 
Our lives are bound up with those of other people, who in turn play a role in our 
stories. This makes them important to us, drawing heavily on shared stories, a 
shared frame of reference to these events, a common history in which our lives 
can flourish. In addition to this, our group identities frame what we value and how 
much. To have a coherent identity consequently leads us to behave in certain 
ways to protect that identity: we are loyal to the sources that give meaning to that 
identity. 
Section 3: What makes us Loyal? 
Turning back momentarily to a previous claim: we can be loyal to differing 
things, many at the same time, for example to professional associations, to family 
units, to sports teams. The loyalty is strongest when it is to particular others: this 
particular football team, this particular family, this particular group of workers. 
Loyalty has benefits to others as well as to ourselves: it keeps us bound to like-
minded others when there are alternative choices. 
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As a way into this discussion, I need to introduce two further ideas using 
theories and empirical evidence prevalent in the study of economics to look at the 
psychology behind loyalty: brand loyalty (to discuss what keeps us loyal) and 
Hirschman's concepts of Exit and Voice (Hirschman, 1970). 
Brand Loyalty 
The majority of empirical studies of what it is to be loyal centre on the 
usefulness of loyalty in economic terms studying how firms can, through 
advertising and their public 'face', reinforce 'brand loyalty'. Whilst this theory of 
brand loyalty comes from marketing and economic theories, it can be a helpful 
lens to examine how human loyalties can be formed and from there, applied in the 
field of education. 
Within the parameters of this discourse, a customer is defined as brand 
loyal: "if his purchasing pattern depends positively on the last brand purchased" 
(Wernerfelt, 1991, p231). Brand loyalty, as Wernerfelt points out, is a fundamental 
concept in strategic marketing (Wernerfelt, 1991). Consumer behaviour theory is 
thus greatly concerned with loyalty as an attribute, and the sources and 
mechanisms through which it is created. 
Wernerfelt identifies two types of brand loyalty. The first (inertial brand 
loyalty) is characterised by a lack of awareness of the virtues or values of 
alternative brands: people are loyal out of habit: the consumer who stays with the 
local electricity board/ gas company and never seeks to compare prices or to 
switch companies to get the 'best deal'; the voter who always votes for the same 
party because that's what they have always done; the parent who sends their 
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child to the local school because it is their local school (or the one they 
themselves went to) without any thought or investigation of alternatives. 
In contrast, the second (cost-based loyalty) is characterised by 
consideration of the costs of switching. The consumer arms themselves with the 
information, comparing prices for instance, but chooses not to switch for now. 
Maybe there are costs to switching or inconvenience or the last brand had some 
advantage: the voter who reads all the manifestos and votes according to the 
policies that they most agree with/benefits them; the parent who collects all the 
available information about all alternatives, reads Ofsted reports, visits and then 
makes their 'informed' choice but is open to revision should circumstances 
change. 
The concept of brand loyalty is important in marketing because of its role in 
ensuring customers return again and again to the same item. Central to this is the 
claim that brand loyalty is a means by which companies may prevent consumers 
looking elsewhere. Specifically, it can ensure higher equilibrium prices as loyal 
consumers are less likely to look for alternatives. As a result of this, companies 
breaking into existing markets are forced to try to find ways to shift existing 
loyalties by working out the switching costs to loyal consumers of other 
companies or to build up loyalties in those not currently engaged in the market, 
perhaps by lower prices to new customers, special offers. 
Significantly, brand loyalties tend to be negative by nature. People are 
loyal, not for value of the item in question (there is not an attitude of affection 
consistent with the map of loyalty drawn up previously); they see things as 
'mine... for now'. All that being said, it must be admitted that occasionally 
companies will try to create a horizontal relationship between consumers, making 
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them identify with the company products through their ownership: this grouping 
says something about the type of person they are or wish to be seen as (clubs for 
purchasers of a particular brand of car perhaps). In so far as these customers are 
identifying each other as members of a group, there is a feeling of affection as 
fellow members of the group, but there is no willingness to sacrifice one's own 
well-being for the others or mutuality of sacrifice normally associated with the 
virtue of loyalty. It is too small a part of their identity. 
Brand loyalty tends to be created by a variety of measures: easily 
identifiable logos or mottos, clear public marketing to identifiable audiences, 'free' 
marketing via corporate sponsorships, company identities (which can include 
uniforms, company design in and of premises) etc. My contention is that brand 
loyalty is essentially a form of vertical loyalty: it exists between the supplier and 
the consumer. Hence if the consumer is not satisfied, they can exit and seek 
another supplier. 
Exit and Voice 
A major contribution to this argument, by Hirschman, distinguishes 
between exit (leaving) and voice (staying and fighting) as further development of 
the cost-based loyalty game. When members or customers become dissatisfied, 
the choices of action are exit (reaction in which customers leave for another 
product) or voice (in which customers choose to stay and provoke change by 
directly influencing the organisation) (Fletcher, 1993). Exit, and prevention of exit, 
has a major role to play in marketing strategies. Returning to a previous point, 
companies want to prevent exit from their particular brand: they want to keep 
people loyal to their brand. Yet in contrast to this, conventional free market theory 
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decrees that exit is to be encouraged in that it creates competition, drives down 
prices and benefits the consumer (Fletcher, 1993, p3). One solution to avoiding 
this flight, is that companies need to give consumers reasons to stay, hence the 
development of loyalty schemes. One argument in defence of this (Baron and 
Lock, 1995) concerns a chain of supermarkets in Missouri, US and describes how 
in-store marketing environments can have an impact on brand loyalty, price 
sensitivity and introduction of new brands, with information gleaned from scanner 
data (Baron and Lock, 1995; Wernerfelt, 1991). 
Voice, on the other hand, can range from making a complaint, attending 
stockholder meetings, negotiating, banding together with others etc. Arguably, 
many companies have had to change policies because of voice, for example 
Nestle and the baby milk scandal of the 1970s, Barclays Bank in South Africa 
amongst others. However, voice demands a greater commitment than exit. One 
example is that given by Fletcher quoting the fall of the Berlin Wall in the late 
eighties: 
Within a few months of the Berlin Wall's crumbling in November 1989, a 
million East Germans, 6 per cent of the population, left for the West. Not 
only was the federal Republic's "product" similar in history and language 
to life in the East, but the costs of exit were minimal. Only loyalty to the 
socialist way of life could have saved the German Democratic republic as 
a separate state, and it was clear from the outset that economic welfare 
was more important than the state's preservation. 
(Fletcher, 1993, p5) 
Interestingly, the cost of exit is a major factor in determining voice or exit, with 
neither being the exclusive response to any one problem (Labaree, 2000). 
Hirschman points out that exit is particularly suited to the economic sector. 
It is impersonal, neat, (one exits or one doesn't), indirect and confrontation is 
avoided (Hirschman, 1970). Voice, on the other hand, is personal. One has to 
articulate one's criticisms whether by grumbles or protest. Hirschmann describes 
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it as "political action par excellence" (Hirschman, 1970, p16). Exit is easier than 
voice: the latter requires spending time, effort, energy to persuade others to 
change or adapt their point of view. So far we have explored these factors from 
the position of economic theory, yet they have become increasingly powerful 
elements in the organisation of social life, hence in the next section, I turn to the 
field of education. 
Section 4: Loyalty in Education 
In recent years, numerous articles in the press reported how a previous UK 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, wished to import practices of independent and public 
schools into the state school sector. Interestingly, the very practices referred to 
were all concerned with the production of loyalty: school houses, earning points or 
credits, having and wearing school uniforms, internal competition between pupils 
and groups of pupils, competitive sports. These elements are all part of the 
loyalty-forming process; they enable schools to form a brand and corporate 
identity based on that brand. 
Schools are inevitably in the loyalty business. Our schools create bonds of 
identity-loyalty between pupils and also within their schools. At the same time, 
they aim at both horizontal loyalty (between each pupil as a member of the 
school) and vertical loyalty (from each pupil to the school). The sheer fact of 
referring to a class as Year 2 gives them a grouping to identify with, to belong to. 
By wearing a school uniform, they are encouraged to look the same in some 
respect and to be able to identify themselves as being alike in some way, and 
others who wear a different uniform as different. Coupled with this, most schools 
these days have mottos expressing some shared ideal, again, another identity- 
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forming device. This, then, is found on items used to identify members as part of a 
group (school uniforms, bags, scarves). Although there may be much to be said in 
favour of such practices in creating a 'community', the subconscious externalities 
of all this function to declare to others: this is who we are. We belong; those that 
are different do not belong to us. 
Many schools not only try to create a school identity and loyalties, but also 
identities and loyalties at the micro level. It is common practice amongst many 
primary schools to have 'table points' awarded for good behaviour and subtracted 
for poor. By giving the points to those seated at the same table, each pupil is then 
responsible for the behaviour of the next. When one succeeds, they all succeed: 
there is 'something in it for them'. All this leads to the children seeing themselves 
as part of a team: the formation of an 'us'. 
There is a downside to this: those who are not in the group are then 
rejected. Loyalty identifies those that belong together: and equally identifies those 
who are rejected as being 'other', serving to exclude as well as include. Those 
who for one reason or another cannot keep the school or group identity are 
singled out and made to feel different. School uniforms, however basic, cost 
money; not everyone can afford the right colours, shop providers for example. 
The more schools actively encourage children to come to school in the correct 
uniform, the more they make those who cannot do so, feel different and 
'outsiders'. Ultimately, an overemphasis on such things can lead to low-level 
bullying or rejection by peers. 
There are times when education is involved in attempts to exclude 
personal loyalties in order to create joint 'civic loyalties'. The recent 'hijab' ruling in 
France, as explored in the previous chapter, banning the wearing of ostentatious 
90 
religious symbols, is at one level concerned with creating the conditions in 
schools for an equal citizenry outside of personal or religious commitments, and 
the complete separation of church and state, but at another level is concerned 
with identity-loyalty symbols. Who we identify with is as important as how our 
identities are formed. An alternative interpretation of the ruling in France can be 
taken as an attempt to ensure that pupils think of themselves as French citizens 
first and foremost. It serves to introduce a new element into the argument: who 
we want to be (personal autonomy in choice over our future ends) over who we 
are (the sum of our allegiances, traditions and loyalties). Whilst schools can 
provide a place to expose children to various ways of life and commitments, trying 
to prevent children from public displays of religious allegiance may end up making 
such displays more attractive by virtue of being forbidden! 
Most schools in the UK have got around such problems with identity-
forming symbols by allowing religious dress, as long as it is in school colours. This 
allows for the principle sought of being the same (a group loyalty) and providing a 
common symbol (as in the same colours) yet allowing for other identity forming 
symbols (those of religious commitment). When the way we dress becomes an 
indicator of who we are and who we identify with, and thus indicates our deepest 
loyalties, it can and will continue to make others feel uncomfortable and excluded. 
School identity does not need to depend on all pupils looking the same to create 
bonds of loyalty. This raises, however, several troubling issues: which strands of 
identity-forming loyalties should schools have control over? And how much control 
is reasonable? 
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Section 5: Brand Loyalty in Education. 
So far we have explored the nature of loyalty and how schools can be 
closely involved with loyalty development. I now turn, in this section, to a parallel 
argument, applying the lens of brand loyalty within the education system itself. 
State schools have, since the 1980s, set up in direct and open competition with 
each other to attract pupils. Indisputably, the devolution of budgets to single 
school level have made schools function on one hand as quasi-businesses whilst 
on the other hand continue to function as a service to society at large. For schools 
to be able to plan financially, they need to know how much money is coming in, 
which in turn, depends on the number of pupils. As pupil funding now follows the 
pupil to any new school, there is the financial incentive for schools to encourage 
exit from other schools. So pervasive has this become, that schools with falling 
numbers and/or questions about their financial viability frequently find a small, but 
increasingly difficult, mobile pupil populace. As schools view themselves, even 
subconsciously, as businesses, so they adopt particular business practices. 
Where schools once worked together within particular clusters, the concept 
of competition now makes cooperation unlikely or difficult to achieve. Schools are 
unlikely to share ideas or work on shared projects if it could have an effect on 
their 'brand position' in the local market. Each school looks for something unique 
as a selling point to parents. In the UK, for example, secondary schools have long 
been encouraged to identify a specialism: sports academies, ICT academies, 
schools of the performing arts etc. This impetus is now being devolved downward 
to primary schools (brain-gym schools, brain-centred learning schools, Philosophy 
for Children schools etc.). However, the loyalty required towards one's particular 
'brand' or school that requires teachers to put their own school first above other 
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schools can have the unwanted side effect of discouraging the cooperative 
behaviour and the sharing of 'good practice' equally desired by other government 
policies. 
To take just one example. The government policy in the UK in the 1980-
90s encouraged schools to opt-out of local education control by offering such 
schools the promise of greater financial resources. Schools were encouraged to 
leave cooperative ways of mutual support and financial interdependence for 
greater individual independence. Such schools that chose to leave LEA control 
received additional financial resources to those remaining within the Local 
Authority influence, thus setting them up as a more 'attractive' option for parents 
who saw them as better resourced and in some way 'exclusive'. Indeed, in some 
cases schools received as much as £300,000 more than if they had stayed with 
the LEA counterparts (Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997, p. 20) 
Much of economic theory, as previously pointed out, is concerned with 
choice (Akerlof, 1983). By developing a range of different types of schooling 
systems/organisations, each offering a particular 'brand', it appears a choice is 
being created. A huge volume of research appears to indicate such choice is 
superficial at best and that schools' ability to themselves 'choose' their pupils is 
becoming apparent (Edwards and Whitty, 1997; Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997). 
Similarly, and perhaps more importantly, parents eager to maximise their child's 
economic welfare would thus be inclined to value choice between types of 
schools where it can be shown that one type would prove more advantageous for 
their child. Choice can reduce loyalty. 
Many school choice activists have noted that parents have been exercising 
this 'exit' indirectly for many years. Parents who are financially able to do so, exit 
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their children from state schools that do not meet their standards (whether 
educational or social) by moving house into the catchment area of a school that 
does (Anton, 2000; Cuban and Shipps, 2000; Swift, 2003). Some have been 
known to buy second homes in such areas, others stay in their homes and buy a 
different school system (private education), discover religious commitments where 
faith schools have a 'better reputation/standards', and others, still, choose to 
home-school (less so in this country than in the USA, but growing numbers are 
opting out altogether). 
Exit is possible, but expensive. Those who move to a more affluent area or 
pay thousands of pounds every year in private school fees are a minority. 
However, with funding following the pupil as they transfer between state schools, 
the cost of exit is then born by the school as they lose and gain pupils. Parents 
that choose one of these routes are "treating education as a private good" 
(Labaree, 2000, p115); they are treating education as another consumer good by 
exiting one system for another. The aim is not to improve the system or school left 
behind, but to attain the best goods for themselves. Applying the insights of the 
market, this vertical loyalty between consumer and supplier snaps as the 
consumer seeks another, 'better' product. Exit over voice. 
Labaree claims it is to be expected that state education should be 
experiencing the exit option as the preferred solution to educational problems. 
Reform initiatives for choice, charters, and vouchers offer educational 
consumers a variety of ways to leave schools they do not like and move 
to schools they do like. All of these reforms work by removing 
governmental barriers to the exercise of the exit option and increasing 
the responsiveness of schools to their exiting customers. The result, we 
are told, will be an increase in the quality of education. 
(Labaree, 2000, p115) 
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Yet 'Voice' is something schools are particularly open to: parent-teacher 
organisations, complaining directly to the teacher and head teacher, using 
professional and other organisations, appealing to the governors or LEA, 
becoming parent-governors for example. A television programme on school 
choice issues in the UK reported on a middle-class group of parents who 
consciously made the decision not to send their children to private schools, but to 
support their local state school.25 They each believed that state education would 
only improve if parents such as themselves (articulate, committed etc) would 
support their local school. Whilst each was reluctant to do it alone, they argued 
that collectively they could achieve an effectiveness that could not be achieved 
separately (See Reay et al, 2007). 26 Voice over exit. 
Within this argument, there are three distinct parties, each with their own 
reasons for loyalty: parents, children and schools. Schools, as I have previously 
stated are concerned to develop both vertical and horizontal loyalties. Pupils, 
similarly, are required to develop and exercise both forms also. Parents, on the 
other hand, work with a sense of vertical loyalties prevalent in the economic 
model; their loyalty is to their particular child. Whilst they may have concern that 
the school in general prospers, the motivation is the sake of their child. Few 
schools embed a sense of horizontal loyalties with their parents to keep them 
loyal, to give them a sense of ownership, of belonging to that community, and 
where they do, the loyalties may be to that limited grouping and not capable of 
expanding to a wider community of people dissimilar to themselves. 
25 Channel 4 "The Best For My Child" by Fiona Millar broadcast 5th March, 2004 
26 This phenomenon was the subject of a study by ESRC, as reported on by Reay et al: see web 
link for details: http://www.quardian.co.uk/education/2005/mar/15/schools.uk [last accessed 
19.11.2009] 
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I contend that the use of a metaphor from one field to another can lead to 
serious problems. The application of the metaphor of market surreptitiously 
imports the values associated with the metaphor, and as a result of this, can lead 
to the slow erasure of the horizontal loyalty demanded by a commitment to the 
civic sphere. For example, in one town in the shire counties in the 1990s, Roman 
Catholic parents were torn between their competing loyalties when the local 
Catholic secondary schools all became Grant Maintained and thus exited LEA 
control. For some parents, the decision to keep their children within the religious 
sector meant they had to choose that identity over their civic identity. Whilst the 
individual schools benefited by large amounts of money by going Grant-
Maintained, doing so frayed their relationships to other state schools. 
By overstressing the breaking of the ties that unite us and bind us together, 
and focussing on the self-centred individual parts of the whole, we lose sight of 
what loyalty provides in the civic sphere: competition does not necessarily lead to 
cooperative learning or living. Instead of schools constantly playing a version of 
'Robbing the beanbag',27 more might be achieved by reintroducing notions of 
collegiality and working together. In the next section I briefly consider the specific 
virtue of civic loyalty. 
Section 6: Loyalty in the Civic Sphere 
Loyalty, as a virtue, forms a crucial plank in our civic obligations to others 
in the liberal state in its horizontal form by enabling us to identify with certain 
groupings: to see ourselves as being of the same sort and thus have reasons to 
27 A common game for four children in primary schools. Four hoops are set out at right-angles with 
a few metres space in between. Each hoop starts with the same number of beanbags. The aim is 
for the winner to end up with the most beanbags by 'robbing' the other hoops. However, as each 
person is equally robbing each others hoops, the overall number of beanbags in any one hoop 
stays more or less the same. A lot of energy and time is expended for very little progress. 
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consider their well-being. In addition to this claim, it is frequently the 'glue' that 
binds us together, to see ourselves as 'belonging' and to allow us to see the 
relationship as a joint venture. Civic loyalty demands that in some way, within the 
sphere of civic engagements, all actors are somehow equal and interdependent. 
At this point, it is appropriate to step back a little and consider further the 
difference between the vertical and horizontal forms of loyalty within the civic 
sphere. 
Historically, humans have defined themselves in terms of loyalty to a 
person (whether to emperors, princes or popes) or to an institution (empire, state, 
nation church etc) (Franck, 1999). As late as the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the individual's loyalty to the sovereign was personal and real, but with 
little sense of community between ruler and ruled. The loyalty was: 
...law-based and religiously enforced, a duty, not a blossoming of 
common culture or affinity. 	 (Franck, 1999, p53) 
The loyalty was demanded as birthright from those ruled to their social superiors 
(a vertical loyalty). 
The move from subject to that of citizen, following the revolutions of the 
late eighteenth century in America and France in the West, substituted a theory of 
horizontal loyalty (between citizens) for the previous vertical one (from ruled to 
ruler). Loyalty thus became understood as owed by the people to each other. This 
form of loyalty grounds understandings of nationhood, of a people joined together, 
as claimed by Franck, based on shared ideals, not on the grounds of race, shared 
history and culture. The "common bond of mutual loyalty" (Franck, 1999, p54) was 
expressed in the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. It is little wonder, 
perhaps, that envisionings of loyalty have become one of the invisible ties that 
bind us together. 
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One argument within this domain contends that social life itself depends on 
the development of group loyalties, where an object of loyalty can be shared with 
others. This move, Oldenquist refers to as the move from egoism (mine) to group 
egoism or social values (ours) (Oldenquist, 1982). A loyalty, as Oldenquist states: 
..defines a moral community in terms of a conception of a common good 
and a special commitment to the members of the group who share this 
good... Those who share this common good comprise my tribe; the 
common good is its flourishing. 	 (Oldenquist, 1982, p177) 
Thus understood, a loyalty goes beyond an individual to collective others. 
The argument so far suggests civic loyalty can reasonably be explored at 
the macro level. Within this domain, considerations of a loyalty or partiality of 
special concern to particular people, traditions or groupings can usually be found. 
Frequently referred to as 'patriotism', it is usually thought of as a special kind of 
loyalty and devotion to a cause, usually a country. This loyalty is founded upon a 
particular relationship between the subject and the object of the patriotism. In the 
light of this, various definitions are offered in the copious literature on the subject. 
For example, Archard refers to it as: 
...love of one's country or nation, and this love is, in terms of the ideal, 
prescribed as a virtuous disposition to act in certain, often self-denying 
and self-sacrificial, ways on behalf of one's country. 
(Archard, 1999, p159) 
Amongst the key facets of the concept, as identified by Maclntyre, are that it is not 
merely an attitude or emotional disposition, but an "action-generated regard" 
(Maclntyre, 2003, p287). 
I do not pretend to offer a full exploration of the concept of patriotism; such 
would be impossible within the confines of this thesis. It is important to 
acknowledge the existence of this as one possible form of civic loyalty. Yet there 
are weaknesses and difficulties within this move. Maclntyre, for example, wishes 
to use patriotism exclusively for those instances of loyalty to one's own nation that 
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are based on the characteristics, merits and achievements of that nation. Nations, 
he continues are not interchangeable. One wouldn't switch allegiance for another 
nation exhibiting the same characteristics: "the particularity of the relationship is 
essential and ineliminable" (Maclntyre, 2003, p288). 
Patriotism would appear to require me to be devoted in a particular manner 
to my country as it does Joe Bloggs to be devoted to his. Yet in spite of this 
requirement, it is no easy matter to define oneself in terms of one's group loyalty. 
Mass migration and globalisation frequently create ties outside of the 'my-ness' of 
our own original grouping. Globalisation of trade has created new ties: a recent 
article in the Guardian argued that no two nations that had McDonalds had ever 
gone to war. Under the joke rhetoric was the point that trade agreements meant 
that nations were now bound together in a mesh of intertwined financial 
dependencies which, by their very nature, now meant that they had more to lose 
in combat. 
Civic loyalties may be ties that bind us together, either as individuals or as 
societies, but that does not necessitate that the actions leading from the tie will be 
good or virtuous. Needless to say, the challenge for the modern liberal state goes 
over and beyond the shifting loyalties of vertical bonding. It needs to encourage 
the loyalties necessary for civic life to exist without abandoning the individualist 
principles of personal choice and to develop the horizontal forms of loyalty 
necessary for citizens to be able to identify with each other and thus be willing to 
sacrifice some of their well-being for the sake of others — whether through being 
willing to pay taxes to benefit others, to the ultimate sacrifice demanded in 
warfare. This requires treading a fine line between the selfish individualism of too 
little loyalty and the horrifying spectre of too much. The history of the twentieth 
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century is one case history after another of how tribal loyalties have broken down 
respect for people of other tribes leading to a denial of their humanity, for example 
Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Bosnia. 
Section 7: Conclusion: Which type of Loyalty should Schools aim at? 
So far, I have tried to distinguish between loyalty as a personal value 
between individuals (horizontal) and loyalty within the economic arena (vertical). I 
have indicated that personal loyalty is always towards something or someone, the 
'my-ness' effect, and that within the business/market world loyalty has a different 
meaning, usage and purpose. Now I wish to take the argument a step further and 
suggest that the understanding of loyalty from the latter world is now influencing 
the development of loyalty in the education world to the erosion of an 
understanding of civic loyalty, that some solutions sought and implemented may 
even be making matters worse: they may be aiming at the wrong type of loyalty. 
Firstly, as we saw at the start of this chapter, loyalty has an affective 
dimension: we care about our attachments and derive satisfaction from their 
flourishing. It is not enough to identify with those attachments: we have to care 
about them too. However, if we mistakenly confine 'identifying with' to those who 
are the same, those we are closest to or to those we care about, we run the risk 
that our loyalties will not extend to those outside our affections to the wider 
community and to those who are not like us. This then has implications for the 
model of cohesion being used and illustrates the difficulty of presuming 
community or local instances of cohesion will extend outwards to societal levels, 
as shall be further explored Chapter 5. 
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Secondly, we need to consider the function of loyalty: that it is useful for 
what it achieves or aims at; it aims at allegiances. Our loyalties hold our 
allegiances; it states those we are bound to, whom we can count on and who can 
in turn count on our help. Just as loyalty can draw us to those who are most like 
us, it also identifies those who fall outside of this remit, and makes them 'other'. 
But are those we are closest to, the only ones who should come within our sphere 
of moral concern? If we only identify and bond with those most like us based on 
one element of our identity, how would we relate across differing bondings into 
the civic arena? We do not live (and arguably probably never have lived) in 
homogenous groupings: real life is far messier and mixed up than that. An 
argument could be made that we need a variety of loyalties and it is only by 
encouraging such that we can create a civic sphere to begin with. If so, perhaps 
school systems should be formed to create and disperse our allegiances and 
loyalties as widely as possible. 
Thirdly, there is a marked difference between identifying with and being 
identical to. That we may share some values or practices with others does not 
itself make us identical to them. Not all middle-class parents are going to share all 
their values/histories etc (that would make them identical); there will be just as 
much that divides them as unites them. Identities exclude as well as include; they 
show 'who are the same as us' and 'who counts as among us': equally they point 
out those who differ. But to pick on one aspect of our identities and create school 
systems around it can be to ignore all other aspects, and the ties and obligations 
thereof. 
Parents who seek a particular type of school are, in effect, seeking a 
school that can reinforce and nurture the same self identity-reinforcing loyalties 
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that they have or aspire to have. The horizontal loyalties, attitudes and 
dispositions that may be found within groups are not necessarily the same as the 
horizontal loyalties, attitudes and dispositions demanded of equal citizens 
between groups. These bonds of loyalty, mutual recognition and identity that tie 
group members together may prove to be more circular than horizontal; they may 
not expand out of the particular grouping to other groups in the wider community. 
Fourthly, it could be argued that the development of different types of 
schooling is an effort to apply 'brand loyalty' in the realm of education. However, 
both inertial brand loyalty and cost brand loyalty are based on trying to prevent 
customer exit and this may not be an appropriate model for educational systems. 
Such schools then become exclusive schools, not in the sense of being 'elite' or 
'high-class', but as being selective, that by their nature, exclude or restrict access 
(whether by fee, religion or geography). Brand loyalty is ultimately a vertical 
loyalty and may not be the best model for creating or encouraging civic virtues. 
For that we need a horizontal loyalty, where citizens develop a 'mutual loyalty' 
going beyond self-interest. 
Fifthly, neither of the market loyalties identified early in the chapter has the 
good of the customer at heart, but is aimed at maximising profits: a loyal customer 
will not leave even if the price rises slightly or they have slightly less favourable 
conditions. The trick for the market is to identify and understand the exact 
circumstances that would make loyal customers weaken their loyalty and avoid 
those circumstances: this is not the best model for the civic arena. Schools are 
caught in the middle, trying to balance the loyalty of the marketplace (with the 
emphasis on the brand, the individual and competition) against the loyalty of the 
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civic arena (with the emphasis on the civic behaviour, the whole group, and 
cooperation). The two sometimes clash and can be mutually exclusive. 
This illustrates the clash of vertical loyalty over horizontal loyalties. Parents 
are encouraged to see schools as a brand and 'brand loyalty' comes into play. 
This is cost-based loyalty in the extreme. However, it is the parent's loyalty that is 
targeted in issues of school choice, not the child's. If we reverse the problem and 
see it not as a problem of exit, but one of positive choice, what then are the 
problems? Why shouldn't parents be free to choose one school over another? 
Let's start from where we are: should Catholics only go to school with 
fellow Catholics, Buddhists, with fellow Buddhists? But where would such a model 
lead? Wicca worshippers, with fellow Wicca worshippers? Should rich parents be 
able to choose a school based, say, on wealth? Should middle-class parents be 
enabled to choose schools with only middle-class children? Should white 
skinhead parents be allowed to choose schools that best reflect their belief 
systems? What about drug-addicts? Could we have schools specially designed to 
bring children up to identify and be loyal to particular drugs? What counts as 
relevant criteria upon which to base choice? There is nothing intrinsically wrong in 
schools developing their own 'corporate' identities and encouraging a sense of 
'ownership' amongst pupils etc. Identity-forming symbols and rituals can be useful 
tools in doing this. These identities, on their own, however, may be too insular to 
fulfil their civic purpose. 
To assume that education has only instrumental value, and is a product 
that can be bought and sold, is to ignore the value it has as a 'social good' and 
the value it may have in the life of the person being educated. I am not arguing 
that it has no instrumental value. One could hardly claim a flourishing life if one 
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was left unemployable and/or unable to participate in the economic life of the 
collective. The idea of markets and choice work best when used to discuss the 
repeat trading of simple goods, where there is easy entry and exit. This, however, 
is at odds with the highly complex nature of education systems and schools and 
neglects the public good that society expects from schools (the promotion of 
particular values, creating citizens etc). 
But to speak of an educational marketplace at all is simply the misuse of a 
metaphor. The problem arises when we forget marketplace language is just a 
useful metaphor for looking at systems and become convinced that this is the 
reality of it all. By misusing the metaphor of the marketplace in educational 
parlance, there is the danger that such practices necessary for the development 
of civic virtues may be neglected. By schools concentrating overly on creating 
loyalty to their particular brand and school systems 'selling' themselves as a 
`product' in the search for 'customers', the development and encouragement of 
personal loyalty (horizontal) and civic loyalty are downplayed. Fraternity is eroded 
and fraternal behaviour is undermined. 
Wherein lies the role of the schools? Schools are still more or less a 
common experience and as such, they are one of the few vehicles available for 
the character development and reinforcement of these necessary features of our 
civic life. Civic loyalty may not be effectively provided by market-driven school 
choice mechanisms. If civic behaviour and dispositions form the background 
within which civic life takes place, then their development and reinforcement 
within the education system is a crucial challenge. In the next chapter, I explore 
this point further through turning to the third of the metaphors for civic 
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relationships, that of family, and consider the possibility of fraternity acting as a 
normative political concept, situated within a conception of democracy. 
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Chapter 5 
Fraternity 
The idea of fraternity goes to the heart of what being human means - 
what it means to be social. 	 (Rutherford, 2008, p105) 
Introduction 
On the 7th July, 2005, four 'home-grown' young men took part in a suicide 
attack in London. News reports were full of shock that the terrorists were British 
citizens killing their own fellow citizens. It had always been assumed that terrorists 
would be 'others', terrorists coming from outside the country. 
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans (and other 
coastal states) killing 1500 people and scattering the majority of the 450,000 pre-
hurricane population. When an official evacuation of the city was called for on 
August 28th, over 10,000 citizens were unable to leave and crammed into the 
Superdome to wait for help to come. It didn't. It was nearly a week before a 
complete evacuation was achieved, in the richest nation on the planet. Those who 
had the means to leave when the levees broke did so: those who could not, were 
without personal transport and/or had nowhere else to go; nine out of ten were 
poor and black. 
Political and press preoccupation with the 'veil' issue, as raised by Jack 
Straw in 200628, reiterated growing concerns with the fraying nature of our civic 
relationship and how certain features of our lives serve to separate us from each 
other. It had suddenly been 'discovered' that there are parallel communities living 
28 httd://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article662160.ece [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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separate lives amongst us. This fact of pluralism has led national soul-searching 
with regard to our commitment to multiculturalism as opposed to other solutions to 
problems of integration sought by other countries. 
In addition, the Conservative Party in the UK, in 2006, claimed the notion of 
fraternity as a political principle and, as such, commensurate with their own 
particular values. A special adviser to David Cameron, Danny Kruger, in an article 
in October 2006 in Prospect magazine made this claim: 
...our agonized debates about community cohesion, about the 
integration of immigrant groups and national identity, are debates about 
fraternity. How do we accommodate some, a cohesive and exclusive 
social grouping, if that grouping both suppresses one (the individual) and 
admits little allegiance to all (the nation, represented in the state)? But 
fraternity is also the ghost in the machine of the debates about health 
and education, about housing and the environment, and about crime and 
its causes. In each of these areas the vital issue is how communities 
themselves, not the individual or the state, can address the challenges 
that face them. 
(Kruger, 2006, p2) 
Could the family metaphor, to which fraternity belongs, provide a more suitable 
model for civic belonging? 
Whilst much has been written in political philosophy about liberty and 
equality in democratic theory, the concept of fraternity has occupied a lesser 
place. Of the three values espoused by the French revolution, liberty, equality, 
fraternity, it is the one that has been most ignored or neglected. Indeed, in much 
writing it is either ignored as a political concept in its own right or thought to be a 
subset of one of the other two values. Where it has been written about, 
philosophers have conceptualised it in many differing ways: as an ideal, as a 
value, as a civic virtue, as an attitude/disposition or as a relationship between 
people. Few have, however, applied the concept to the field of education and 
schooling. 
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With a general lack of prior attention to fraternity, and to enable us to 
proceed with clarity of vision in our identification of applications within education, 
the conceptual underpinnings and commitments that support our understandings 
of fraternity need untangling prior to situating it within the realm of education. On 
the surface, fraternity is a contested concept whose nature is open to endless 
dispute. That may be so to a point, yet it can be derived from an original 
exemplar, that of the move from vertical to horizontal loyalties, that sustains a 
plausible claim for its development over time. Yet the lack of current literature in 
this area somewhat indicates both a conceptual laxity within the discourse (as 
shown by its adoption by political groupings), and a failure of existing advocates 
to take account of the philosophical difficulties found within this area. 
Fraternity forms part of a group of 'family' relationships (including 
paternalism, brotherhood, fatherland, nation etc) that have been metaphorized in 
different ways. These metaphors stress interdependence, affection and 
belonging. Thus models of idealized family structures are argued to lie at the 
heart of political imaginings as a way of modelling how moral obligations to help 
each other can be expanded into civic understandings and frame discussions of 
political issues (Lakoff, 1995). Perhaps the most commonly encountered family 
metaphor is that of nationalism, whereby a people are imagined as connected by 
'bloodline', as shall be further explored in this chapter. Family metaphors are 
common because of their usefulness as specific images representing interactions 
in terms of the interactions of family members. 
In this chapter, I indicate two different senses of the concept: the first I call 
the strong version of fraternity, which is related to an obligation, connected with 
dependence, responsibility and morality. This, I contend, is rooted in a strict 
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interpretation of the family metaphor. The second, I call democratic fraternity: an 
ideal metaphoric relationship between citizens within a conception of democracy 
between different people who may not belong to the same community and do not 
have the same ties. This distinction plays a crucial role in considerations of 
models of cohesion. 
I purport that strong fraternity cannot provide a model for the civic 
relationship, nor is it likely to expand from particular groupings to the civic domain. 
Furthermore, this type of bond may ultimately prove more circular between people 
of 'interest groups' rather than the horizontal loyalty relationship between citizens. 
In other words, strong fraternity, being more in line with community cohesion, 
does not expand without difficulty into the societal cohesion of weak fraternity. 
With this in mind, I explore democratic fraternity as a concept, having both 
historical and metaphorical import, which may provide such a link. In Section 1, I 
précis the historical significance of fraternity. Following this, in Section 2, I 
examine the claims for strong fraternity and consider the strong affective bonds 
that tie those of both tight-knit communities and communities of interest together. I 
acknowledge the positive elements of this, but also indicate some of the problems 
with this when extrapolated into the civic community in the form of nationalism. In 
Section 3, I offer an alternative concept, grounded within the historical exemplar, 
based on the ideal relationships between citizens as required by an 
understanding of democracy. Central to this, I indicate a need for the horizontal 
loyalties of citizens and the implications this has for the restriction of socio-
economic inequality. Finally, in Section 4, I indicate that it is not an either/or 
choice between the two concepts of fraternity, but that both are needed for 
different purposes. 
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Section 1: A Brief History of Fraternity 
In 2004, Theo Van Gogh was murdered by a 26 year old man of joint 
Dutch and Moroccan nationality two months after his film "Submission" 
(which criticised the treatment of women under Islam) was shown on 
Dutch TV. The Dutch press was full of surprise and horror that their 
liberal democracy had given rise to such a thing. Where had they gone 
wrong in their willingness to adopt live and let live attitudes? The 
estrangement from each other felt by 'native Dutch' and the largely 
Muslim immigrant section of the population was widely reported and 
commented on. 
The history of the metaphor of fraternity can be claimed to be almost a 
shorthand history of politics. Yet the phenomenon of group loyalties and the 
sharing of resources existed long before political terms for it were coined (Stjerno, 
2005). Ties of kinship and familial bonds formed the basis for the duties and moral 
obligations required by living in groups in many early societies (Stjerno, 2005). 
Brunkhorst draws out a fascinating and convincing history of human relationships 
along historical lines. He argues persuasively that the weakening of kinship ties 
and familial bonds as the basis for social arrangements led to the development of 
a concept of civic friendship as the ideal form of civic relationship amongst the 
Ancient Greeks (see Chapter 3). 
According to Brunkhorst, the concept of fraternity (the concept mirrored the 
religious imagery of the time, hence has often been viewed as having strong 
Christian overtones: that of brotherhood before God as a loving parent) took over 
as a concept from that of civic friendship held by Aristotle amongst others 
(Brunkhorst, 2005). Just as the growing Christian empire replaced that of the 
Ancients, so concepts associated with particular virtues valued by the prevailing 
orthodoxies also replaced each other. Whilst brotherliness was originally familial, 
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Brunkhorst claims it became detached from kinship relationships by the growth of 
Christianity to include the 'brotherhood' of all human beings (Brunkhorst, 2005). It 
used the metaphor of family relationships to illustrate the relationship between 
creator (father) and created (brothers/children). The paternalistic and vertical 
relationship of ruler and ruled mimicked this Christian model. 
Stjerno points out that the Christian understanding of fraternity was 
originally based on communities of friars and that by the Middles Ages the term 
had come to be used to indicate relationships of people of the same profession 
(Stjerno, 2005). Alongside this religious connection, developed a more secular 
understanding of the concept. The online etymology site, Etymonline, traces the 
word 'Fraternity' back to c1330 as meaning 'a body of men associated by 
common interest' from the Old French, 'fraternite' which in turn can be drawn back 
to the Latin 'frater' meaning 'brother29 . 
Family imagery was a recurrent feature of medieval life (Phillips, 1984). 
Craft masters saw themselves as 'fathers'; kings played the same card. Patriarchy 
was the underlying model for how a society should function. Trades and 
professions organised themselves along similar lines. These fraternities and/or 
brotherhoods pre-figured later trade unionism. They brought together strangers 
who shared a common concern, who became united or joined together by this 
common purpose to put pressure on masters who tried to cut wages or conditions 
of work. 
Fraternity achieved, perhaps, notoriety as the slogan of the Jacobin 
Revolution, together with freedom and equality in 1793: libertO, egalite, fratemite 
29 http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=fraternity [last accessed: 31.7.2006] 
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(Stevens, 2001). Whilst, undoubtedly, as Stevens draws out, the ideal of fraternity 
may have been influenced by working men's associations prevalent in France at 
the time, the older meaning from the Latin is perhaps the more interesting. 
Consider the following: 
It evokes a metaphor of family relations: relations among brothers. The 
revolutionary idea of fraternity was meant to be extended to all humans 
so as to view humanity as an extended family: the family of man. 
Relations among brothers are basically horizontal relations: relations 
among equals. The revolutionary fraternity is in competition with another 
political family metaphor: paternalism, which is the government of a 
father over his children, a thoroughly vertical relation. It is a relation of 
authority and hierarchy. Paternalism is a relatively new term coined in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but viewing the king as father and 
his subjects as children has been with us from time immemorial. 
Paternalism is based on the idea that the ruler, the metaphorical father, 
knows best what is good for his subjects, his metaphorical children, than 
they themselves do. Fraternity differs from paternalism and in a way is a 
rejection of paternalism. We the metaphorical brothers will help you as 
long as you are loyal to the family. 
(Margalit)3°  
In what sense could one speak of people as being brothers outside of close 
kinship relationships? 
The usage was obviously metaphorical in nature, used as it was to draw 
out a particular relationship: not one of particular siblinghood, but to demarcate 
that in some sense people should relate as brothers. It was to step away from the 
vertical loyalty relationship (as discussed in the previous chapter) associated with 
aristocratic ruling, particularly that of kings, to indicate a more horizontal 
relationship, that of brothers, of equals in some respect. This horizontal 
relationship was public; they were no longer subjects, but citizens. Fraternity was 
thus the ideal relationship of citizens, representing the emancipation from other 
ruling powers. 
30 This article can be found online at http://www.vn.nl/Standaard-media-pagina/Fraternity.htm [last 
accessed 19.11.2009] 
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Brunkhorst continues in his historical analysis that the revolutions of the 
18th Century took it further still: 
On the streets of Paris in the 1790s, the old Christian slogan of brotherly 
love of neighbour turned into the political longing for a kind of fratemitO that 
would disband all the clerical brotherhoods of premodern Europe and 
overturn the altars.... The third concept in the new association of citizens, 
was then no longer regarded as the fulfilment of the divine command to 
love, but was understood in socially immanent terms as the realization of 
the political freedom of all citizens. 
(Brunkhorst, 2005, p59) 
The concept of fraternity thus became detached from the history of Christian 
idealism and attached to freedom and equality in democratic literature in the 
sense of a secularised 'love' of neighbour. Johnston, quoting from Furet & Ozouf, 
points out that as a concept, fraternity was not as central to revolutionary 
predecessors (Furet and Ozouf, 1989): they were more concerned with the 'rights 
of man' and equality of entitlement to these rights (Johnston, 1991, p492). Yet 
fraternity was said to consist of a moral obligation upon citizens. Furet and Ozouf 
point out it was the Second Republic of 1848 that adopted the Republican credo 
of liberte, egalite, fratemite which became part of the new constitution of that year 
(Furet and Ozouf, 1989). Ozouf writes convincingly of the failure of literal fraternity 
being achieved after the French Revolution, but concludes the search, or hope, 
for fraternity among the sans-culottes was not without value: 
... fraternity did not challenge the principle of democracy. On the 
contrary, it realised that principle, since it refused to imprison the 
individual in the concrete conditions in which he lived. It postulated the 
idea of humanity within the idea of individuality, added social rights to 
individual rights... 
(Ozouf, 1989, p703) 
Contrary to this analysis, Hobsbawm, claims that the slogan jibed& egalite, 
fratemite derives from the Freemasons (Hobsbawm, 1975) and that a relationship 
of mutual aid and dependence associated with the concept indicated a type of 
social cooperation outside of brotherhood (whether real or artificial). Interestingly, 
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whilst Hobsbawm acknowledges that fraternity may initially have had some strong 
emotional content akin to the sentiments of friendship and kinship (Hobsbawm, 
1975, p472), he also indicates that fraternity can imply two things: 
....an ideal of society as a whole and an ideal relationship between 
people for particular purposes: a 'programme' and a technique. 
(Hobsbawm, 1975, p472) 
In a similar vein, more recent theorists draw a parallel argument with the rise of 
understandings of nationalism (Fletcher, 2001; Gilbert, 1998; Miscevic, 2005). To 
take just one example, Fletcher considers the move from peoplehood to 
nationhood using the example of the American constitution in 1787, where the 
preamble begins with "we the people"; he elucidates that the people are coming 
together (or at least as imagined by their representatives), with the emphasis 
being on voluntary association, to create their union. A 'people' is here seen as a 
collection of individuals who have come together for a common purpose at a 
particular (perhaps metaphorical) point, a voluntary association. To be able to go 
from the here and now, from those immediately around us, from the particular to 
the general is not a straightforward task. Even Fletcher accepts that, in imagining 
the nation, a certain leap of faith is necessary from what one sees to what one 
does not (Fletcher, 2001). 
The history of fraternity thus captures and symbolises the change from 
vertical loyalties to horizontal ones, the linkage of the concept with democracy 
itself and with the concept of what it is to be a citizen. It points to the ideal of free 
and equal citizenship within civic association: 
...it gives fraternity a democratic form and extends it to the nation. 
(Leydet, 2006b, p800) 
It discards individual differences and inequalities as irrelevant to the practice of 
citizenship. 
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...what the ideas of 1789 give us is a concept of fraternity/solidarity, 
which is both radically inclusive and political. It is radically inclusive in the 
sense that it now covers all of our co-nationals... it is political in the 
sense that it is essentially linked to democracy itself. 
(Leydet, 2006b, p800) 
This linkage with citizenship, with notions of equality, of nation, and especially 
with democracy itself, shall be further spelled out as this chapter progresses. In 
the next section, I shall draw a distinction between the fraternity of the closed 
group and that of the wider civic community, and indicate the inadequacy of this 
conception of strong fraternity for this latter grouping, thus illustrating the need for 
further conceptualisation in this area. 
Section 2: The Inadequacy of Strong Fraternity 
In 1994, 800,000 Rwandans were killed in the space of ten days. Most of 
the dead were Tutsis; most of the killers were Hutus. The two ethnic 
groups spoke the same language, lived in the same area and had the 
same traditions. Neighbours killed neighbours, encouraged by radio 
propaganda, the military, the police and other authorities. 31  
Prior to further analysis, it should be acknowledged that fraternity as a 
relationship or bond going beyond the family has frequently been examined from 
the point of an affective element in the civic relationship (Caputo, 1999; Eshete, 
1981; Kahane, 1999; Stephens, 1874). Because of this, there has been a 
tendency for it to be subsumed into discourses on community. Whilst the idea of 
'community' has been debated at length over the past few years, there appears to 
be little agreement as to what precisely is entailed by the concept. 
The communitarian argument that we are essentially social beings, that our 
moral characteristics are constituted socially and historically through our roles can 
31 See http://www.un.org/events/rwanda/resources.shtml for further information on the genocide 
[last accessed 15.08.2009] 
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be argued to draw on a particular model of a traditional pre-modern community. 
The claims are that moral norms are always the norms of some society or other 
and thus belonging is central to the acquisition of these norms. Within this, the 
individual's identity is inseparable from their place in a rigid social structure and 
system of values; one is always a member of this family, this tribe, this city. These 
serve to anchor one's identity to a particular way of life by viewing people as 
being united by shared norms, traditions and identities (Strike, 2000). The shared 
values within this framework help continually to experience and create a shared 
identity through engaging and contributing to the practices of the community. 
There is usually a strong commonality between members of particular 
communities, which forms a major part of the identities of members through 
participating in the group. These internal ties I call the strong version of fraternity, 
characterised as a relationship between people of the same kind, connected by a 
joint endeavour or with ties to a community. It is affective: there is some emotional 
tie to the group, which is particularistic - these particular people, this particular 
project. This attitude of affection promotes a sense of belonging and loyalty 
commitments from one to the other as members of the group, hence a strong 
sense of partiality to fellow members. 
Many of these 'groupings of interest' are held together by a distinct body of 
ideas as to the best way to lead individual and collective lives. The private 
commitments of some of the groups and individuals, however, can be grounded in 
a zero toleration of opposing points of view, even to the extent of cutting their 
community links with others who live differently. A well known example of this 
would be that of the Amish, a group with a particular system of beliefs cutting 
themselves off from the society around them in all aspects. The Amish take 
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seriously the biblical injunction to keep themselves separate from unbelievers: 
they do not vote, accept public welfare, are not in general connected to public 
utilities, or public education systems. The triad of family, faith and community 
forms the background ethos to such dealings. It would appear on the surface that 
they are a self-sufficient people living a particular life-style, wearing a particular 
form of dress, living by a particular set of rules and regulations. 
Lest we think such groupings belong only in certain parts of the USA, we 
have the example of the Exclusive Plymouth Brethren (referred to here as EPB) in 
the UK. The EPB refuse to take part in community clubs or events, they do not 
vote, they ban TV, radio, the internet and theatre. They are quiet, conservative in 
view and fundamentalist in religious outlook. They are not unfriendly with 
outsiders; they choose not to socialise or eat with them. Their children attend 
publicly funded schools for the main part, but do not partake of extra-curricular 
activities. There are 43 private schools for 11-17 year olds (teaching app1400 
children) in the UK operated by the Plymouth Brethren. The children do not go to 
university; they do not have friends outside the group; they only work in Brethren 
owned businesses. They do not use mobiles, computers or newspapers. 
The stronger, the thicker the fraternal bond and bonds of loyalty, the more 
exclusive the group becomes. Strong fraternity, as the previous examples have 
demonstrated, can create communities that are closed to those who are different, 
whether in belief, practice or simply physically different. It is undoubtedly true that 
this form of 'belonging' can be examined at a broader level outside of religious 
groupings. One solution has been to consider the concept of nationalism (the 
creation of a bounded people committed to the fate of one another), which also 
depends on these strong bonds. 
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Nationalism 
As indicated previously, nationalism relies heavily on a strict family 
metaphor, frequently based on bloodline; members believe they share something 
in common, be it language, history or symbols, that there is some shared interest 
binding them together and that this is 'inherited' in some way over generations. 
Although such a community may be diverse and comprise of some different 
traditions, through the attachment of 'nation' they become one. 
The concept of 'nation' conjures up different images that may at times 
interlink and/or overlap and remains hotly contested. As Gilbert points out, the 
very term 'nation' is not without complications. There are few who will agree on a 
precise definition of the term (Gilbert, 1998). It can be taken to indicate the 
population of a territory, a cultural community, an ethnic group, voluntary 
associations, a sovereign people amongst other definitions. People believe that 
they, as part of the group, have a shared identity based on this conceptualisation 
of nation: 
Historically, it is the nation that has allowed large numbers of individuals 
to feel a sense of commonality, setting them apart from others and 
making solidarity among strangers possible. 
(Leydet, 2006a)32 
There is, arguably, a certain psychological component of what it is to be 
connected in this way, that we need a group identity, a community we think of as 
'us' (Anderson, 1991). Some groupings may clash in their aims and objectives; 
others sit side by side. In the civic arena, it springs from the need to identify those 
who are to be governed together, and those outside the scope of such 
governance (Gilbert, 1998, p26). Yet, even within the metaphor of 'nation' sit 
32 Online resource: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/ [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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other metaphors, each seeing human connections through particular insights, 
resulting in different policy decisions. 
An example. Until the 1980s, it was customary to speak of the American 
experience of creating the nation as a melting pot: that all different peoples 
became Americans by blending together into one whole as in a cooking pot. This 
encouraged newcomers to assimilate into the existing culture. Consider the 
original exemplar: in a melting pot, all the ingredients lose some of their own 
identity in mixing together, in the blending and mixing, they become a new reality. 
Thus one could understand the process of becoming an American as integration 
and assimilation into the larger group. Previous identity-loyalties fade as the new 
ones are adopted. 
Since then, a further metaphor has evolved: America as 'the salad bowl', 
whereby each keeps their individual identity but forms part of a 'salad'. All the 
ingredients of a salad contribute towards the end product. They can all be seen 
for what they are: the tomato, the lettuce, the onion, but all form part of the same 
salad. Transpose this metaphor to the political scene and we get the hyphenated 
American: for instance, Irish-American, Italian-American amongst others. With this 
metaphor, the newcomers retain their own previous 'national characteristics' while 
integrating into a new society. The point to note here is that both the newcomers 
and the society itself are changed. Two contrasting images, melting pot and salad 
bowl, representing two contrasting kinds of loyalty. The melting pot only allows the 
vertical loyalty to the new state and the abandonment of previous ones; the salad 
bowl encourages both the vertical to the new state, but also allows horizontal ties 
to previous commitments. 
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Is Strong Fraternity Sufficient? 
On the surface, strong fraternity would appear to be a possible contender 
for modelling the civic bond needed by a society which aspires to be cohesive. 
But there are problems. Firstly, many moral philosophers accept that our lives 
may begin embedded in such thickly formed attachments but that this alone is 
inadequate as a response to the problem of social justice. Family, nation or 
people no longer determine inescapable identities. The modern society may lack 
these shared frameworks and belief systems (Maclntyre, 1985). Modern liberal 
societies tend to have weaker identities, celebrating their achievement of 
pluralism and/or multiculturalism. 
Secondly, when citizens of the same state are also citizens of the same 
nation, the loyalty and obligations of one to another is straightforward. However, 
when more than one nation shares the same state, the lines become blurred. 
Citizens have particular obligations to fellow citizens of the same state, but that 
may not mean having prior obligations to fellow members of the same community 
simply on the grounds that they are members of the same community. If we allow, 
or encourage, community commitments over state or civic commitments, the 
notion of justice becomes meaningless. 
Thirdly, the problem of nationalism is that it is almost exclusively defined 
along historical bloodlines: for a people to become a nation, Fletcher claims, takes 
time and shared experiences (in some ways, parallels can be drawn with the 
move from acquaintanceship to friendship). 
Choice marks the people. History breeds the nation. (Fletcher, 2001, p2) 
Fletcher further points out that to be understood as a nation is to include the 
dead, the living and the unborn and hence no single generation can undo the 
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work of the past or hold back on the promise to the future; a nation is extended 
out over history. 
If this view of what it is to be a nation is correct, that it is both an historical 
fact and based on shared experiences, there may be no easy way of adapting the 
concept within a pluralist society that is both rapidly growing and changing. Under 
pluralism, nationalism may not serve as a focus for identity and allegiance if some 
are excluded from the nation itself, particularly where one national group is given 
preferential treatment (i.e. the Malays in Malaysia have preferential quotas in 
particular services, a practice resented by both Chinese and Indian Malaysians 
(Abdullah, 2007b; Fang and Norman, 2006)).33 A society based on nationalism 
may unwittingly create oppression of minority cultures within and an imperialistic 
attitude to others outside the group. 
Whilst strong fraternity may have many 'goods' about it (i.e. creating a 
sense of belonging, creating close tight knit communities) it also contains many 
'bads'. Such networks create a sense of inclusion, but in so doing, produce the 
externality of a sense of exclusion, creating outsiders and sometimes even 
unrealistic hurdles for those who wish to join the group. The deaths of the 
Chinese cockle-pickers on the beach in Lancashire in 200434 (referred to in the 
last chapter) shocked the British public in more ways than one. It had never 
occurred to many people until then, the perilous conditions that illegal immigrants 
might be forced into, that they may be owned in a form of modern day slavery, 
hidden in the shadows. For those who do not belong, who are forever on the 
33 Until April 2009, it was official government policy for any business starting in Malaysia to be 30% 
owned by ethnic Malay shareholders. Malays have easier access to public sector employment; 
racial quotas are enforced for university admissions etc. 
34 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/enciland/lancashire/3464203.stm [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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outside, life can be unimaginably harsh. Yet even for those who successfully 
migrate legally, many can be made to feel second class, 'not quite one of us'. 
We cannot assume that all tight-knit communities are bound together with 
a vision of the good: it could equally well be a vision of 'the bad', for example, a 
death squad or an armed and murderous militia. Simply positing the creation of a 
sense of belonging, sharing a tradition or belief says nothing about the value or 
the worth of the joint enterprise. It does not rule out a severe form of inequality 
through a caste system, or the exploitation of members. Even the Jonestown 
suicide sect had a sense of belonging, a shared purpose and belief system35. 
As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the horizontal loyalties, 
attitudes and dispositions that may be found within groups are not necessarily the 
same as the horizontal loyalties, attitudes and dispositions demanded of equal 
citizens between groups. The bonds of loyalty, mutual recognition and identity that 
tie group members together may prove to be more circular than horizontal; they 
may not expand out of the particular grouping to other groups: herein lies the 
problem. On its own, this conception of fraternity is insufficient to support the civic 
bond. 
Phillips points out that 'identity recognition' based on family metaphors may 
in fact lead us into a divisive cul-de-sac (Phillips, 1984). The problem with family 
relationships is that it indicates the differences between your family and mine: 
We may be willing to co-operate with those we see as alien, but we will 
reserve affection for those of our own kind. Unity premised on family 
likeness can be a recipe for disaster. It tends to exclude those from a 
different family background, and subjects those it embraces to the 
familiar tensions of family life. In contemporary Europe, where 
35 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisdav/hi/dates/stories/november/18/newsid 2540000/2540209.  
stm [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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heterogeneity is so much a feature of our lives, it is bound to lead us 
astray. 	 (Phillips, 1984, p239) 
Instead of being a model for the ideal civic relationship, the consequences of this 
particular metaphor are often deleterious, degenerating into an excuse for 
nationalism and the atrocities associated with this bond (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia, 
Sudan, amongst others). It would seem that the metaphor of family falls down in a 
similar fashion to that of friendship in previous chapters. 
However, I wish to argue that this need not be so. Our experiences of what 
counts as family and how one joins a family have greatly expanded from that of 
pure bloodline; most liberal western societies are accustomed to reconstituted 
families, step-families, adopted family members, the break down and reformation 
of marriages leading to second or more families. In addition, there tends to be a 
bond of affection between family members, yet it is by no means compulsory: yet 
the bond of connection still holds. Whilst you choose your friends, it is very rare 
that one gets to choose one's family members. Can this then expand into the civic 
arena in a more productive manner? Using the insights of Munoz-Darde on 
fraternity as a 'sibling' relationship, (based on our changing understandings of 
'family') I seek, in the next section, to re-imagine the family metaphor to avoid 
these pitfalls, rooting it instead within an understanding of democracy. 
Section 3: Democratic Fraternity 
In the autumn of 2005, riots occurred in Clichy-sous-bois, (a ghetto-
suburb of Paris, marked by both economic and social isolation from the 
richer residential areas), leading to political commentators discussing the 
failure of the French model of full citizenship integration. Those who lived 
in the impoverished, segregated communities tended to be second and 
third generation immigrants from France's former colonies, who suffered 
greater unemployment, discrimination and poorer housing than those in 
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equivalent suburbs. The riots lasted eight nights and spread to other 
cities. 36 
So far we have explored the strong version of fraternity, and, finding it both 
unsatisfying and ultimately unpersuasive, have concluded that it cannot ground 
the relationship needed between citizens; for this, we need a different style of 
thinking and conceptualisation of fraternity. Prior to further analysis, it is useful to 
summarise the argument from previous chapters to focus in on necessary 
features desired in a civic relationship. 
Whatever the civic relationship is, or however it is defined, it must include 
certain elements: it must be impartial by nature (the partiality of friendship would 
be inappropriate in the public sphere); it may include but cannot require emotional 
attachments (whilst it is good to care about our civic others, we cannot base a 
system of justice on people's ability to care), and it must encompass strangers, 
those we do not yet know or may never know, yet indicate 'those who count as 
one of us' and those who do not. It requires a certain element of equality between 
persons: within the civic domain 'each counts for one and none for more than 
one'. 
This weaker conception of fraternity is marked by being non-particularistic 
in its reach, by enabling us to reach out to others outside our immediate realm, by 
an attitude and preparedness to share resources, by including unknown civic 
others, by reciprocity and mutual assistance. It should be noted that this form of 
fraternity is not synonymous with fraternal feelings towards others (though this 
may come to be the case) but denotes a way of behaving/attitude to fellow 
citizens. 
36 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4413964.stm for further details on the 
riots. [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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The relationship I call 'democratic fraternity' is both descriptive and 
normative in its reach between different people who may not belong to the same 
community and do not have the same ties as in strong fraternity. It is democratic 
in that the concept of democracy has an assumption of a particular vision of the 
relationship between an equal citizenry. It requires a - what can only be described 
as 'metaphoric' - relationship of mutual recognition in a form of equality between 
citizens, that each is of equal value or worth in some way, that there is a principle 
of equal standing from one to another as citizens: it is more than the space in 
between citizens. It is the invisible link itself. It is fraternity in that the historical link 
with the original conception provides the metaphoric power associated with the 
move from vertical to horizontal loyalties. Together, it provides an 'over-arching 
umbrella' enabling disparate peoples to come together for a shared purpose: that 
of being governed together. In what follows, I shall begin to unpack this 
alternative understanding of fraternity. 
Historically, fraternity formed a break from the existing political order. It 
symbolised that very shift to a civic notion of 'citizen' and how each is bound to 
each other; it distanced the citizen from the paternalism of the reign of monarchs. 
It renewed a conception of what it was to be a citizen. The more secular 
understanding of the term indicates the belief that when strangers come together 
for the common purpose of government they are somehow standing one to 
another as 'brothers', as family members. It encompasses not just the present 
generation, but generations past and present, forging a civil society. Fraternity, 
through its historical importance in the transition from autocracy to democracy, 
from vertical to horizontal loyalties, provides the metaphor. 
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Democracy begins with the simple view that 'people' are the source of 
political authority. As such, it rests on an assumption that such authorities can be 
changed at regular intervals through the actions of the citizens. This in turn 
requires a citizenry capable of choosing; to exercise rule, such choices have to be 
based upon knowledge of alternatives: 
...the term 'democracy,' ... refers very generally to a method of group 
decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the 
participants at an essential stage of the collective decision making. 
(Christiano, 2006)37 
But the ability to make choices is not sufficient in itself; the citizenry needs a form 
of moral commitment to the collective values needed to sustain democracy itself. 
This voices two distinct problems to be explored in this section: firstly, what kind 
of bond is required amongst such participants to enable both collective decision 
making and the moral commitment needed to sustain the process, and secondly, 
what kind of equality is required amongst said participants. 
Associational Bonds 
As I have suggested elsewhere (Healy, 2008), there has been a failure on 
the part of many theorists to acknowledge the quintessentially metaphoric nature of 
how we envision associational bonds within conceptions of social cohesion. 
Nonetheless it should be noted that for us to survive and flourish in society we 
need to somehow see ourselves as bonded together to thus generate reasons for 
cooperative behaviour. Indeed, empirical studies appear to validate this claim. This 
claim is particularly pertinent to the study of social cohesion in which theories start 
from the assumption that society can be examined through studying patterns of the 
interconnections, ties or bonds between people that hold groups together. It is 
37 Available online at: http://www.seop.leeds.ac.uk/entries/democracv/ [last accessed 
19.11.2009] 
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these factors that have made social cohesion (and its polar opposite social 
fragmentation) a major feature in work on equality issues, integration, social capital 
and social policy.38 
Many of the studies on the 'social fabric' that makes a society argue that 
interactions and relationships of trust require a certain level of shared values and 
purposes. The notion of social capital has been bandied around across subject 
boundaries for many years. It is viewed as a useful way of entering into dialogue 
for modelling civic society. The central thesis is that relationships (and networks of 
relationships) matter: that the social fabric is created by interactions and 
relationships of trust. It is taken very seriously in governmental circles as witnessed 
by a recent European Commission on the subject (Aldridge, 2002) and World Bank 
studies as being an important indicator of economic performance, as impacting on 
health, education and crime. Yet even theorists within the field acknowledge that 
all too often there is a lack of clarity and blurring of boundaries between the ways 
in which associations and organizations within the society prove vital to the 
production of social capital and the upholding of democracy (Putnam, 2000; 
Putnam, 2001; Putnam, 2002; Putnam, 2007). 
The analysis of social relationships within this area suggests three distinct 
forms of association: bonding, bridging and linking. Bonding social capital holds 
people together in groups and is characterised by strong ties usually within a 
homogenous community which shares a common identity usually within families or 
ethnic groups. It also refers to those close relationships to people like yourself: 
friends, work colleagues, people we turn to for help in a crisis in our personal life. 
38 	 is It interesting to note that the term can be traced back to at least the work of 
Durkheim on the interdependence between members of society. 
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These are the personal ties we need to lead a happy, flourishing life. A certain 
level of bonding social capital is need for bridging to emerge. Bridging allows us to 
connect across diversity, is believed to create reciprocity of generalised trust and 
to enable economic transactions to take place between strangers and tends to be 
characterised by weaker links, loosely shared values within more heterogeneous 
relationships across social and ethnic groups, people who are not like you in some 
sense; they may be names in your email or address system you rarely contact but 
who are essential for your professional life. Linking occurs when such relationships 
cross social classes and/or power structures. A person's ability to get things done, 
to seek advantage relies on these ties to these elites. (van Staveren and 
Knorringa, 2006). These categorisations of associational bonds are potentially 
useful ways of understanding the utility of cooperative social networking 
relationships. 
According to the work of Granovetter, in one of the most influential of social 
networks papers, one of the characteristics of close primary relationships is their 
interdependence (Granovetter, 1983). Our social networks of primary 
relationships tend to be with mutual others. We usually know the friends of our 
friends, or they are similar sociologically, of similar ethnic origin, religion, social 
standing. Secondary relationships, on the other hand, being weaker ties, do not 
have so much overlap. We may not know the friends or the networks of these 
distant others. The strength of these ties is usually decided on by taking into 
account the amount of time characterised by the tie, the intimacy encouraged, the 
reciprocity and emotional intensity found within the relationship. The stronger the 
tie between two people, the greater percentage of people to whom they are both 
tied ('the friends of my friends'). 
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Significantly, strong ties draw us together with similar others and to some 
extent, exclude distant others. However, the weaker ties are argued to be those 
that open us to others in the wider community.39 Labaree, in discussing 
Granovetter, claims: 
Weak ties are what hold societies together in a complex web of 
connections and interactions, which make up in number and richness 
what they lack in intensity and duration... A rich network of weak ties is 
therefore the essential basis upon which citizens can construct a sense 
of public education as a public good. 
(Labaree, 2000, p128) 
The ability to develop these important secondary relationships (or weaker 
ties) becomes diminished if we choose to only associate with similar others. 
These weak ties to a larger, wider society give us good reason to view education 
and state schooling as having a crucial role to play in both developing and 
nourishing opportunities to bring about these ties. It gives us the opportunity to 
meet, mingle and meld with those who may be different. This becomes more 
pertinent when it refers to schools of a particular kind, ones that are open to the 
public without restriction based on faith, finance or ability. 
Recent studies in neuroscience seem to indicate that our brains have 
evolved to cope with group living; in other words we may have a biological 
precondition to trust each other within cooperative living (Grimes, 2003). 
Following from this, is that social bonding and other trust relationships appear to 
depend upon the production of a chemical in the brain, oxytocin (Broad, Curley 
and Keverne, 2006) and neuroactive hormones. The most notable contribution of 
this approach is that such chemicals act as 'social glue', enabling individuals to 
engage in trust-bond relationships and thus live in social groups (Broad, Curley 
39 Granovetter's doctoral research in 1970 for Harvard University focussed on examining how 
social networks can be used to obtain new jobs. He found that most people found their jobs, not 
through close friends as might be initially supposed, but through 'weak ties' which, he argued, play 
an important role in occupational mobility. 
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and Keverne, 2006; Zak and Fakhar, 2006). Whilst this empirical research 
(neuroeconomics) is obviously in its infancy and requires further development, at 
present it is still limited in both its outreach and analysis, yet holds the possibility 
of supporting a normative appraisal. 
However we define these bonds, whatever names we give them, they are 
an important part of our psyche and our social lives. The first observation from 
this would be that to feel bonded with others requires an affective disposition of a 
particular kind. It also carries with it an inclination to action based on the bond, a 
practice of working with others in pursuit of common interests. Some interests are 
short lived and require directed, cooperative working of a particular kind, for 
example, the collective action of workers at Visteon, who in answer to losing their 
jobs at the firm, undertook a rooftop occupation. Or the workers in Woippy, 
France who 'boss-napped' five managers of FM Logistic in protest at plant 
closure.40 It is unlikely that these individuals would share all interests in common, 
but the shared nature of their common problem motivated common response. 
When the common interest no longer exists, the bond is unlikely to continue (in a 
similar fashion to that of utility friendship). 
The second observation would be that when the bond is a civic bond, it 
denotes the group of people to whom we are bound within a complex mesh of 
obligations and responsibilities. It seems reasonable to assume that it marks out 
that grouping as being of special concern: I am obliged to regard them in some 
way differently from those to whom I am not bound and this may ground the 
extent of the help that I am willing to give them. One positive suggestion arising 
from this discussion of the nature of the bonds that bind us together is not just the 
4° The Observer:26.4.09: Business and Media Section, p6-7, Kathryn Hopkins 
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recognition of the complexity of the issues involved, but also interlinking this with 
ethical considerations. With this in mind, in the next sub-section, I shall explore 
further the horizontal relationship referred to previously. 
The Horizontal Bond of Equality 
When we consider the bond between those drawn together because of a 
common interest/connection (in the sense of strong fraternity: our most usual 
understanding of the concept), a literal understanding of equality does not seem 
to be a necessary element of the bond. If we take the literal family itself: not all 
family members stand one to another as equals. Frequently the parents are seen 
as the leaders of the family, followed by the children. Even amongst the children 
there may be different levels of 'seniority'. However, the civic relationship requires 
a particular form of commitment to equality between citizens which, I argue, is 
lacking in strong fraternity and which the concept of democratic fraternity can 
offer. 
It is undoubtedly true that one can care about human equality in many 
ways and for many differing reasons, which I do not propose to go into. Equality 
(and there are numerous different forms of it), is rarely sought for its own sake, 
but for what it leads/contributes to, the flourishing life of the individual (Marmor)41  
or as part of a wider vision of what society should be (Miller, 1982). Many 
philosophers give credence to the idea that the concepts of fraternity and equality 
are somehow linked and can only be understood in relation to each other (Arthur, 
1986; Fielding, 1988; Lee, 1986; Lyons, 1986). For some, fraternity is either a by- 
41 
 http://wwwl.idc.acil/marmodwork/eQuality.htm [last accessed 24.03.2007] 
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product of equality or a subset of equality. White identifies the fraternal attitude as 
being: 
... feeling a bond between oneself and others as equals, as moral 
beings with the same basic needs and an interest in leading a life of 
one's own, is the necessary emotional attitude between citizens who hold 
that one of the basic principles of their society is that power must be 
exercised, or controlled, equally by all moral agents who form the citizen 
body. 
(White, 1983, p72) 
The maintenance of some impetus towards equality across a group of people may 
foster and encourage feelings of fraternity and community among them which in 
turn can motivate the maintenance of structures in societies that encourage 
equality. 
Inequality, on the other hand, can undermine social cohesion and fragment 
fraternal feelings. Where there is vast inequality in societies, the affluent tend to 
dominate the decision making processes, create lower levels of social trust, the 
residential segregations of different groupings and the erosion of a shared public 
realm (Jackson and Segal, 2004). It is generally believed that a society structured 
to create or allow a high level of inequality would be politically unstable (giving 
rise to the threat of high levels of crime, social unrest, violence, a divided society). 
The belief holds that political instability would be caused by the have-nots 
envying the holdings of the haves and that such envy would be socially 
destructive. The problem of envy has frequently been seen as a weapon against 
egalitarians; the charge is that envy forms the psychological basis for the concern 
with equality and egalitarian conceptions of justice (those seeking to limit 
inequality would thus be concerned that if they could not have something, no one 
should). To hold, egalitarians would have to be motivated by opposing only 
inequalities that were unfavourable to themselves (it would not make sense for 
them to be envious if it were to their advantage). Whilst there may be some 
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egalitarians who might be envious of others' holdings, it does not hold that all are. 
Some may be concerned by the effects of inequality. Neither is it certain that all 
egalitarians are concerned only with inequalities unfavourable to themselves: 
there may be some concerned with inequalities in which they would benefit from 
the status quo. Maybe their concern is, as Cohen points out, because inequalities 
alienate people from each other (Cohen, 2001). It destroys fraternity.42 
It can thus be seen that the nurturing of fraternity is adversely affected by 
high levels of inequality. The desirability of some form of equality arises from the 
ability to connect with others, the desirability of civic cohesion, not for the sake of 
equality itself, but for the social effects of political stability. Interestingly, this ties in 
with the neuroeconomic research referred to earlier by Broad, Curley and 
42 Envy is described by Norman as a socially destructive feeling - that social life would go 
better the less envy generated (Norman, 2002). When people start to envy other's holdings, it 
affects their sense of well-being and personal satisfaction with their lot, creates dissatisfaction and 
unhappiness. La Caze, however, sees this kind of envy as useful in a society (La Caze, 2001; La 
Caze, 2002). She builds an argument that this social envy is what motivates people to improve 
their situation or standing. When we see that someone can do something we cannot, it can 
motivate us to seek the same through practise of a skill, learning a new way of doing things etc. 
She further argues that the point of envy can be to alert us to injustice — by noticing how we differ 
from others, comparing and justifying differences can itself lead to a "righteous envy". In this non-
vicious envy, the judgements we make of the situation are correct ones and the object of our envy 
really is unworthy of their good fortune. The "envy" becomes a prompt to action. 
What is frequently missed in the argument is that the envy being spoken of by political 
philosophers and economists is not the emotion known as 'envy'. The confusion arises from the 
use of the same word to signify two different things. The first, an emotion which can make life 
unpleasant for the sufferer (malign envy); the second usage (as used by Rawls, Nozick and game 
theorists) is as a term or a symbol allowing discussion of inequality of distribution within a society: 
it functions as a formula, almost as a metaphor. Indeed, Dworkin defines equality as an 'envy-free' 
distribution of resources (Dworkin, 1981). 
The adoption of a second metaphorical sense of envy avoids the overtones evoked by the 
emotional form of envy, that of the sense of inferiority and welfare loss as: 
"The form of envy it uses is comparatively benign insofar as it takes a disinterested viewpoint 
towards the object of envy. According to that interpretation a person envies not because the 
envied are in a better position than they are, but because they want what the envied has for their 
own benefit. His envy is motivated by personal want-satisfaction, rather than wishing to be better 
than the envied, or wishing them to be less than him, or wishing to emulate them." (Wigley, 2000, 
P3) 
No-envy or envy-free allocations are based on two agents having the same preferences 
who should be treated equally in considering the fair allocation of goods in economies. A scheme 
for distribution of goods is thus considered envy-free (in terms of game theory) if each recipient is 
convinced that no other recipient has received more than they have (according to their measure). 
The issue is that no recipient would wish to swap their share. The idea of no-envy or envy-free 
allocations is attractive to economists because it is claimed to be impartial between conceptions of 
the good as agents are responsible for their choice of their allocation of resources. 
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Keverne, that indicates that levels of oxytocin are affected by such external 
circumstances as trust relationships (and their lack), air pollution, equality (and 
conversely inequality) and socio-political stability (Broad, Curley and Keverne, 
2006; Grimes, 2003). 
Empirical studies on social capital43 have also drawn links between 
inequality and conceptions of connectedness, arguing that periods of greatest 
economic equality tend to coincide with high levels of social and civic 
connectedness (Putnam, 2000). The current vast, growing gap between rich and 
poor in UK society gives cause for concern. Consider the following: 
... it would be perverse to neglect the fact that large economic 
inequalities are important causal drivers of social exclusion: both of the 
poor, and of the rich. When the rich are very rich, and the poor are very 
poor, it is much harder for them to meet as equal citizens. Indeed, it is 
hard for them to meet at all. Large inequalities lead to radically divergent 
consumption patterns and lifestyles, and to mutual incomprehension and 
lack of sympathy between individuals who are nominally members of the 
same civic community. 
(Jackson and Segal, 2004, p40-41) 
The US is said to be more socially divided now by the gap between the richest 
and the poorest than thirty years ago. Each year, the gap grows. Hutton reported 
in 2002 that the richest 20% of Americans earned nine times more than the 
poorest 20%: 
The US has more of its population living in poverty — 19.1% - than any 
other Western industrialised country (quoting Mishel et al — State of 
Working America); worse, the bottom 10% of Americans, even though 
they live in a richer society, are poorer than their counterparts in Europe, 
Canada and Japan (quoting Freeman — National Bureau for Economic 
Research June 2000 — working paper 7757) 
(Hutton, 2002, p149) 
In the UK, a recent Performance and Innovation Unit paper on Social Mobility 
informed ministers that over the past 20-30 years, income inequalities widened 
significantly (Aldridge, 2001). Between 1979 and 1998/9, the income of the 
43 Definitions of social capital categories can be found on p125-6 
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bottom decile of population rose by 6% in real terms, whilst that of the top, rose by 
82% (Aldridge, 2002). 
The idea of civic engagement and the effects this has in other areas has 
received much attention in empirical studies over the past decade. Robert Putnam 
has been examining the gradual disappearance of these joint ventures in civic 
and social life where citizens came together whether through social activities or 
civic engagement in the USA for many years. In 2000, he published the largest, 
most comprehensive study of the phenomenon of civic erosion, Bowling Alone 
(Putnam, 2000). Using the example of bowling, he pointed out that whilst as many 
Americans were going bowling as in the 1950s, they were no longer joining 
bowling clubs. They were figuratively 'bowling alone'. People were less deeply 
connected in the lives of their communities than post war, less civically engaged 
and less likely to vote. 
The 'bowling alone' phenomenon, showing the erosion of this particular 
element of civic life, over generations, is not limited to the USA. In 2002, a study 
by the Performance and Innovation Unit in the UK indicated a link could be shown 
between civic engagement and economic and business performance (Aldridge, 
2002). Interestingly, Putnam did a follow up study (less widely reported) in 2002 
after the effects of 9/11 (Putnam, 2002) where in he found that some elements of 
civic engagement were 'repairing' themselves as a crisis brought the nation 
together (e.g. trust of government). Civic engagement would thus appear to affect 
not only individual wellbeing and life chances, but the capacity to be a public. 
Much work has been done in recent years on the development of an 
underclass in society (Hills, 2002), the growing numbers of people who cannot for 
one reason or another fully take part in the life of the society (usually measured in 
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financial terms). When inequality widens, life chances are curtailed for some. If a 
grouping within a society can cut themselves off from cradle to grave by avoiding 
those things held in common, by always using private medicine, schooling, gated 
communities, private transport, accessing different media for instance, in what 
sense are they actually functioning as members of the same society with those 
who cannot so afford? Where is the meeting place, what 'language' is shared by 
those with nothing in common? In what sense is it a society at all? 
Collective goods, I argue, are amongst the things that bind a society 
together and create a sense of belonging. The idea of shared public goods de-
commodifies certain goods essential to the wellbeing of the citizen. They form a 
space in which all members of the community can metaphorically 'meet' enjoying 
a basic equality as citizens regardless of their differing social backgrounds. With 
high levels of economic inequality, those with wealth can buy their way out of this. 
Once the wealthy do so, they are less likely to be willing to pay taxes for the 
upkeep of this public space and less supportive of efforts to improve them. 
Suissa, in discussing the work of White, points out that: 
... the conceptual connection between fraternity and equality can work 
both ways: not only does a relatively high degree of socio-economic 
equality foster and support fraternal attitudes, but the institutional 
maintenance of such equality may depend on a degree of fraternal 
feeling. 
(Suissa, 2006, p68) 
The tendency for fraternal bonds to cause people to act co-operatively, to identify 
together and feel part of a 'team' can affect the impetus towards equality. 
Is there an alternative interpretation of family metaphors? Munoz-Darde 
offers a vision of fraternity as an abstract concept based within a Rawlsian theory 
of justice. Using the metaphor of siblings, Munoz-Darde points out that brothers 
and siblings tend not to share things between each other on the basis of altruism 
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nor on a shared vision of the good life: what concerns them is 'fairness' (Munoz-
Darde, 1999). They are more concerned with the fairness of the distribution of 
goods by parents. The metaphor of siblings, she suggests, leads us to: 
... an interrogation of each of the brothers and sisters concerning the 
rules and principles applied to them, which suggests the analogy with the 
scrutiny of principles of political legitimacy and distributive justice. A 
further aspect of the metaphor is also visible at this stage: unlike 
solidarity or community, with which fraternity is often associated, the 
accent is put not only on the group, but also on each of the brothers and 
sisters that belong to it. 
(Munoz-Darde, 1999, p89) 
The power of the sibling relationship is not the emotional tie with each other, but 
the way in which they stand to each other in the distribution of goods. 
The concept works as a metaphor for the relationship between citizens 
through the suggestion of a political family (one in which we happen to find 
ourselves not through choice or voluntary association). The metaphor carries both 
similarities and disparities: it is not a simple comparison (Munoz-Darde, 1999). 
We do not relate to fellow citizens as if they were siblings, (the criticisms of the 
concept of civic friendship would no doubt apply here too) but serves to tie us to 
impersonal others through the need to consider each other as someone having 
rights to resources that we share. All that being said, it must be admitted that the 
ability to stand back from one's own situation and consider how one's actions and 
choices affect civic others may require a high level of abstract moral development 
(in seeing oneself as connected to abstract others) and as such, needs far greater 
exploration than can be achieved within the parameters of this thesis. 
Section 4: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have sought to explore the nature of fraternity as a model 
for the civic relationship through identifying and drawing out two differing 
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conceptions: one, I have termed strong fraternity and indicated how this may be 
inadequate at the civic level; the second, I have termed democratic fraternity. As 
the previous discussion has intimated, there are several remaining puzzles left to 
address. 
Firstly, the horizontal loyalties demanded between groups differ in kind 
from the loyalties between members within groups. Many of the groups may have 
differing conceptions of the good; some will have opposing conceptions. A 
pluralistic society means accepting we have a multiplicity of identities and 
attachments, but that in the public realm, our personal loyalties to those most like 
us (whether in terms of culture, religion and/or interests) may be inappropriate. 
Secondly, the dispositions and attitudes needed to sustain citizens in such 
situations require careful nurturing and development within education systems. 
They require 'reasonable toleration' (akin to Rawls' theory of reasonable 
doctrines), the willingness to enter into dialogue with fellow citizens (Abdullah, 
2007a), respect for those who come within the remit of 'being governed together', 
'knowing' our fellow citizens, interacting with them, to develop these particular 
dispositions. 
Thirdly, why has the concept of fraternity received so little attention in 
political philosophy? Why has there not been the same development and analysis 
of the concept as have been received by liberty and equality? One of the foremost 
explanations must be the normative significance of the concept: it expresses a 
form of attachment that tells us how we ought to relate to others. It contains within 
it an implication that this is both desirable and valuable, which sits uneasily with 
other commitments within the modern liberal state. Following from this, the 
relational aspect appears to be in tension with individual rights expressed by 
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commitments to liberty and equality. Fraternity, at the expense of liberty and 
equality, would certainly fall foul of this argument, however in conjunction with the 
other two, and firmly rooted in a conception of democracy itself, the idea of 
balance may avoid this. 
Fourthly, linked to the above, is the idea that fraternity requires some form 
of sacrifice, for want of a better term, of some in favour of others. It can evoke 
memories of the outcomes of particular totalitarian regimes promoting radical 
collectivism, such as Soviet Russia, coupled with emphasising the needs of the 
many over the individual, which would appear to make such a society appear 
illiberal. It seems to involve some form of commitment on the part of some to 
forego certain of their rights in response to the needs of others. This links to the 
argument in the previous section, that fraternity is adversely affected by vast 
socio-economic inequalities within a society. Democratic fraternity is not 
necessarily concerned with 'neighbourhood inequalities' (between individual 
people or between certain groupings); it is more concerned with the gap between 
top and bottom — the spread of inequalities. Just as in friendship, it is hard for the 
very rich to befriend the very poor (see Chapter 2), so the civic relationship is 
harder to sustain when the gap between top and bottom becomes too great. 
Lest it be thought I am dismissing strong fraternity in favour of democratic 
fraternity, I am not; both may be important in a society. The former gives us a 
sense of belonging, allowing us to join with like-minded people in ventures that 
give meaning and pleasure: whether they be philatelists, philosophers or 
Philadelphians. The latter enables us to be a society. Strong fraternity alone will 
not allow us to create the strong bonds across disparate groupings and thus 
support collective action nor collective sacrifice: yet no society could exist over 
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time without requiring citizens to make sacrifices on behalf of other citizens 
(Wellman, 2000). It would not enable a modern pluralistic western society to rise 
above individual differences and conceptions of the good to enable social life. 
If we accept Anderson's argument, democratic fraternity would have 
metaphoric significance as an imagined relationship within an imagined 
community — but not less real for the fact of being imagined (Anderson, 1991). To 
describe fraternity as an imagined relationship is not to comment on the 
falsity/veracity of the claim but to indicate the style in which it is experienced. The 
people are real, the way in which they are connected or feel to be connected is 
best described as a social imaginary. It is a necessary way of feeling/being 
attached to others for social life to continue. 
The concept of democratic fraternity is metaphoric and does not point to a 
particular relationship. We seem to lack an appropriate 'vocabulary' in which to 
address these issues and hence lapse into metaphorical imagery. The physical 
and social isolation from each other of the poorest sections of the community has 
serious consequences for democratic politics. But the horizontal relationship of 
fraternity goes beyond this resource inequality. It seeks something more. 
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Chapter 6 
Metaphors, Imaginaries and Schools 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have considered three different metaphors we use 
to consider civic relationships in the search to identify an appropriate theory of 
belonging to correspond with our desires for social cohesion. This chapter turns to 
the second and third of my original questions to consider the possible implications 
of the three metaphors and how they might affect both school structures and 
pedagogy when social cohesion is taken seriously. By considering the 
commitments held within the models, examining their capacity to bind disparate 
people together through an appropriate exemplar, we may gain clarity as regards 
the potential ramifications for how we organize education to nurture and 
encourage these relationships. 
Political concepts influence our lives and are constantly being re-examined 
and redefined by politicians or theorists in the course of everyday life. The way in 
which we describe the world, the metaphors we use, marks out and highlights 
what we think as being of importance. Coupled with this is the view that such 
metaphoric models form a crucial link between the world around us and our 
knowledge of the world (Willson-Quayle, 1991, p8). It is undoubtedly true that we 
cannot know our civic others in the same way that we know our friends and 
families, and given that we cannot relate to them or feel for them in the same way, 
we have to find a way of discussing these complex situations. All such discourse 
necessarily depends, to some extent, on metaphorical models, and given that the 
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models we choose can have such extraordinary effects on the policies we 
choose, it is of utmost importance that we are aware of how our policy choices 
may be formed by these underlying commitments. In other words, every effort 
should be made to critically examine our metaphors to ensure the implicit values 
are the ones we want to inform our policies. 
There are many different strands to the argument surrounding the issue of 
the use of metaphor, echoing many of the complexities surrounding how we 
organise our social lives, some of which we have explored in previous chapters. 
As the preceding discussions have indicated, the models through which we 
discuss the civic relationship are themselves fiercely disputed, and open to 
interpretation and analysis. I now wish to examine how different metaphors affect 
our understanding and organisation of schools and to demonstrate the 
importance of appropriate models. In this chapter, I will outline two distinctive 
arguments concerning the use of metaphor in this area. Firstly, I shall argue that 
metaphor is used where ordinary language fails: in new situations, we need a new 
'vocabulary'. Metaphor enables us to create this new vocabulary. Metaphor, in this 
view, enables us to encapsulate potentially complex arguments and phenomena 
in a way that can be understood by the populace or can be used to further 
scholarly discourse and understanding of the subject matter. In the second 
argument, I wish to suggest that metaphor not only translates what is there but 
also in turn has the power to affect that reality. 
Whilst most political philosophy is built upon the tacit understandings and 
interlinked assumptions of two contrasting metaphors for the civic relationship 
(that of friendship or family - both of which I have shown to have problems), in the 
last chapter I proposed an alternative to these: that of democratic fraternity. In the 
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course of addressing these issues, I suggested that by rooting of fraternity in a 
concept of democracy, we might throw new light and gain fresh insights into the 
nature of the civic relationship. As I indicated in my first chapter, understanding 
and analysing the associational bond is only one element of my thesis. As 
discourse in this area can be seen to be unavoidably metaphoric by nature, the 
methodology of this thesis needs necessarily to turn to consider this facet to 
achieve the former. 
The use of metaphor as a focus in itself for academic study has emerged 
over the past two decades from the field of Cognitive Linguistics into a field of 
study known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory. This has been built around the 
work of George Lakoff, based on empirical studies as well as the application of 
metaphor, in contrast to the literal understanding of the world around us. Whilst 
metaphor has long been the subject of study of linguistics and literature, less 
attention has been paid to it as a feature of our neurological systems, informing 
the way we conceptualise systems and interpret the world around us (Lakoff, 
2002). Metaphor, following the work of Lakoff and Johnson, is a fundamental 
mechanism of the mind that allows us to use what we know about one area to 
affect our understanding of others. They become 'metaphors we live by' and are 
frequently used to interpret or explain novel phenomena. The use of particular 
metaphors helps create and frame discourse in shifting political ideas. They are 
about meaning and the persuasive consequences of interpretations (Beer and De 
Landtsheer, 2004, p7). 
Metaphors abound as soon as we start to consider complex ideas. To take 
just one example, all talk of a public sphere is metaphorical by nature and 
demands an acceptance of a social imaginary for the discourse to take place. The 
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state is invisible and has to be symbolised, it has to be imagined before it can be 
conceived (Anderson, 1991). Metaphor becomes a distinct way of allowing us to 
consider particular areas of life by carrying over images, values and associations 
from one area of life to another; it allows us to enter the realm of political theory 
and thus can affect policy. It is in this respect, I suggest, it can interplay with the 
way we structure school systems. 
Democracy requires citizens: it requires citizens of a certain type, yet such 
citizens are not born, they are made (Callan, 1997). Education is a cornerstone of 
democracy. Making citizens, turning children into citizens can be claimed to be 
one of the basic functions of education. Education and schools, more than any 
other institutions, shape normative values and beliefs and transmit these to 
successive generations. The models we choose to use for shaping these values 
thus assume great practical importance. In so far as schools form a central role in 
the primary socialisation of children, then how we conceive of this civic role and 
the relationship between citizens assumes importance for how we structure the 
transmission of this view and the institutions we choose to do this in. Given this 
close association, it is important that the structure of the institution that transmits 
the policy should not itself undermine the values being transmitted. 
Simply posited, schools in societies that purport to be democracies are 
obliged to develop citizens, part of which is developing the necessary relationship 
between such citizens (Parker, 2005). Whilst citizenship education has come to 
be seen as a means of addressing the social cohesion needed by the state and 
the diverse range of cultures formed within the polis, some models of organisation 
can restrict the achievement of this aim. Discerning how a system of schooling 
might aim to prepare children for their future lives as citizens, how it might be 
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structured and how it might affect their capacity to restrict or develop the 
relationships and behavioural traits necessary to democratic character, forms the 
subject-matter be explored in this chapter. 
To explore how the metaphorical models for the civic relationship interplay 
with how we structure our educational institutions, in Section 1 I explore how we 
understand our collective life through an expository section on the academic 
literature surrounding the social imaginary. In Section 2, I examine how an 
understanding of 'root metaphor' illuminates many of the features of this area. In 
Section 3, Metaphors and School Organisation, I look at how the metaphors of 
friendship, the marketplace and family give normative authority to how school 
systems are structured and to how the relationships between schools, teachers 
and pupils would thus be organised. Finally, in Section 4, the conclusion, I return 
to my alternative metaphor using a modification of the family metaphor as 
siblinghood within a concept of democracy. 
Section 1: The Social Imaginary 
It is not part of my focussed intentions to offer a complete exposition of the 
study of social imaginaries, yet having alluded to the work of Benedict Anderson 
and the insights gained through his work on the 'imagined community' as a way of 
thinking about nationalism and how we consider our collective life, it appears 
imperative to explore how this complex topic relates to my field of study and the 
conceptualisation of what it is to be a 'we'. 
The term 'social imaginary' was first coined in 1975 by Castoriados in his 
book "The Imaginary Institution of Society" in which he examined how a 
multiplicity of socio-historical realities could be possible through an ontological 
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approach. In other words, that society is a self-creating enterprise whose form 
cannot be deduced from previous conditions. Each society derives its unity 
through its collective myths, legends, symbols and shared significants. The 
creation of new language, for example through metaphors, serves as a heuristic 
model for understanding the social imaginary (Gaonkar, 2002). It is the formation 
of this element of often unarticulated background understandings that has formed 
the background to this thesis. I purport that a rapidly changing pluralist society 
within a modern liberal democracy requires the creation of a new language for 
how we stand to one another, and that this conceptualisation, in turn, relies upon 
the use of metaphor. 
This 'grand narrative' has in turn been taken up and interpreted through a 
rapidly growing mountain of literature. Take for example, Charles Taylor's book, 
Modern Social lmaginaries, which looks at the way people imagine their social 
existence and the "deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations" (Taylor, 2004, p23). He adopts the idea of an 'imaginary' to focus on 
how ordinary people imagine their social surroundings through images, stories 
and legends (p23). The overall picture that emerges from this is that an imaginary 
is a way of 'imagining' our social existence, how we relate to others, how social 
life can be ordered. It goes beyond the background understandings necessary to 
make sense of these practices to encompass: 
How we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, how we relate 
to other groups, and so on. 	 (Taylor, 2004, p25) 
This idea of social embeddedness then becomes part of a theory of personal 
identity. And again, an imaginary is taken to refer to how a given people imagine 
their collective social life: 
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...the thinking shared within a society by ordinary people, the common 
understanding that makes common practices possible and legitimizes 
them. The social imaginary is implicit and normative; it derives from the 
usual, the quotidian, from everyday attitudes, behaviours and opinion 
making... the social imaginary provides the background that makes 
sense of any given act in daily life. 
(Arthurs, 2003, p580) 
These quotations taken together suggest that the imaginary has to be shared by a 
large group of people, if not the whole society, yet allows for change and 
development; it does not remain static and unchanging. 
I will try to approach the main issue here by first sketching how the idea of 
social imaginaries encompasses three areas that are crucial to the modern 
imaginary in the Anglo-American world in Taylor's original piece: the public 
sphere, the citizen-state and the economy (Taylor, 2004). Consider the following: 
I want to speak of social imaginary here, rather than social theory, 
because there are important — and multiple — differences between the 
two. I speak of imaginary because I'm talking about the way ordinary 
people "imagine" their social surroundings, and this is often not 
expressed in theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories and 
legends. But it is also the case that theory is usually the possession of a 
small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that 
it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. 
(Taylor, 2004, p106) 
On the present interpretation, modern social imaginaries are dependent on 
relationships between strangers made possible through the existence of mass 
media, for example (Anderson, 1991). It is dependent on a notion of 'we' — a 
collective metaphorical coming together. 
Since its publication, the book Imagined Communities (Anderson, 1991), 
has been a point of reference for many writers in the area of political philosophy 
as well as those of anthropology and sociology. Whilst it was initially conceived as 
a contribution to the discussion of nationalisms, it has found its way into 
discussions of contemporary social analysis as a way of analysing how society is 
formed and interacts. Indeed, it has become almost impossible to discuss 
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nationalism without reference to this seminal work. The first point to consider from 
this text is that Anderson defines the nation as: 
..an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign. 	 (Anderson, 1991, p6) 
He argues that it must be imagined because members of the nation cannot 
possibly know, meet or hear of all of their fellow citizens in the face-to-face way 
that can exist within a small village. Yet, despite this, each citizen holds an image 
of their community. It must be limited in that there has to be an 'us' and 'others'. 
Even the largest nation has to have boundaries beyond which there are other 
nations. No nation, he argues, sees itself as encompassing all of humankind. It 
must be sovereign because of its historical origins, from the Age of Enlightenment 
and revolution destroying the divinely-ordained and/or dynastic realms. It is 
imagined as a community because 
...regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in 
each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal relationship. 
(Anderson, 1991, p7) 
Whilst there appears on the surface to be some ambiguity within the concept, it is 
important to understand that for Anderson 'imagining' does not imply falsity or 
imaginary. He contends that all communities larger than the face-to-face-ness of a 
small village have to be imagined. 
What is the metaphor of the 'imagined community' illuminating? What is it 
pointing to? Ultimately, it is pointing out a psychological fact, that the nation 
cannot be known in the same way as close, personal relationships, neither can it 
create the same attachments. Yet the metaphor goes beyond this, in a poetic 
way, to indicate the type of relationship. The nation is like a community; it puts the 
nation in with the family of concepts that includes 'communities'. 
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There are, however, several unspoken suppositions underlying much of 
this material. There is the implied sense of a certain psychological element to how 
we experience our social life. When political life is imagined a certain way, a 
particular set of insights is then available. More interestingly, beyond this, lies the 
ethical or normative claims forming much of the background understandings: the 
myths, legends, stories that carry the imaginary speak of what we see as 
important, the values and commitments that underlie social life. The social 
imaginary is then conceived as "a set of symbols with which people give 
imaginative definition to their yearning for supportive, reciprocal and intimate 
social relationships" (Farrar, 1999, p13). These provide the background 
understandings for the organisation of social life. 
Whilst much of the discourse on social imaginaries is decidedly vague in 
character and full of unclear interpretations (perhaps due to being a relatively new 
area of study), some elements of it have been accepted into mainstream social 
and political theory. It is generally accepted that we orientate ourselves in the 
political world by the symbols and referents used. The challenge for countries 
facing high levels of immigration would thus lie in adapting or reinterpreting our 
existing symbols and referents that speak of this element of political life. This in 
turn requires an ever-adapting language through which to conceive of our social 
existence. Given that Anderson is correct in his analysis of 'the nation' as a social 
imaginary, that it is a necessary way of conceiving of ourselves as a collective 
agency, and given that much of political discourse depends on the use of 
metaphor, it seems reasonable to assume that how we conceive of our social 
bonds will also be conceptual. In the next section, I shall briefly step back a little 
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to consider how the use of metaphor relates to that of the imaginary, by outlining 
one particular understanding of the role of 'root metaphors'. 
Section 2: Root Metaphors 
Much of our social and political reasoning makes use of interlocking 
systems of concepts (Lakoff, 1995). This assertion seems both reasonable and 
self evident. Yet I wish to consider the usage of particular metaphors that can be 
unpacked to reveal subconscious commitments to particular values and goals, 
and when acted upon, can have important consequences. Whilst the three 
metaphors forming the basis of this thesis are interesting in their own right, I wish 
now to argue that one of them in particular when rooted in a conception of 
democracy provides the most appropriate interplay with the modern liberal state. 
The concept of root metaphors has been gaining attention and importance 
since the 1970s; it is generally accepted in the literature that root metaphors seek 
to explore the 'logic' of the metaphor. The contribution of Lakoff et al that I find of 
potentially most interest in this area is that the root metaphor differs from other 
metaphors in not being an explicit language device, but more an unconscious, yet 
fundamental assumption necessitated by the argument. 
Taking this further, there are two distinct applications of this point. Firstly, it 
can be understood as an underlying world view that shapes an individual's 
understanding of a situation. A key feature of this claim is that these tend to be so 
embedded within the language, that one can be unaware of their existence as 
metaphor. One has to go: 
...beneath the surface of expression where metaphors exist as figures of 
speech and seeking that level of thought where they serve, formatively, 
to bring into being a world we are to experience as concrete and literal. 
(Kunze, 1983, p153) 
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Secondly, root metaphors can be understood as the concept from which other 
metaphors spring, for example, winning an argument (argument as war, battle, for 
instance). I wish to make use of both of these facets: firstly, that when we unpick 
the underlying and implicit commitments and values within democratic fraternity, 
we will recognise that these most fully correspond with our liberal traditions, but 
secondly, that democratic fraternity has a unique relationship to that of 
democracy, that democracy implies a relationship of fraternity. 
Metaphors of family and friends are amongst the strongest we have for 
models of the public space and as such, are common in many different cultures. 
These metaphors are not only universal as models, but also incredibly powerful; 
kinship and models of kinship, for example, have impacted on every part of social 
life throughout history. Both anthropology and sociology, through the work of 
theorists such as Mary Douglas and Emmanuel Todd in their studies on natural 
symbols in cultures, have given support to this claim. Indeed, Todd, in particular, 
looked at how family structures and relationships constitute models of socio-
political relationships in societies (Todd, 1985). In addition to these two 
metaphors, there has been a growing tendency to use market-place metaphors to 
describe civic relationships as 'transactions' between strangers. In what follows, I 
shall consider the particular values and commitments entailed by these three 
metaphors. 
Turning back momentarily to Lakoff: different uses of family-metaphor (with 
different visions of 'parents': strict parent versus nurturing parent) are claimed to 
underpin much of US politics and indicate how beliefs are frequently supported by 
the metaphors in which the ideas are framed (Lakoff, 1995). Our identity is 
socially embedded as a member of the family. By so characterising the topic, the 
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relationship to the state is dependent to some extent on our relationship to other 
people. For example, the 'Nation-as-family' metaphor carries with it a strong 
notion of belonging together in some sense, whether by birth or adoption. 
Consider just a few of the common metaphors in this area: 'Uncle Sam,' founding 
fathers,' sending sons into war' family of man', 'brothers-in arms' and other such 
examples. These surreptitiously serve to call to mind the warmth and support of 
kin relationships (Kaplan, 2007). It can, however, carry over other, more negative 
images: government-as-parent and citizens-as-children and invoke paternalism 
(Lakoff, 1995). 
Similarly, I would argue, the metaphor of 'Nation-as-friends' carries with it a 
particular notion: that of having been a 'chosen' relationship, of being bound 
together in a joint venture: 'Britain will stand by her friends' living side-by-side' 
'citizen-friends' civic friendship' friendship of peoples' our fellow Americans'. 
Here, the effect created is of a society of equals, of mutual benefit, of people 
'drawn' together. But the equation of friendship with citizenship has problems 
(Healy, 2006). Ties of friendship require a voluntary nature and affection between 
participants; ties of citizenship are more contractual, driven by obligation and duty 
(Wellman, 2001). 
In contrast, the metaphor of 'nation-as-marketplace' carries with it 
'government as contract' and citizens as 'buyers and sellers', an exchange of 
services, society as 'consumption or production': 'social contract' we need to be 
more competitive as a nation' the consumer society' corporate citizenship' a 
nation of shopkeepers'. The relationship between people becomes that of utility, 
not affection. For a society to achieve civic cohesion, however understood, it 
would need to go beyond a relationship based on exchange of services to 
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achieve inclusion of those weaker members of society outside of the boundary of 
the market. Citizens need to be motivated towards doing what is good for the 
sake of others: they need a sense of concern for the well-being of each other 
(Kaplan, 2007). 
These metaphors undoubtedly have 'audience appeal' in that they can 
activate conscious and subconscious emotional responses (Beer and De 
Landtsheer, 2004, p27), even suggesting that often complex political issues have 
a simplicity to them, thus giving the audience a sense of confidence. There are, 
however, negative aspects to this: they are capable of carrying stereotypes, of 
oversimplifying complex issues, even of lulling the audience into being 
manipulated by their emotional responses. The more literally a metaphor is taken, 
the less likely it is to be subject to examination and critique. No metaphor can 
wholly eliminate these problems, yet as intimated in the first chapter, it is highly 
important that the metaphors that shape our lives should be as germane as 
possible. 
To consider democratic fraternity as a metaphor. Each component of the 
metaphor highlights an important aspect of the concept. The metaphor of family 
evokes a specific community of people who belong; it implies a home, an 
emotional bond and a common purpose binding people together. But what it does 
goes beyond this: democratic fraternity secularizes the notions of family and 
expands those within its remit, removing lingering historical religious connotations. 
Democratic fraternity, I argue is unique as a political metaphor in that it is rooted 
in a particular understanding of the relationship between citizens in an 
understanding of democracy. The linkage with democracy serves to point to a 
normative dimension and gives a guideline for future action. It shifts the core of 
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investigation to both the linkage with equality and the realm of the political. The 
idea of the nation-as-family is referred to by Lakoff as a deeper metaphor in the 
way to it underlies many liberal values (Lakoff, 1995), can avoid many of the 
problems associated with family metaphors (paternalism for instance) by confining 
the image to that of siblings. It is this particular characteristic of this particular 
metaphor that is lacking in the other two. 
Could democratic fraternity be understood as a literal relationship, a 
straightforward description of a state-of-affairs? It seems a trivial point to make, 
but citizens of western liberal democracies are not brothers or family members in 
a literal sense of the term (with the possible exception of possible tribal 
communities). As elucidated in the previous chapter, when fraternity is used 
metaphorically on its own, it results in 'strong fraternity' and the problems that 
arose from this (see Chapter 5). To expand into possible wider understandings of 
belonging, beyond the narrowness of birth relationships, fraternity is 
indispensable to democracy. Fraternity, when rooted in a conception of 
democracy, achieves something the other two metaphors fail to do: it forms a 
framework through which to consider democracy as a way of living in society. 
Munoz-Darde points to how fraternity itself works as a heuristic device 
because of being a metaphor: 
...it suggests the idea of a generation of siblings asking: 'what would 
things be like if, instead of obeying the rules and principles that are 
applied to us, we were to choose them?' ... But fraternity also invites us to 
enquire: "What kind of principles would I want to apply to my fellow 
citizens if I had a concrete understanding of their needs and then of the 
kind of person each of them is such as the understanding I would have if 
they were my brothers and sisters?' In the first sense, fraternity works as 
a heuristic device for the discovery of normative binding elements 
between each of the brothers and sisters and among all of them. In the 
second case, fraternity provides a conceptual link between concrete 
personal care and impersonal benevolence. 
(Munoz-Darde, 1999, p90) 
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Thus the use of metaphor allows us to enter the realm of political theory, allowing 
us to move from the metaphor to insights into the relationship between citizens. 
These deep metaphors serve a further purpose. They provide a standard to steer 
by, yet hold the possibility of being realizable (Taylor, 2004). To develop this 
further, I now turn to how these different metaphors influence/interact with the 
field of schooling and school structures to examine the normative significance of 
each of the metaphors considered here and suggest how they might be realized. 
Section 3: Metaphors and School Organisation 
Whilst undoubtedly there are those who view metaphors as merely 
decorative or stylistic additions to arguments, the study of how metaphor frames 
the domain language and interacts with policy is starting to attract academic 
attention (for example Beer and De Landtsheer, 2004). Metaphors clearly play a 
role in how we think and talk about the realm of the political; the rhetorical 
persuasiveness of these can form a framework within which to then reason about 
our commitments. However, it must be acknowledged that whilst we may speak of 
the 'power of metaphor' and the 'interplay between metaphor and policy', 
demonstrating this in practice may not itself prove entirely achievable in all 
situations. New phrases, new metaphors, new vocabulary come in to usage all 
the time, some pass into common usage, others wither and fade. Some affect the 
ways in which we organise or run aspects of our shared lives, for example 'the 
stakeholder society', 'the third way' amongst many others. 
If we remained at the level of metaphor as mere decorative language, it 
would be of interest, but not of great importance. However, as intimated in the 
previous chapter, it is the possibility of metaphor usage to go beyond this at an 
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unseen level, to import the hidden, sometimes subconscious, values and 
commitments from one area to another that epitomizes this aspect of metaphor 
that I wish to focus on in this section. Herein lies the role of philosophy, mapping 
out metaphoric concepts and enabling us to understand better the metaphorical 
nature of what we take for granted in conventional language. 
Hence, to look at the normative implications of this, I shall consider the 
metaphors of friendship, family and market (economic metaphor) already 
encountered in this thesis. I then consider what kinds of schools and school 
systems would emerge when interplaying with practice. So pervasive has the 
market metaphor become in both the structure and running of schools (particularly 
in the UK), that many elements will be instantly recognisable, hence this forms the 
best starting point. 
Market (economic metaphor) 
Even for advocates of the marketisation of schools, there have been 
rumblings of disquiet over some of the externalities" associated with this as a 
practice, and as such, the impact of markets on schooling remains hotly contested 
in many quarters. Yet to look at it as a metaphor, interplaying with practice and 
carrying over the associated values is an area less often explored. For example, 
this metaphor emphasises the vertical forms of loyalty over the horizontal forms 
needed by citizens; exit becomes the preferred way of dealing with problems or 
dissatisfaction; brand loyalty emphasises the corporate-identity forming process; 
the concept of competition reduces the likelihood of cooperation; 'choice' is the 
predominant feature (Healy, 2008). 
44 Externalities in economic terms are the consequences or factors of production that are 
not taken into account in establishing the market price. 
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I will approach the salient issues by first sketching out some of the 
concepts associated with the metaphor of market: price, value for money, 
customers, clients, sponsorship, standards, competition, delivery, appraisal, 
assessment, business, economy, corporate identity, contracts, demand, 
enterprise, market and sales. Using this metaphor, what would the school system 
look like? There would need to be a variety of types of school to choose from 
(choice requires more than one to choose between), each offering something 
different (brand loyalty to the extreme). Whilst parents would be looking for 'best 
value' for their particular child, schools would also be choosing: they would be 
looking for pupils that could meet their academic requirements. Funding would be 
by vouchers and/or top-up fees or completely fee-paying. Between schools would 
be intense competition both for pupils (frequently referred to as customers or pupil 
units) and position, with a declining or low level role for LEA involvement. Schools 
would have to consider their market position in admittance procedures, for 
example, pupils who might lower their position in league tables and/or academic 
achievements would not be viewed as 'valuable' to the school and may even be 
discouraged. Schools would be judged on their position in league tables, ranked 
in order: those with declining pupil rolls would be deemed unprofitable and 
allowed to close. Those schools looking to increase their advantage over other 
schools, and market position, would look to how best to achieve academic 
achievement including size of school. Whilst there may be schools that could be 
tempted to increase the number of pupils and hence have greater financial gain 
(each pupil being worth X number of pounds), others may well concentrate on 
'small schools'. 
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On the present interpretation, such schools would be stratified 
organisations with a strong emphasis on uniforms and vertical loyalty symbols. 
Teachers and schools would be pitted against each other in competition. Staff 
relationships would be affected by emphasis on individual personal achievements, 
lack of co-operation and non-sharing of good practice (for fear of others' 
advancement). There would be an overemphasis on achievement measured by 
constant assessment, targets and testing, league tables and competition. 
Personalised learning would be sought for individual benefit, gain and 
achievement. Placement by test scores and league tables would feature highly. 
This model contrasts and clashes with many important values within a 
liberal democratic society. With the use of the metaphor of markets, excellence for 
some would mean the failure of others. There would be little regard for the civic 
virtues of mutual respect or toleration, no equality of worth of citizens: it would 
negate any idea of 'education for its own sake'. Again, it would neglect the 
secondary relationships needed by the civic relationship, but it may even go 
further. It could damage or fray the primary relationships too: the work colleagues, 
friends and people we turn to in a crisis, with whom we may also be in 
competition. The consequences of a purely market-metaphor based education or 
school system would damage an important element of the flourishing life: 
personal relationships. 
Family 
The family is a primary domain in how we organise social life and as such, 
it provides a powerful metaphor for how the civic relationship can be modelled. As 
a model of organisation and relationships, this subsequently affects how we view 
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and interpret systems of cooperation. With its suggestion of the domestic sphere, 
the model can be seen to underpin some conceptions of civic interaction. This 
model can be understood as a metaphoric model for schools wherein the pupils 
are tied together through something substantial shared in common: a strong 
attachment linked to a sense of identity, inseparable from their place in a 
particular structure; shared values and traditions; strong, thick bonds of loyalty; an 
emotional tie to the group; a distinct body of ideas as to how best to live a life. 
Many church/religious schools work within this imaginary seeing each person 
involved in the school (pupil, staff, governors, parents) as being related as family, 
through the attachment to the religion, priding themselves as being part of a 
greater whole, united as the 'family of God'. They would conceive of them as 
being part of a 'whole life'; the same people involved in the public life of the school 
would be the same people involved in the elements we associate with the more 
private world of religion/tribe and home. This gives an extraordinary closeness to 
the communities and sense of belonging. 
Now consider the concepts evoked by the metaphor of family: clan, group 
identities, related by origin, common lineage, group, related, kinsfolk, private, 
kindred, community, tribe, intimates, a house and a sense of belonging (usually 
by birth). In so characterizing the metaphor, it should be noted that such an 
educational system would be evidenced by schools based on group identities, 
(frequently religious, ethnic or tribal) and these would have very strong internal 
structures and tight bonds of loyalty. They would be groupings bound together on 
the basis of a common origin or lineage. Such schools would bond tightly with 
other schools sharing the same identity but to some extent, stand at a distance 
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from those who did not. Some schools may deliberately limit their size to enable 
the close relationships and allegiances: the family-school. 
Within the school, the metaphor of family would determine the organisation 
and ethos: they would see themselves based on 'family principles'. There would 
be clear leadership roles with centralised control. There would be the use of 
strong identity symbols: uniforms, mottos, group activities to bind individuals to 
the group. The tight vertical and horizontal loyalties would be evidenced in the 
responsibility each felt for the other. Schools would be organised to anchor the 
personal identities of pupils to a particular way of life, nourished by contributing 
and engaging in the practices of the community. The loyalties and dispositions 
would be between members of the same group. There would be a sense of 
shared tradition and belonging through a shared belief system or framework. 
Obligations would be felt towards those who share the same characteristics; a 
sense of communion can be felt with those attending other schools bearing the 
same characteristics. 
Again, there would be problems transposing these values to the civic 
sphere where there would be a variety of other groupings bound tightly together. 
Those not related by origin (whether birth, cultural for example) would be viewed 
as outsiders and a lesser sense of responsibility would be in order: they would be 
outside the clan. The allegiances of 'family' may even clash with their civic 
allegiances. This metaphor would create and sustain very strong primary 
relationships, in a similar way to friendship metaphors, yet fail to encourage the 
secondary ones needed by the general civic community. Again, in the same way, 
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it may be successful at creating and nourishing bonding social capital, but less 
successful at bridging and linking social capital.45  
Friendship 
Friendship is not as easily mapped onto school structures or types of 
schools as the other two metaphors yet can be understood on several levels with 
regard to personal relationships within schools. Firstly, it can be understood as a 
metaphoric model using a 'mirror' understanding of friendship. This encompasses 
features of friendship: first and foremost, that of emotional attachment, voluntary 
nature, partiality, a shared history, issues of equality, an attitude of equal worth; 
reciprocity and mutual aid. But also there is the point that we tend to choose our 
friends from those who are like ourselves. 
Consider the surrounding concepts evoked by friendship as a metaphor: 
closeness, strong affective bonds, affection, goodwill, intimacy, kind-heartedness, 
sympathy, openness, sociability, empathy, generosity, understanding and love. 
Transpose these attitudes and dispositions into schools and we can construct a 
second more literal understanding of schools using the features of friendship. In 
school terms, this would appear to be an appropriate metaphor for prescribing an 
idealised relationship which could then be reflected in the organisation and ethos 
of the functioning of the school. Between schools would be a spirit of cooperative 
ventures, an emphasis on staff and pupils meeting and working together. Such 
schools would not be competing against each other but would have a sense of 
mutual belonging and a common goal, evidenced by federations or clusters of 
schools working together. However, this would only extend to those schools that 
45 These concepts were outlined on p125-6 in Chapter 5. 
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'knew' each other, that were somehow connected whether geographically or by 
some shared system of values; it would not extend to all schools. 
Between adults, the emphasis would be on team teaching, supportive 
learning environments, working together. There would be the supportive 
relationships of 'critical friends': teachers working alongside each other, talking 
through problems, observations of each other teaching, solving each other's 
difficulties. The emphasis would be on personal feelings and relationships 
between adults and other adults, adults and children, and children to children. 
However, such a metaphor also carries some of the negativities of 
personal friendship: the possibility of partiality and favouritism. Such partiality can 
exclude as well as include. It is one thing to be friendly towards others, another 
entirely to be friends. This metaphor creates very strong primary relationships, but 
may also fail to adequately encourage the secondary ones needed by the general 
civic community. It may be successful at bonding social capital, but less 
successful at bridging and linking social capital. 
Friendship tends to be more common between those who share a 
particular bond; where schools consist of children of the same kind (whether 
class, race or geographical similarities) the chances are high that the loyalty 
bonds will be stronger. Ball draws a very convincing picture of how 'choice 
politics and education markets' aid the reproduction of class advantage (Ball, 
2003). This, combined with the ability to cherry-pick (whether by post-code or 
ability) the peers their children are schooled with, means parents 'inadvertently' 
create schools of 'similars': similar types of children will attend. Unlike the family 
metaphor that seeks to bind together those who share a particular vision of the 
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good (including), this seeks to exclude those who are different or do not fit the 
profile, in turn creating intolerance towards the 'out-group'. 
Democratic Fraternity 
The concept of democratic fraternity is itself metaphoric and thus does not 
point to a particular relationship. This combined metaphor can throw new light and 
insights through grounding the symbols and referents used. It may require a 
common system of schooling; it would certainly reject segregation of any type as 
being incompatible with the democratic ideal of citizenship. Schools would have a 
wide range of persons attending; physical and social integration would be highly 
prized in creating a space where future citizens come together. Schools would 
see themselves as having common goals, working together, again, possibly in 
federations, perhaps emphasising the amelioration of disadvantage. 
There would be mutual support in school processes with schools working 
together for best practices. Schooling would focus on future citizens' abilities to 
choose between alternatives and to exercise 'rule'. Schools would be concerned 
to develop both vertical and horizontal loyalties. The relationship between adults 
and pupils would be one of sharing common goals and a lessened sense of 
competition with other pupils and other schools. There would be an equal 
emphasis on the 'weak ties', or 'bridging' that connects us to others as well as on 
the bonding/strong ties. There would be a sense of trust and affection for fellow 
citizens; partiality would be balanced with the demands of justice. 
Pupils would see each other as standing one to another as moral equals. 
Personal virtues such as co-operation and fairness would be highly valued 
personal attributes. Pupils may well work in a variety of different ways: team, 
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group and individual. Celebrations of achievement would encompass both group 
and individual achievements (both vertical and horizontal relationships). Pupils 
would feel a sense of ownership within the school but a lessened sense of 
competition between others. 
It is notable that the contrast between 'schools-as-they-are' and these 
metaphoric models emphasises that no actual school fits neatly into just one 
category; most schools are an amalgamation of more than one metaphor, though 
some will inevitably emphasise one more than another. However, it does illustrate 
how these different metaphors for the civic relationship are themselves reflected 
in the values and attitudes that influence school, forming the 'background noise' 
affecting development of civic relationships. 
Section 4: Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have indicated that the metaphors we use for the civic 
relationship can interact with and reflect how we organise educational institutions 
and, unconsciously, the values we then transmit. I have thus outlined how the 
three metaphors explored in this thesis can be realised in school organisations. 
However, a major problem with this sort of move is to justify whether we need 
metaphor at all. Is it possible to step outside of metaphor? It is to this that I now 
direct my argument within the framework of democratic fraternity. 
Firstly, it is palpably correct that all talk of a public sphere is metaphorical 
by nature. Political life would be unintelligible without being ordered and given 
meaning by language; metaphor is how we order these important constructs. The 
world of the political is too big and complex to be directly experienced hence we 
need metaphors from direct experience to help us engage with the subject. In 
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other words, we are limited in our ability to process information from such large 
entities as the civic sphere; we need a way to limit or draw out important features 
in a manageable manner: 
Metaphors allow the general public to grasp the meanings of political 
events and feel a part of the process. They are also effective because of 
their ability to resonate with latent symbolic representations residing at 
the unconscious level. 	 (Mio, 1997, p130) 
This requires us to filter out unnecessary features allowing us to discuss and 
predict possible connections, which of necessity limits and structures the 
information available. It is hardly surprising that 'social cohesion' is rarely seen as 
being, itself, a metaphor. If subjected to the same examination as the three deep 
metaphors forming the core of this thesis, it can be seen to contain the unspoken 
subtext of accord, harmony, union, wholeness , as referring in some way to a 
`social glue'.46 It creates a model for how we speak about 'belonging' at a macro 
level and illustrates both the seeming impossibility of political study without 
recourse to metaphor and that some of our most widely used metaphors become 
so embedded within the language that we forget their metaphorical character. 
However, whilst it is possible to speak of the civic relationship 
metaphorically, these deep metaphors do more than this. As previously intimated, 
they give us guidance in discerning how to live the civic relationship in reality. 
Democratic fraternity, I purport, encapsulates a particular vision of how we might 
consider our collective life. 
This brings me to my second point: philosophical explanation needs 
metaphor because, on occasions, no literal language yet exists to discuss new 
areas or to communicate new insights. In these cases, metaphors have a creative 
role to play in filling in the gaps as we attempt to create such a vocabulary and as 
46 I am indebted to Graham Haydon for this insight. 
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such, they aim at 'global coherence' (Peres, 2006). Unlike literary metaphors, 
philosophical ones are tied up with explanation: they serve a function that cannot 
be served in another way, allowing us to create and model theories, to test 
hypotheses, to consider that which is hard to articulate in another way; they 
create the background conditions in which we work and think. 
It can be argued that the study of political life has always depended on the 
use of metaphors, but these metaphors can change over time in response to 
socio-historical contexts (as so interestingly drawn out by Brunkhorst47). Yet 
changing metaphors can also indicate changes of mind and reclassification of 
ideas or concepts. (One can recall from the previous chapter that the concept of 
fraternity itself replaced that of civic friendship in response to such contexts). The 
challenge for ethnic and social diversity, with its subsequent implications for social 
cohesion (as set out in my first chapter) requires such a new vocabulary, hence I 
argue for a place for democratic fraternity as a contribution to this vocabulary. 
Newly crafted metaphors take time to pass into common parlance, yet when 
adopted can drastically alter particular parts of social life ('the public sphere', 
'community', 'the social contract' amongst others). The 'stakeholder society', for 
example, which started as a way of understanding the relationship of the citizen to 
the state, had enormous influence for a short time in the late 1990s on issues 
such as an enabling welfare state, issues of dispersion of wealth and opportunity. 
Thirdly, the normative value of metaphorical models in political 
philosophical discourse (and I include educational discourse in this category) lies 
in their ability to carry over particular un-stated, (and possibly un-stateable) values 
and commitments. Consider the following: 
47 Brunkhorst: 'Solidarity': extensively referred to in Chapters 3 & 5, tracing the history and 
usage of the bonds of civic friendship and fraternity. 
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I have argued that perhaps the most important part of any real moral 
system is the system of metaphors for morality and the priorities given to 
particular metaphors. If I am correct, then vital political reasoning is done 
using those metaphors -- and usually done unconsciously. This means 
that the empirical study of metaphorical thought must be given its 
appropriate place in ethics and moral theory. 
(Lakoff, 1995, p20) 
As I suggested in the first chapter, there is an ethical dimension to the models 
used. With this in mind, I contend that fraternity encompasses many values 
needed within a notion of democracy that are not explicitly contained within the 
concepts of liberty and equality: fairness, cooperation, trust, inclusion and 
responsibility for example. 
The difference between liberty and equality, on the one hand, and 
fraternity on the other, is that the former values promote the free 
association of individuals, whereas the latter promotes the cooperation of 
individuals in the community. Cooperation is inspired by the commonality 
of interests and gives rise to the pooling of resources in pursuit of a 
common goal. Association per se connotes a simple fact: people are 
connected with one another. Cooperation connotes something more: 
people who are connected can work together to advance common 
interests. 
(Gonthier, 2000, p.574) 
And again: 
The goal of fraternity is to work together to achieve the highest quality of 
individual existence. 	 (Gonthier, 2000, p.570) 
Such metaphors can have enormous social consequences in shaping our 
understandings of our world, often subconsciously. It must be remembered: 
political theory is meant to be persuasive, aiming at new attitudes, changing 
minds and thus discovering new meanings (Shklar, 1969, p225). 
The use of metaphor as a methodology allows us to create and model 
theories, to test hypotheses, to consider that which is hard to articulate in another 
way. But more than this, they not only provide the language in which to express 
these commitments, but by tapping into our memories and associations as a tool 
for understanding, can subconsciously direct public policy. These factors direct 
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the methodology used in this thesis to zone in on the use of metaphor as a viable 
subject of study. Nevertheless, one must be careful to remember metaphorical 
insights are not literal truths and cannot be subjected to the same verification 
processes as such. Although not verifiable by empirical testing, they can be 
subject to similar standards of authentication: their 'truth-value' is in their 
usefulness as models. 
Democracy has a unique interest in the formation of all citizens and future 
citizens. If we determine that one of the most crucial responsibilities of public 
education is the formation of a public, then it is incumbent on us to work within an 
appropriate model that will reinforce that aim. This entails that we are working with 
an appropriate, useful model of the civic relationship, have some conception of 
how public education nourishes this and can show why this is the best policy to 
fulfil this responsibility. Where models clash, the aims of both are undermined. In 
the next chapter, I turn to how best to translate the metaphor of democratic 
fraternity into action. 
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Chapter 7 
Realizing Democratic Fraternity: From Theory to Policy 
For democracies to thrive, citizens have to be taught how to be 
democrats. 
(Enslin, Pendlebury and Tjiattas, 2001, p115) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that the use of metaphor helps us to 
model possible relationships, and as such, can aid the move from theory to 
practice. I suggested that the implications of this analysis may lead us to 
rearticulate not only how we organise our schools to further develop these bonds 
of association, but also could impact on what happens within the classroom. I now 
wish to look at these claims a little more closely. 
The focal point of any vision of what a socially cohesive, democratic 
society should be, must be how its citizens relate to each other and the bonds and 
loyalties required of them. It is through these associations with others that we 
learn to practise and develop the civic skills and attitudes needed to uphold the 
civic bond. The wider the range of contacts, the wider the scope for secondary 
relationships, thus bringing students together to associate with one another is an 
important part in learning to be free equal citizens (Gutmann, 2003, p130). Where 
associations are restricted amongst particular sectors of a populace, the 
development of the civic virtues of toleration, respect, for example, may 
themselves also be restricted. Merely seeking to expose pupils to a smattering of 
differences and diversity through teaching about other commitments/ways of life is 
arguably not sufficient. Learning about someone's way of life is very different from 
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knowing someone who practices that way of life and thus appreciating the 
importance that this holds for them as part of who they are. 
Education is unavoidably about the next generation (Reich, 2002). Schools 
are probably one of the first sustained, public experiences children have (Parker, 
2003). These two factors make schools particularly well-situated to supporting 
future citizens with common sets of values, attitudes and knowledge to enable 
social life to continue. These attributes enable us to develop the secondary 
relationships necessary to make possible our breaking out from family, tribe and 
friendship. Schooling is our most deliberative form of human instruction 
(Gutmann, 1987) where our private and public selves come together in a 
necessary tension. I use the word 'necessary' deliberately. The constant tension 
between the two causes us to continually evaluate and create dialogue between 
all parties concerned. Democracy needs the tensions: the tensions prevent 
complacency and limit power of one party over another. 
The purpose of this penultimate chapter is twofold. Firstly, I start from the 
query: what are the implications for a democratic society that wants an 
appropriate educational system capable of the development of appropriate levels 
of social cohesion. I then seek to consider the practical implications through 
considering possible policy solutions to the problem. Rather than delve into all 
possible pedagogical or structural issues connected with democratic fraternity, I 
have chosen to treat several possible scenarios with brevity to help illustrate the 
use of metaphor as a methodology for moving into policy. Using an 'ideal model' 
may allow us to consider that which cannot be transposed directly into a current 
situation. 
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A second function of this chapter is to raise questions as to the nature of 
the relationship between ideal theory and policy. Leaning on the insights of others 
in the field (Forester, 1993; Reich, 2002), I suggest that ideal models serve to 
delineate possible policies that accord with our ultimate ends and to completely 
exclude others that are contrary to the values we seek. I argue that it is a far from 
simple matter to totally separate arguments about school structures from those of 
pedagogy, and suggest instead that the two are intimately connected: that certain 
structures both encourage and nourish particular ways of working. Similarly, other 
structures may inhibit or completely rule out particular desirable pedagogical 
practices. 
In Section 1, I explore the relationship between school structures and 
human relationships at an ideal level. With this in mind, I query whether 
democratic fraternity demands a particular form of school structure and whether 
this conforms to other endorsements of school organisations such as the common 
school movement. In Section 2, I consider current policy research in school 
organisation such as school federations, networks and schools-within-schools 
movements as the means to ameliorate concerns with fraying social cohesion at 
school level through expanding the possibilities for increasing the range of 
societal relationships. In Section 3, I consider the last of my three initial questions, 
given that we have decided to take social cohesion seriously within a democratic 
society, and equally given that we realize these commitments in the way in which 
we structure our school systems, what are the implications for pedagogy within 
these structures? To this end, I consider the contribution claimed by the 
Philosophy for Children movement, that coherence between conceptions of 
teaching about democracy and teaching democratically is required to support 
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democratic citizenship. I consider the possibility that what happens within schools 
may be as important as the structures and organisation of schools: that the 
debate about school choice policies (and their impact on social cohesion) fails to 
adequately explore the equal need to account for the civic attitudes necessary to 
uphold civic relationships. Finally, I question to what extent the ends we desire 
indicate particular means and consider the purpose of philosophical research in 
relation to policy. 
Section 1: From Philosophy to Policy 
One of the historical functions of education has always been to enable the 
citizens to form a civic body. Because they are public civic places (as opposed to 
private places), schools are uniquely placed as ideal sites in which this should 
take place. With this in mind, questions about school choice subconsciously 
affect how we see ourselves as related as citizens. Consequently, when the 
development of social cohesion is seen as a key aspect of publicly funded 
education, the consideration of how best to value and develop appropriate bonds 
of association acquires political pertinence. This forms the background motivation 
to the second and third of my original questions: what sort of structures would 
best support social cohesion when we choose to take it seriously, and what are 
the implications for pedagogy within these structures? 
When democratic fraternity is understood as an ideal relationship between 
citizens, one that encompasses such things as impartiality, an element of equality, 
mutual support for example, and is equally viewed as the capacity to develop 
secondary relationships, encompassing both bonding and bridging social capital 
that are argued to lead to social cohesion, the question arises as to how can we 
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best educate for this? Does it imply a particular form of organisation of schools to 
nourish and develop this ideal? If part of the identified problem is the wide variety 
of possible forms of schooling with the resulting segregation of different 
social/ethnic/religious groups, plus the lack of attention to the development of 
human relationships, would a different form of school organisation support such 
ties better? 
It is to this focal point where principles and theoretical models meet and 
generate policy that I now direct my attention. The exact linkage between these 
two strands is decidedly unclear. Indeed many political philosophers are decidedly 
silent on the subject of expanding models and principles into prescribing particular 
educational policies and pedagogies at school level. Yet practical experience 
teaches us that theories can and do push policy makers into specific forms of 
action by serving as 'road-maps'. In other words, ideas provide us with a frame 
within which to act. However, our ideal models are not always easily articulated 
and realized of at the level of policy and pedagogy48. 
Policy makers frequently look for clear cut simple solutions to problems, yet 
normative stances rarely contain a coherent and consistent set of positions that 
are translatable into policy decisions without difficulty. This is not to argue that the 
role of philosophy is redundant but that it occupies a particular role as regards 
policy. Philosophy offers a unique methodology in discussing possible scenarios 
through the use of models. It creates a space to consider alternative practices that 
may be accepted within the desired model. In addition to ruling in particular 
policies, it also serves to rule out other scenarios (this was demonstrated in 
previous chapters: a civic relationship based on friendship, a strict understanding 
48 I am indebted to Rob Reich for this insight given at the Roehampton /PESGB Summer School, 
2009. 
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of the family metaphor and all those dependent on a thick usage of the market 
metaphor cannot be contenders). This provides a framework for the analysis of 
policy, serving to indicate and thus restrict the group of policy ideas found in 
accord with the desired aims. 
In order for policies to be adopted effectively, they must cohere with the 
underlying norms in society. All possible solutions must themselves accord with 
other deeply held values and commitments in society. The policy consequences 
of uncovering the hidden assumptions and values implicit within the models we 
make use of, often rely on the examination of both metaphor and models. This 
has the practical outcome of setting limits on the possible structures of schools 
and provides guidelines for what schools within these boundaries may look and 
operate like. In what follows, I purport that I cannot point to one particular 
structure or pedagogical practice and state unreservedly that this is how 
democratic fraternity will play out in practice. What I can do, however, is to show 
which particular policy decisions can be ruled out completely (as being outside the 
boundaries) and which in turn may be fruitful areas for policy makers to consider 
or perhaps to adapt. 
To start with, I consider whether our ideal relationship of citizens can best 
be guaranteed within an ideal system to which all have access without exception: 
a common school. 
The Common School 
There is, needless to say, a rapidly growing literature considering the 
common school which I cannot begin to address comprehensively in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, it would be impossible to address the practical outcomes and 
174 
implications of my work without reference to this body of work. Although the 
understanding of the concept of 'common school' is itself open to some ambiguity, 
it is usually understood in one of two ways; firstly, as a belief that all children are 
entitled to an education at state expense, funded commonly, but the second, and 
perhaps more controversial of the two, is that all children should be educated 
together regardless of class, race or social distinctions (as proposed by Horace 
Mann in the USA in the 1830s). Consider the following: 
Bringing together children from different backgrounds, and caring about 
their education as free and equal citizens, is a crucial feature of 
democratic education that will fade from public view if the market 
metaphor comes to dominate the theory and practice of publicly 
subsidized schooling in American democracy. 
(Gutmann, 2003, p.147) 
Historically, the common or public school movement in the USA evolved precisely 
for this purpose: the social good that ensued through bringing children of differing 
persuasions together into a single setting during a period of mass migration. The 
belief was that such school organisations enabled children from differing traditions 
to come together, learn from one another and exercise mutual respect within a 
safe, public environment. These schools were thus seen as an essential building 
block in creating one nation from a multitude of immigrants in the Americian 
experience and with ensuring that civic virtues and national identity, through a 
shared set of values, were reflected in the school structure. Non-public schools, it 
was felt, could not reliably represent public educational values such as equal 
freedom and civic relationships: the task of creating the nation. 
One of the historic functions of public education in democracies has always 
been to connect people, build common values and drive the engines of 
democracy. The idea that if children were educated together, attending the same 
schools, then race relations would improve underpinned many of the examples 
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we have of bussing in the USA. Contact theory is alluring - that by being with 
those who are 'different', people will trust each other more and increase social 
capital. Yet the theory clashes with its polar opposite: 'conflict theory' - that the 
more diverse a populace is, the more we 'stick to our own' and create out-groups, 
reducing social capital. 
Social psychologists and sociologists have taught us that people find it 
easier to trust one another and cooperate when the social distance 
between them is less.... Social distance depends in turn on social 
identity: our sense of who we are. Identity itself is socially constructed 
and can be socially de-constructed and re-constructed. Indeed, this sort 
of social change happens all the time in any dynamic and evolving 
society. For example, religious evangelism, social mobilization and 
political campaigning all involve the intentional transformation of 
identities. 
(Putnam, 2007, p159) 
Putnam claims many resolve this dilemma by relating the theories to the different 
types of social capital: that contact theory is based on bonding social capital and 
conflict theory is concerned with bridging social capital (as defined in Chapter 5). 
If the production of citizens capable of standing back from their own 
attachments to debate and participate in shaping their society is required by 
democracy, a third definition of 'common schools' can thus be created: public, or 
common schools, are not only schools funded by the public or open to the public, 
but can hence be defined as the means by which we become a public: 
Public schools are not merely schools for the public, but schools of 
publicness: institutions where we learn what it means to be a public and 
start down the road toward common national and civic identity. They are 
the forges of our citizenship and the bedrock of our democracy. 
(Barber, 1997, p22) 
Public education thus becomes the vehicle by which all citizens, regardless of 
their birth, wealth or family background can take part in society with shared 
purpose, a society that can talk and make decisions together through access to a 
'social dialogue'. 
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Given that public or state schooling fulfils this role within a democracy, 
does this in turn require a particular organisation of schools? The answer to this is 
not entirely clear. This, I wish to suggest, is as should be expected. Whilst the 
ideal model might indicate that a particular system of common schools should, in 
theory, enable this intermingling better than other systems, we have very little 
empirical evidence that allows us to come to this conclusion. Schools have 
multiple purposes, some of which conflict with each other: not all of these 
purposes serve democratic aims equally well. Our desire for social cohesion, for 
creating a shared identity conflicts with our equal desire to allow parents to 
educate their children in line with their deepest attachments. Liberal neutrality 
requires that states should be neutral with respect to competing controversial 
conceptions of the good; public policy should not be based on one particular 
vision: citizens have the right to live according to their particular reasonable 
conception. Yet equally, liberalism, and its commitment to democratic practices, 
requires that future citizens acquire particular attitudes and values to support and 
maintain these practices. 
Something of this conundrum has puzzled many who contemplate this 
area: that school choice systems undermine our common future when the 
polarised positions of market values are allowed to dictate how our institutions are 
organised and entrusted with perpetuating the political system. Whilst I might 
conclude that the ideal of the common school may indeed be the ideal venue in 
which to explore where our democratic and private sentiments come together, I 
also acknowledge the fact that no democratic state would forbid parental choice, 
private education or home schooling. It would be undemocratic to do so, which 
leaves the democratic state supporting the ability of parents to school 
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undemocratically if they so choose and have the finances to do so. In other 
words, whilst the state may value and actively seek social cohesion, it cannot 
forbid practices that may undermine this aim because of other equally important 
commitments; it has to temper one commitment with another. 
If the recreation and reinvention of the common school is doubtful given 
our other democratic principles respecting the rights of parents and communities 
to reproduce in each generation the beliefs, traditions and visions of the good, 
and the freedom to choose educational options that best express and support 
their preferences and goals (the demand for school choice), is there a way to 
develop democratic fraternity and overcome the problems created by the 
fragmented educational system we currently have with policies that may be 
consonant with the goal of democratic fraternity? With this in mind, I wish to 
suggest that the idea of the common school as a way of securing a single 
'imagined community' may need revising (Feinberg, 2007). 
This brief analysis indicates the difficulty in directly drawing out complete 
policy implications in every respect from conceptual models. Whilst the common 
school accords with the values and commitments contained within democratic 
fraternity, its feasibility may not translate into direct policy without revision. In the 
next section, I explore several current policy proposals, federations, networked 
schools and schools-within-schools considered as possible adapted variations 
attempting to realize this commitment to the cohesive society. Whilst many of 
these are seen as being possible starting points for working towards a system of 
schooling with the potential to expand and develop the associational bonds 
between future citizens needed in a liberal democracy, I will indicate that some 
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contain values that should exclude them from the set of ideas from which policy 
ought to be drawn. 
Section 2: School Organisation and Associational Bonds 
In the chapter on loyalty, I raised a concern about the direction of UK 
schools in eroding the cooperative practices needed through the use of 
marketisation and extreme competition practices which in turn affected the 
capacity to develop the horizontal loyalties of the civic sphere. I suggested that 
school systems should, perhaps, be formed or created to disperse our allegiances 
and loyalties as widely as possible. This dilemma, created by the over emphasis 
on market values and competition and the resultant effects on our collective 
flourishing, preoccupies both politicians and educationalists. Indeed, at least four 
government initiatives have been aimed at encouraging schools to find new ways 
to recapture this working together: Excellence in Cities (1999), Networked 
Learning Communities (2002), School Federations (2002) and the Leadership 
Incentive Grant (2003). These documents have been serious efforts to re-
examine and enable school collaboration through encouragement, incentives, or 
even external pressure. In this section, I shall briefly consider examples of 
possible contributions made towards reinvigorating our civic connectedness: the 
federation and the networked learning communities and suggest a relatively new 
contender for consideration, that of the schools-within-schools. 
Federations 
The idea of federations of schools comes from attempts to reintroduce 
ways of schools working together and to thus avoid some of the effects of the 
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market metaphor when applied to public schooling, that of schools working in 
competition to the neglect of the cooperative development and sharing of 'best 
practice'. The Standards Site defines federations as: 
For our purposes here, federations can be defined in two ways: 
• The definition as invoked in the 2002 Education Act which allows for the 
creation of a single governing body or a joint governing body committee 
across two or more schools from September 2003 onwards. 
• A group of schools with a formal (i.e. written) agreement to work together 
to raise standards, promote inclusion, find new ways of approaching 
teaching and learning and build capacity between schools in a coherent 
manner. 49 
There is an increasing interest in the model, particularly at secondary level, in line 
with the demands of 'Every Child Matters' requirements. At present, hard 
federations (those with shared governance) are only available within the 
maintained sector. 
As a possible practical solution to the problem of re-imagining the public 
aspect of education, it would be quite feasible, in theory, to set up federations to 
include private, fee-paying schools (perhaps making their active participation a 
requirement for keeping their charitable status), faith schools, special schools, 
further education bodies, academies and all other Heinz varieties of schools. 
Where it is sought, the federation seems very much to be an instrumental aim: as 
a support/solution to 'weak' or 'failing' schools, and not as a good in itself. 
However, further investigation of the empirical evidence for school federations 
that really do work in a hub supporting each other is vital. As Ainscow et al 
(Ainscow, Muijs and West, 2006) point out, there is very little research to show 
when and how such ventures are successful. Where research does look at 
49 httc://www.standards.dfes.gov.uk/federations/ [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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success criteria, it tends to be seen solely in terms of school management and 
pupil standards, with little regard for citizenship. 
Similar to the idea of a federation, is the practice of schools working in a 
virtual network thus allowing schools which may be geographically separated to 
work together. Acknowledging the impact of competition and league tables, the 
hope is that working collaboratively with other schools may improve teaching, 
learning and attainment over and beyond what individual schools may achieve 
alone. With the growth of ICT systems in schools, it is considered possible to link 
schools, not only in community-based formats (still allowing for those shared 
orchestras, for example) but also for more fundamental joint activities, in subjects 
(particularly citizenship) thus widening the curriculum to some and extending the 
possibility of interaction to others. This is seen as a "radical answer to raising 
standards of teaching and learning in every school"50 . 
Whilst on the surface, the school federation or network may seem an 
acceptable substitute for the common school ideal, I contend such arrangements 
do not go far enough, and frequently go in the wrong direction for three reasons. 
Firstly, such initiatives are time-consuming for those involved, and socially 
complex to achieve (Ainscow, Muijs and West, 2006). Secondly, research 
conducted by the National College of School Leadership appears to suggest the 
idea that the major attribute of networks leading to success was to be found within 
the character of people in them and their relationships (Bell, Cordingley and 
Mitchell, 2006). Thirdly, collaboration may even look different in different social 
contexts (Ainscow, Muijs and West, 2006). But underlying these empirical 
50 http://www.innovation-unit.co.uk/content/view/82/596/ [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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difficulties lies a deeper problem, that of trying to work within two competing 
metaphor structures at one time. 
My contention is that the very idea of federations or networks may be faulty 
if expected to take the weight of encouraging the cross loyalties currently found 
wanting in the system: the mixed metaphors generated by ideals of cooperation 
and market competition simply undermine each other. It is unrealistic for schools 
to be able to do both at once; 'successful schools' which wish to hold their place 
in the marketplace would be foolish to give up their advantage in this manner. To 
illustrate further: school improvement, as currently defined, is driven by 
competition. The educational market, with its over-emphasis on the raising of 
standards, severely constrains genuine collaborative practice between schools. In 
the light of this, it can be argued that not enough attention is given to the 
competitive nature of the school market (Taylor, Fitz and Gorard, 2005). 
Cooperation and networking between schools may be an approach to raise 
standards overall, but, as Taylor et al point out, 
...naively ignores the presence of school choice and competition that is 
now firmly established in the education system. 
(Taylor, Fitz and Gorard, 2005, p66) 
Whilst there may be recognition of the importance of collaboration amongst 
schools, it fails to recognise sufficiently the way in which competition and markets 
undermine this. 
The current system of organising schools into federations or networks is to 
tamper with a system that is already problematic in terms of equality and social 
justice. This is not to argue that federations or networking are not worth pursuing. 
These may be worthwhile activities for other reasons: they are just not the answer 
to promoting a genuinely democratic civic relationship. For there to be real 
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possibility for developing both primary and secondary relationships across the 
board, the solution has to go much further. A more creative view is arguably 
needed to fulfil the requirements of allowing for the growth of both primary and 
secondary relationships. 
School-within-schools 
The problems of the above organisational structures superimposed on 
existing school management has led some to champion the development of the 
small school movement, in the belief that this will encourage a greater community 
spirit and more personal connections between staff and students as well as 
between each other (related to the call by some politicians for the return of the 
'house system'51). This way of structuring schools is being re-examined in a new 
way: as schools-within-schools. 
What should be noticed first is that units within school settings have been 
features of schools for many years (SpLD Bases, Nurture Groups, Behaviour 
Units, Dyslexia and other such units in the UK, and Gifted programmes in the 
USA). The schools-within-schools approach claims to go one stage further than 
this: to provide a way for the personalized learning of some, with the capacity to 
interact with a larger school population in ways that are mutually enriching. 
Where these exist, they tend to be schools that have 'down-sized' from large 
schools into smaller, autonomous units. Each has their own learning community, 
staff, and facilities but with a use of shared space and/or some use of facilities 
with the larger 'school'. The attraction of such schools stems from the more 
personalized relationships between staff and pupils with smaller numbers of 
51  The Guardian: Tues, Sept. 20, 2005 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2005/sep/20/schools.uk3 [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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pupils (units can range from 30 to about 500), thus combining the best of the 
features of large schools with the advantages of smaller schools. 
Some experiments with this approach are already in existence in the UK: a 
school for the deaf being situated within a secondary school in Bristol; the school-
within-schools approach with Year 7s at Kingswood High School, Kingston upon 
Hull; Countesthorpe College, Leicestershire; Stantonbury Campus, Milton 
Keynes; Bishops Park College, Clacton (the latter being the subject of a research 
project for the Department For Education and Skills Innovation Unit (Fielding, 
2006))52. The principles behind the projects tend to be on relationships and 
creating a feeling of belonging, of team-work and commitment to the whole 
community. 
As yet, there have been no exemplars adapting the constituent parts to 
include faith communities. Where there has been experience of shared faith 
schools, the success has been mixed: from the proposed shared-campus schools 
in Glasgow in 2002 (where neighbouring Catholic and non-denominational 
schools would share dining rooms, assembly halls and playgrounds — rejected by 
the Catholic Church in Scotland), the proposed shared campuses in North 
Lanarkshire in 2004 (again turned down) to the more successful inter-church 
schools in Liverpool and Lagan College in Northern Ireland (today there are 58 
integrated schools in Northern Ireland). Restructuring school systems is 
understandably both politically and practically time-consuming and may not, on its 
own, provide the development of democratic fraternity as desired without 
loosening the intense ties to personal commitments. 
52 Further 'Human Scale Schools' can be found at 
http://www.hse.oro.uk/ssp/Casestudiesofschools.htnnl [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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As the above have shown, certain elements of policy would automatically 
be shown to be contrary to the desired ends. Neither federations nor networked 
schools could be exemplars contributing to social cohesion (this is not to argue 
they could not be adopted for other purposes). Notice that the school-within-
schools model however, would fall within the set of ideas from which policy could 
be drawn. This however, is only half the story. Current public policy suggestions 
to tackle difficulties of social cohesion, as outlined above, rest on suppositions 
that may turn out to be founded on false premises. Just as we cannot suppose 
that the virtues of particular relationships such as friendship, family or market can 
be extrapolated unchanged into the macro level of society, neither can we 
assume that what counts or contributes towards social cohesion on a small scale 
community level will also hold for societal cohesion. If we judge that an aim of 
education within school systems is to become a public, we must naturally 
question the organisations within which this occurs, yet we must also be open to 
the possibility that other factors may need to be taken into consideration. 
One route out of the impasse created by the previously identified difficulties 
in restructuring school systems, is to attend to what happens within the school: 
that school practices need to be as democratic as the civic ideals they preach 
(Barber, 1997). Whilst human associations are undoubtedly affected by the 
structures that enable them to take place, they are also deeply affected by the 
motives and attitudes of the people who attend or use them. If this holds, then the 
importance of actively teaching and practicing the virtues and attitudes necessary 
for the upkeep of democracy in a democratic manner has important practical 
implications. 
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In the following section, I finally turn to consider the issue of pedagogy. 
What would be the implications for pedagogical practices if we are to take social 
cohesion seriously? To answer this, I shall consider just one particular approach 
that may be worth further investigation for the claims it makes in developing the 
skills and attitudes necessary for democracy to flourish, going some way towards 
situating democratic fraternity within the classroom itself. Instead of arguments for 
a particular organisation of education systems, I consider the ethical environment 
within which it is translated and thus resituate the argument within a practical 
conception of democracy. The overall picture that emerges is that the nurturing of 
democratic fraternity itself may require teaching in a democratic fashion. The 
development of the character of those within schools and that of future citizens 
directs a consideration of one particular exemplar that claims to achieve this: 
Philosophy for Children. 
Section 3: Philosophy for Children 
If we are serious about democracy, then philosophy has to be taken 
seriously as well. Doing philosophy and developing democratic attitudes 
and dispositions are intertwined, and both require practice or doing. 
(Portelli and Church, 1995, p80) 
Much has been written about the role of education in supporting/ensuring 
the durability of democracy (Callan, 1997; Gutmann, 1987; Levinson, 1999; 
McPike, 2003). In addition, many democratic states have expressed concerns 
about levels of political engagement amongst the population as a whole, 
particularly the young. Citizenship education and/or democratic education has 
come to be seen as a means of addressing the social cohesion needed by the 
state and the diverse range of cultures formed within the polis. In terms of the 
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curriculum, it has been customary to suggest the teaching of PSHE53 and/or 
Citizenship as part of the solution within schools. These effective pedagogical 
approaches, however, may not be sufficient. In attempting to answer what sort of 
pedagogical approach is required when we take social cohesion within a modern 
liberal democracy seriously, I shall examine and articulate a vision of what it could 
be like to teach democratically. In what follows, I shall argue that citizens of a 
democracy need to be more than active, involved and informed: they also need 
particular attitudes from one to another to uphold the democratic process. 
Philosophy for Children, as a governmental initiative, has mostly been 
identified with the thinking skills movement.54 A common objection to this 
classification by proponents of the methodology is to distinguish Philosophy for 
Children from other critical thinking programmes by the dialogue that develops 
amidst a 'community of enquiry'. This, it is claimed, differs from mere conversation 
by its emphasis on constructing ideas, working together towards a common goal 
as well as questioning the ideas themselves. In other words, the emphasis is on 
learning together collaborative learning: 
...the program is worried about behaviours and habits such as; 
developing the ability of self-correction, learning how to listen to other 
people, paying attention and trying hard in order to understand, asking 
for and giving reasons, among others.... these habits and behaviours are 
crucial for the existence of a democratic society. 
(Accorinti, 2000) 
Crucially, the goal of the programme is not to turn children into philosophers, but 
to develop particular skills and attitudes. Whether or not this is 'philosophy' is an 
argument for elsewhere; I wish to concentrate on more recent claims that it can 
53 In 2008, the UK government announced it was to make Personal, Social and Health 
Education statutory in both primary and secondary schools. In November 2009, it was 
announced that this would commence from 2011. 
54 httb://www.standards.dcsf.dov.uk/thinkindskills/guidance/567257?view=get [last 
accessed 19.11.2009] 
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affect and reinforce 'citizenship education' and aid social cohesion. It makes many 
ambitious claims for its significance for democracy and democratic education. But 
do they hold up? 
Philosophy for Children (P4C) was started in the 1960s and 70s by the US 
philosopher Matthew Lipman and is now used in over fifty countries from all 
continents. Claiming to be rooted in the work of Vygotsky and Dewey amongst 
other theoreticians, it has usually been seen as having the primary goal of 
teaching children to think critically (Daniel et al, 1999): 
Philosophy for Children incorporates the Deweyian and Vygotskyian 
notion that in order to think for oneself, one must be a member of a 
community. However, Dewey's ideal of community is not the 
homogenous community, criticized by Iris Marion Young. Rather, it is a 
democratic community of inquiry, which is inclusive of difference and 
interacts with other communities. 
(Bleazby, 2006, p30) 
The aim of Philosophy for Children for Matthew Lipman, however, has always 
been developing democracy in social character and reasonableness (as in 'be 
ready to reason') in personal character. It is these claims that lead to it being 
considered as a contribution to citizenship education: the promotion of autonomy, 
reasonable citizenry, participation, dialogue, critical thinking amongst other 
attributes. Take for example, the curriculum review Diversity and Citizenship 
(Ajegbo, Kiwan and Sharma, 2007) which named Philosophy for Children (P4C) 
as a possible tool to encourage diversity in the curriculum, thus reinforcing the 
findings of a previous paper on the assessment of citizenship education for 
assessing enquiry and communication skills (Briefing Paper for Teacher Mentors 
Of Citizenship Education): 
P4C strategies help to develop pupils' powers of logic, advocacy, 
discussion and debate. It is a powerful tool to help young people deal 
rationally with difference and conflict. 	 (Brett, 2004, p21) 
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The Deweyian insight of creating a democratic culture within schools (Dewey's 
Laboratory School, at the University of Chicago, distributed decision -making and 
responsibility to even the youngest children by allowing all to exercise and 
practise their skills appropriate to their level of development) is further developed 
to enable pupils to practise the skills necessary for the participation in a 
democratic community. 
Similarly, and perhaps most importantly, the idea of democracy is claimed 
to be central to the community of inquiry. Indeed, it has been described as an 
expression of democratic values (Fisher, 2000). The rationale behind the practice 
is to encourage children to cultivate the social skills necessary for both good 
moral conduct and to enable them to take their place in a pluralist society: to 
develop listening skills, and reasonableness of character, taking into account the 
views and feelings of others, to develop the capacity to be reasoned with and to 
change their own mind or beliefs upon good reasons, to be reflective learners. 
Arguably, the habits and behaviours practised and developed within Philosophy 
for Children are the same as required by the practice of democracy itself. The 
emphasis is not so much on democracy as a system of government but, in a 
Deweyian sense, as a way of life (Dewey, 1997). Given the close connection 
between the two views, transforming a class into a community of inquiry assumes 
fundamental import: the process is the worth as opposed to the product (Accorinti, 
2000). Every child has the same rights in the community of enquiry to express 
their opinion and to be listened to: the connection with equality. This is not to 
argue that every opinion is accepted as equally valid (hence the role of the 
facilitator) but to create a climate enabling the acceptance of difference. Coupled 
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with this, students are encouraged to exchange ideas in an open and respectful 
manner. 
The format of Philosophy for Children can arguably help in this situation as 
it defuses the tension between the hierarchical role of the teacher against that of 
the pupil (Vansieleghem, 2005). Although pupils lead the discussion, (the topics 
are chosen after democratically voting on a variety of open-ended questions 
raised by a stimulus) the teacher (or facilitator) is expected to challenge and 
deepen the argument. Children are taught not to be afraid of conflict or 
disagreement but how to understand and make sense of the need to find a 
solution, emphasising consistency of argument, and reflection on value 
judgements. It values the development of particular social behaviours: supporting 
one another in building arguments, taking one another's ideas seriously, 
collaborating and co-operating, encouraging each other, a willingness to be open-
minded to change, the courage to change their minds in response to good 
reasons. Sharp describes it as "reflective communal action" (Sharp, 1991, p35): a 
commitment to open debate, pluralism and practical judgement. 
Does Philosophy for Children teach and give the space for practise of the 
very attitudes we wish future citizens to have? Is this just another form of 
character-building? If Philosophy for Children remained at the level of enquiry one 
would be led to believe that its influence was directed towards a form of PSHE or 
even moral education. However, the very proponents extolling its virtues seem to 
want more from it than this: that it should spur young adults to action, to 
participate in the democratic life. The Deweyian idea that participating in a 
democracy was the most effective way to create and maintain democratic virtues 
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pushes the methodology into combining in some way the 'improvement' of 
thinking and positively influencing behaviour. 
Whilst such an approach may well prove to be useful as an experience of 
democratic education, and may well have positive effects on teaching particular 
attitudes and dispositions necessary for the sustaining of the democratic ethos, it 
does not, on its own, answer the problem of how to inculcate social cohesion. 
This is just an unrealistic task even if the practice of teaching democratically 
expanded beyond the one weekly session recommended, to embrace a wider 
usage both in the curriculum and school ethos. Whilst Philosophy for Children 
may have much to recommend it as a particular teaching method and may 
contribute as deliberative democracy in action, on its own, it will be insufficient, as 
it does not embrace the whole 'public'. It does little, on its own, to tackle the 
segregating features of schools. 
Whilst Philosophy for Children may well be a useful tool for teaching some 
democratic virtues and attitudes (for example, the emphasis on each person's 
contribution leading from the previous "I agree/I disagree with...." ensures that 
pupils listen carefully to each other; the emphasis on interacting with the 
argument and not the person saying it can explicitly teach children to treat each 
other respectfully), this on its own may not contribute towards democratic 
fraternity. Whilst for cohesion of argument, the method of teaching should not 
undermine the content (if we are to teach democratic values, we should ideally 
teach them in a democratic manner), democratic fraternity requires more. Again, 
this is an approach that would come within the domain of possible areas for policy 
to explore. 
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Schools in societies that purport to be democracies are obliged to develop 
public citizens: part of which is developing the necessary relationship between 
such citizens (Parker, 2005). There has been, as yet, no empirical study to 
explore, consider and examine these aspects of Philosophy for Children; much 
'evidence' is anecdotal at best. I argue that this may be worth further empirical 
examination as to its possibilities for developing particular attitudes and virtues of 
citizenship. To date, the relevant literature on Philosophy for Children has mostly 
been driven by thinking skills proponents, seeking measurable, utilitarian raising 
of academic standards with little interest in exploring the possible relationship with 
the civic attitudes and virtues of practical citizenship. Philosophy for Children 
raises questions as to whether a pedagogic methodology of teaching 
democratically is itself a requirement of democratic fraternity. The question of how 
to encourage the practice of particular attitudes and dispositions needed between 
citizens to support a democratic framework is an area which is decidedly under-
theorised at present and requires empirical research to further these claims. 
Section 4: Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to focus on some of the difficulties in moving from 
a particular theory into recommendations for policy. It is undoubtedly true that 
school systems are a cornerstone of democracy and play a significant role in 
forming 'the public'. Armed with these assumptions, public life can be argued to 
require a constant reconsideration of what it is to be a 'public'. As education is 
primarily engaged in enabling society to re-imagine itself over the generations, it 
would appear reasonable to assume that philosophical analysis can contribute 
towards core aspects of educational policy and schooling arrangements. This in 
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turn raises fascinating questions about the nature and relationship between 
theory, policy and pedagogy. 
Firstly, whilst the ideal model of society may initially seem to imply a 
common schooling solution, the constraints of our equal commitment to individual 
freedoms and rights to choose lives of value cause us to question the feasibility of 
this as policy. The liberal democratic society is constantly negotiating two 
incompatible demands. The first, that public schooling should be provided for all 
children and that the state has a justified interest in the content and form of that 
education in view of its capacity to create future citizens. The second, that 
individuals should be permitted to choose educational options that best express 
and support their preferences and goals (the problem from school choice). 
Our liberal commitments accept that individuals within a western liberal 
society may hold differing conceptions of the good life over which the state must 
remain neutral. This includes allowing "parental discretion over the education of 
their children" (Reich, 2002, p10). Whilst no acceptable theory coming from these 
commitments would outlaw the practice of parental choice including faith schools, 
what can be done is to delineate the parameters within which these can operate. 
Policy can be created to encourage such schools into partnerships (such as the 
schools-within-schools) allowing for greater development of relationships upon 
which conceptions of social cohesion can be built. Should schools of faith or the 
privately funded choose to remain outside any such reorganised structures, there 
is no moral requirement that we ensure their survival, thus the removal of all state 
funding becomes a viable option (whether 'charitable status' or otherwise). The 
practical outcome of just this stance could significantly affect the topography of 
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school organisation and our capacity to achieve schools open to the creation of a 
socially cohesive society. 
Secondly, the focus of education must concern itself with fostering the 
attitudes and virtues needed to sustain the political framework and hold a critical 
attitude to current practices that claim to uphold this vision. Being overly 
concerned with enabling the possibilities and opportunities for widening primary 
relationships (by restructuring school organizations) without, at the same time, an 
equal concern with the development of the civic attitudes and virtues 
underpinning these relationships, may serve to undermine or weaken each 
resolution. My contention is that both may be required. A greater attention to 
particular pedagogical methodologies and how they interact with schooling 
arrangements is required. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to reiterate that no 
particular theory can provide a complete blueprint for either school structures or 
the pedagogy required to support said structures. Theory does not easily translate 
into policy, neither does policy automatically map onto classroom practice (Reich, 
2002). It cannot be assumed that theory can automatically provide answers to 
problems, yet without theory our chances are diminished of alighting on 
appropriate policy. What theory can do is to provide a framework within which we 
can consider the relevant issues and then rule out particular practices as either 
contrary to our ultimate aims and commitments. All planning and policy decisions 
are necessarily value-laden, educational planning perhaps more conspicuously so 
than other areas. To claim that all theories have normative dimensions is hardly 
radical, yet it does suggest our work as philosophers of education should be firmly 
involved in policy issues. 
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The task for the philosopher is to get a clearer view of the commonplace 
assumptions we use in our everyday thinking about the world and to assess the 
coherence of this way of thinking (Gilbert, 1991). Yet it has to be acknowledged 
that big ideas and sweeping narratives do not always neatly fit reality. Whilst 
philosophy, at the level of models and principles, cannot indicate one particular 
design of schooling nor the pedagogy practiced within, it can rule out possibilities 
that would undermine or be contrary to the end result desired. It can delineate the 
borders within which the discussion takes place by eliminating particular 
structures or pedagogies. 
In the next and final chapter, I reflect on this thesis as a whole and draw 
together its contributions and significance for philosophy of education and policy. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
The plans which are formed, the principles which man projects as guides 
of reconstructive action, are not dogmas. They are hypotheses... to be 
rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our 
present experience the guidance it requires. 
(Dewey, 1948, p96) 
I think there is a world market for maybe five computers.55 
(Thomas Watson: Chairman of IBM, 1943) 
The focus of this thesis has been a philosophical consideration of the 
educational implications for social cohesion given the internal diversity of the 
modern western liberal state, and the effect of globalisation on a previously 
territorial conception of the nation-state. The preceding chapters have clearly 
demonstrated that any theory of social cohesion is incomplete without a 
corresponding consideration of the model of belonging used. It should be noted 
that in a stable and self-perpetuating society, the models we adopt are informed 
by our commitments, values and aspirations for how we ought to live. As such, 
they can have deep effects on the way we organise our social lives and the 
organisations we create to fulfil this image. Given that education plays such a 
large role in enforcing and upholding the collective commitment to particular ways 
of life, the quintessentially metaphoric nature of how we envision these 
associational bonds and the ways in which we model those commitments can 
become urgent issues for educational policies. 
http://www.enterpriseirregulars.com/1881/i-think-there-i s-a-worl d-market-for-maybe-fi ve-
clouds/ [last accessed 19.11.2009] 
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It is currently a requirement in the UK that community cohesion must be a 
consideration within school settings.56  The lack of conceptual clarity in much of 
the discourse, including policy papers, combined with often confusing and 
contradictory strands of thought, has often made the drawing of practical 
implications difficult to achieve. Fresh insight into this perennial problem can be 
achieved by raising critical questions as to what it would mean in educational 
terms if we should take social cohesion seriously and explore its implications 
through the methodology of metaphor. 
To recap the argument. The bulk of this thesis has been an attempt to 
piece together a systematic account of some of the major political metaphors for 
social relationships and to assess and evaluate their contribution to 
understanding the tension between cohesion and diversity. I started by raising 
three main questions which formed the framework for this study: firstly, what 
would it mean to take social cohesion seriously? What sort of structures would 
best meet the desire for social cohesion and finally what pedagogical implications 
would this then have? 
In Chapter 2, I explored the first of the models for civic engagement, that of 
friendship. What sort of a society could be based on friendship as the binding 
attachment? I drew upon the Aristotelian origins of the concept to elucidate that 
personal friendship requires personal contact and time spent to create the deep 
affection between friends. As such, a literal understanding of friendship could not 
be a model for civic engagement. 
This then led into Chapter 3 in which I considered whether friendship could 
act at a metaphorical level to offer insight into civic relationships. However, even 
56 The Education and Inspections Act, 2006 actively promoted cohesion and OFSTED has been 
directed to consider and report on these duties since September 2008. 
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as a metaphor, it became clear that the virtues and attitudes of personal 
relationships offered little fresh insight not already found in other metaphors, and 
could sometimes be misleading. How personal friendships and attachments serve 
to bind small groupings together and the civic value of so doing, was not, 
however, an aim of this thesis. Despite growing attention to the topic, there is still 
much to unravel in the domain of friendship, both empirically and philosophically 
on how the role of on-line communities ties in with civic relationships. 
In Chapter 4, I considered the second of the major metaphors, that of 
market, and demonstrated that market relies on a different type of loyalty to that of 
the civic sphere, and thus had the potential to undermine our attachments in other 
areas. By reducing the relationship to one of utility, the metaphor of 'marketplace' 
was argued to be particularly ill-suited to dealing adequately with matters of 
citizenship and the public domain. 
In Chapter 5, I established the concept of fraternity as both distinct and 
philosophically interesting in its own right as an imaginative way to embody some 
of our most revered values. The exploration of two different conceptions of 
fraternity signalled that only a conception of fraternity rooted within democracy 
had the capacity to offer fresh insights into the problem of the civic relationship. 
The model of connectedness that I have advanced in this thesis emphasised the 
role of centring the civic relationship within a framework of democracy itself. 
Although throughout this thesis I have often used the phrase 'civic others', this 
phrase can itself be problematic. The very language used (others) serves to 
distance us from each other: it suggests that the default position is that some are 
not part of 'us'. Any theory dealing with the creation of a 'we' is automatically 
creating a 'they'; inclusion always carries with it the shadow of exclusion. Whilst a 
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small point, it illustrates how the language we use to model our attachments can 
position us prior to engaging with arguments about the models used. Yet it goes 
beyond this. Rooting our imaginings of our belonging within the family metaphor, 
serves to change the default position to include 'others' as part of 'us'. 
Part of my project in this thesis has been to argue that we need to pay 
proper attention to the vocabulary and models used for our civic attachments. 
Hence, in Chapter 6, I turned to the second and third of my three original 
questions, through a deeper examination of the use of the three models and 
metaphors for civic engagement examined in this thesis, and an indication of the 
commitments they unconsciously align us with. Without a consideration of the 
implicit attachments found within exemplars, no model can faithfully represent the 
values and commitments they need to carry. Yet any metaphor adopted for civic 
relationships within a liberal democratic framework must, itself, cohere with the 
demands of democracy. 
This led, in Chapter 7, to a fuller examination of the background 
connections and commitments of democratic fraternity and a consideration of how 
this might be realised in policy and practice. The contention that developing civic 
virtues and attitudes within schools whilst at the same time examining how best to 
reorder current school structures to encourage and nourish cooperative 
behaviours between schools strove to align our theories with our practices. The 
chapter concluded by cautioning that considerations of what can be achieved, all 
too often mediates the degree to which our most cherished beliefs are realized in 
practice. Despite this, it seems reasonable to suggest that both the schools-
within-schools as structures and Philosophy for Children as a pedagogy for 
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democratic values would both benefit from further empirical research and 
exploration with regard to the possible benefits for social cohesion. 
The focus of this thesis has been the location of civic relationships within a 
wider framework of accounts of belonging which draws on parallel arguments 
from the social sciences. Whilst it is undoubtedly chronological in format, with one 
chapter leading necessarily to another, an alternative reading suggests that it can 
also be viewed more holistically as five interwoven perspectives (as laid out in the 
first chapter). The first perspective examines three models for civic relationships 
within a democratic framework. This is then interwoven with a consideration of 
the use of metaphor in which questions are raised about its usage as 
methodology and as a subject for analysis. A third perspective is offered by a 
consideration of empirical work on social relationships within this area and a 
fourth by a reappraisal of fraternity within democracy as a model for civic 
connectedness. Finally, the fifth perspective highlights the practical implications 
for policy and pedagogy with respect to issues of social cohesion and school 
choice. 
The ideas espoused within this thesis, through their originality of content 
and method, contribute to and extend the boundaries of current knowledge in four 
distinct ways. Firstly, the thesis makes a contribution towards untangling some of 
the conceptual confusion underlying the models we have for civic connections. I 
have referred extensively to other disciplines, which inform major trends in 
education, from situating concepts historically, to considering the contributions of 
theories of social relationships, social capital, metaphors and imaginaries. I do 
not claim to have offered a comprehensive account of these traditions and 
concepts, but have used their insights to position the concept of democratic 
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fraternity as a modified metaphor within the wider academic framework of family 
metaphors, to demonstrate where it fits in the 'grand narrative'. 
Secondly, this project is significantly distinct from other approaches in that 
it suggests we should extend our understanding of the interplay between the 
models and metaphors we adopt for civic relationships, and the institutions we 
choose to teach and nurture the relevant attitudes, virtues and values. One thing 
to be noted is that metaphors are a vital resource for political reasoning. Whilst we 
may abandon particular models in the pursuit of a coherent integration between 
our values and social arrangements, we cannot abandon all. Until our policies 
take metaphors seriously and accommodate to their demands, they may be 
offering inappropriate guidance, sometimes even undermined by conflicting 
commitments. My research has clearly pointed to the importance of an 
understanding of metaphor in the ongoing debate on school policies about social 
cohesion given the light it throws on the unspoken assumptions embedded in 
particular models. It offers a new way to conceptualise the educational aspects of 
social cohesion by establishing the hidden assumptions and commitments 
inherent within such approaches and demonstrating how we are bound by such 
metaphors within a social and political context. 
Thirdly, the account of democratic fraternity that I have developed is both 
transformational and emancipatory in its ability to voice what it is to be connected 
to others within a modern liberal democracy. Democratic fraternity, by providing a 
framework to encompass seeming strangers as connected civically, proves itself 
to be theoretically equipped to deal with the contemporary problems of a modern 
society. Furthermore, the repositioning of the concept within its metaphoric origins 
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has clearly shown that the values and aspirations underpinning such a concept lie 
within liberal traditions. 
Fourthly, the significance of my thesis for social cohesion and school 
choice arguments is to cause us to consider the everyday metaphors, models and 
imaginaries we use in a new light, as having the capacity to radically challenge 
our current practices, and the potential to significantly affect how we structure our 
educational organisations and school systems. It differs in important respects 
from existing work in social sciences on social cohesion in adding a philosophical 
analysis to examine and challenge aspects of what we take for granted in our 
existing frameworks of reference. I believe this conceptualisation is an important 
contribution to the ongoing debate on how school organisation and the issues of 
civic relationships needed for social cohesion may feed into each other. It 
suggests a possible normative dimension to the models we choose. It seems 
incoherent to claim attachment to particular values and then not be willing to 
express these in any way in policy decisions. It seems equally incoherent to have 
particular policies in practice and then deny attachment to the values contained 
within them. 
I have used the term cohesion within its usual domain but I wish to suggest 
the concept may not denote any one particular condition that must be met, but 
may work more as an appraisal of a state of affairs. Critically, to say a society has 
social cohesion is evaluative rather than descriptive of particular practices. To 
some extent, this accounts for the slippery usage of the term within much of the 
literature, but it adds a secondary feature that is, for me, more interesting. It 
serves to place it within the concern of philosophy. If this proves correct, perhaps 
the study of social cohesion may belong in an 'ethics of social life'. 
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This thesis has by no means resolved the theoretical and practical tensions 
involved in balancing the commitments of individuals and those of society at large. 
Neither, I argue, should it. The tension is necessary: it is the conflicts between the 
two competing demands that 'keep us honest'. Theoretical stresses 
notwithstanding, I suggest our ideals of the good society, the metaphors used, are 
normatively important to motivate us and guide our policy making. 
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